No Escape: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Central and Eastern African Armed Conflicts

by

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Abstract: Poiché nel loro piccolo villaggio di Shabunda nella Repubblica democratica del Congo la violenza si andava intensificando, Sophie, con il marito e i loro quattro bambini abbandonarono la loro casa e cercarono rifugio nella foresta. Quando pensarono che la situazione fosse più sicura, tornarono, ma sfortunatamente non fu la loro salvezza. Circondati da un gruppo di ribelli Mai-Mai, che affermavano che suo marito fosse una “spia dei Tutsi” – dice Sophie – lo uccisero e fecero a pezzi il suo corpo di fronte a lei. “I Mai-Mai erano otto. Due di loro mi trattennero e gli altri mi stuprarono. Mi puntarono il coltello sugli occhi e dissero che se avessi gridato me li avrebbero cavati”. Lei e i bambini, uno dei quali molto piccolo, che stava ancora allattando, furono tenuti in schiavitù per più di un anno dai Mai-Mai (intervista con Sophie W., Shabunda, 22, ottobre 2001, in Human Rights Watch 2002).

Today, very violent armed conflicts are raging in a number of African countries, and women and girls are routinely and brutally raped in all of them. In Sophie’s Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the war is said to have “left the country in ruins, and Congolese women have been victims of rape on a scale never seen before” (Nolen 2005, p. 56). In the eastern province of South Kivu, a center of the fighting, over 100,000 women are believed to have been raped (“IRIN news” 2006). Honorata Kizende, a former director of a technical institute for girls in the DRC, estimates that in her community, 90% of the women are rape survivors (Women for Women International 2005). Further, as Amnesty International (2004b) has pointed out, an enormous number of the victims have been raped more than once, at different times and places, and by different forces.

In this article, I examine war rape through the lens of the armed conflicts in the DRC and other central and eastern African countries. The gender violence that occurs in all armed conflicts is not necessarily more brutal or pervasive in these African countries than that in other countries, and the level and intensity of war rape varies among the African conflict countries themselves. However, the African armed conflicts and the countries in which they occur do provide provocative

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examples of conditions in today’s wars that provoke and exacerbate war-related violence against women.

In many ways, Sophie’s experience reflects the plight of civilians in armed conflicts throughout the world today. Fighting occurs everywhere in the war zone, and combatants sweep across lands, often employing a “scorched earth” tactic in which villages are pillaged and burned to the ground, leaving civilians homeless and terrified. Situated in South Kivu, an area of vast mineral wealth, Sophie’s town of Shabunda was threatened by an escalation in combat in the early part of 1999; close to half of the population of the town of 32,000 fled the violence, mainly into the forest. Of these displaced persons, according to one NGO, 60%-80% were in households headed by women (Norwegian Refugee Council 2001).

Civilian men are regularly recruited as combatants, detained by authorities, or murdered by armed combatants, leaving the women to fend for themselves and their children. Without the protection of family or community, the women are at high risk of war-related sexual assault. They are raped in their homes, at their work sites, along roadsides, in fields, at checkpoints as they flee the violence, and then in the very settlements where they seek refuge. In some conflicts, scores of women and young girls are abducted and sexually enslaved in combatant encampments. Rapes are perpetrated by some members of all war-related groups – government soldiers and militia, rebel groups, police and other security officers, peacekeeping troops, roving bandits, and other civilian men, including refugees. That is, sexual violence in armed conflict is both site- and perpetrator group-ubiquitous. In the worst conflicts and in virtually all conflicts in the worst of times, women in the war zones have no safety spaces at all – that is there is simply no way for them to escape the violence around and upon them.

The sample and data sources

My sample for this research includes eight of the eleven African countries listed by one major source (Project Ploughshares 2009) as having active armed conflicts in 2009: Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan & Uganda, along with one recently-ended, Rwanda1. All nine countries are located in the central and eastern region of sub-Saharan Africa, and all have contiguous borders with at least one other country with an active civil war. The countries have a number of commonalities related to the occurrence of armed civil conflict and pervasive war-related sexual violence.

Data for this analysis come from multiple studies and reports published by academic, governmental and non-governmental organizations on the armed

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1 The most recent listing by Project Ploughshares (2009) identifies 28 active conflicts in 24 countries and 30 recently-ended countries in 23 countries. Close to half of the 24 countries with active conflicts are in Africa, and of the 23 countries with recently-ended conflicts, 10 are in Africa. African countries outside of the sample region with current active conflicts are Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria; and with recently-ended conflicts are Angola, Congo, Eritrea, Egypt, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and South Africa.
conflicts in the sample countries, and on war-related sexual violence in them. Many of these works provide victims’ own accounts of the assaults they have survived or witnessed, and these testimonies offer the most vivid pictures of the brutality and viciousness at the heart of war rape.

**War rape prevalence**

Documenting the number of war-related sexual assaults is notoriously problematic. To begin, the unstable conditions in warring countries make it unlikely that resources for such data collection are adequate. In some of the most dangerous places, outside organizations have been denied access. And, in the most disordered and isolated areas, there may be no one to whom to report a rape, or if there is, it is highly unlikely that an arrest or prosecution will occur. But even where rapes have been documented, the understandable reluctance of survivors to come forward most likely leads to serious under-reports. In some communities, victims of rape are rejected and abandoned by family and community, and so silence seems like the better option. As she recalls the day the Somali Transitional Government forces broke into her family’s house, for example, then-15-year-old Malka says that she “tried to escape but...I was hit from behind with the butt of a gun...I last remember a man holding my neck as another climbed on top of my body. I woke up to yelling and the cries of my mother...I was not taken to [a] hospital because of the fear of stigma by my mother”. (Ali 2008, p. 1). In Burundi, Odette was raped at gun point by a government soldier when she left her IDP camp. When interviewed by Amnesty International (2004a), she said, “I don’t know where my husband is. He left me and our children when he heard I’d been raped. I’m still in the camp – I have no where to go” (p. 14). Odette added that, even if she could return, she thought her husband would not let her live in the house which she had shared with him. Additionally, threats of reprisals for reporting are common and all too often carried out. Many victims are immediately silenced, as they are raped and then murdered. In spite of serious undercounts, however, there is enough evidence to conclude that rape is widespread and constant in all the conflict countries in the current sample.

As indicated earlier, one of the highest war rape counts comes from perhaps the most violent active conflict today, that in the DRC. But others have also yielded extraordinary numbers. Estimates of the number of rape victims during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s range from 250,000 (Degni-Segui 1996) to as high as 500,000 (Médecins sans Frontières 2004). Although data have been somewhat harder to come by in Sudan, in its 2007 report Human Rights Watch (2007) stated that “tens of thousands” of women had been raped or murdered in the current conflict. Rape has clearly been used as a “weapon of war” in Darfur (Amnesty International, 2004c). One Darfur NGO documented close to 10,000 cases of rape, a figure which on-the-ground workers believe to represent half or fewer of the actual number (Médecins sans Frontières 2004). In another report, Amnesty International (2004a) noted that in some places in Burundi, rape was so common that many women sought safety by sleeping at night in public buildings rather than
in their homes. Between 2004 and 2006, some 4,000 Burundian women told staff at one NGO that they had been raped (Amnesty International 2007b). And, in a 1990s study in one district in Uganda, 70% of the women reported having been raped by combatants (Isis-WICCE, 1998). Thousands of women and girls have been abducted and sexually enslaved in Uganda, primarily by the notoriously vicious rebel group, the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Most of these kidnapped girls were forced to become the “wives” of their abductors, and many bore their children (World Vision 2007). Abductions have also been a problem during the ongoing conflict in Chad, where reports indicate that some 7,000-10,000 women and children have been enslaved for soldiering, domestic labor and sex (United Nations 2007). In addition, according to an Amnesty International report in the mid-1990s (1996), women in Chad have routinely been raped by security forces during questioning or detention.

In the two lower-intensity conflicts in Kenya and Ethiopia, war rape is also a serious problem. During the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, a single facility, the Gender Violence Recovery Center at Nairobi Women’s Hospital, treated over 650 cases of rape (Anyangu-Amu 2010). But Kenya has a war-related rape problem of far greater magnitude in its sprawling northern refugee camps, housing primarily Sudanese and Somali refugees. In the late 1990s, according to UNHCR spokesperson Emmanuel Nyabera, an average of 100 rapes a day were being perpetrated in and outside of Kakuma camp in the northwest and Dadaab camp in the northeast (Firewood 2002). Many of the victims were raped when they left the camp in search of firewood and other household natural resources. The conflict in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, according to interviewees, rape by military personnel “regularly occurs” while women are being questioned, transported to, or held in military camps, and often involves “senior military officials” (Human Rights Watch 2008, p. 58; Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 2010). Here also, women are often raped near military bases as they collect firewood, water and other supplies (Human Rights Watch 2008).

**Extreme rape**

Sexual assaults in these African armed conflicts, like those in today’s conflicts in all regions, are often particularly brutal, constituting what I have described elsewhere (Farr 2009) as “extreme rape”, that is:

regularized, war-normative acts of sexual violence accompanied by intentional serious harm, including physical injury, physical and psychological torture, and sometimes murder. Perpetrators intentionally harm their victims by means such as penetration with foreign objects and substances, amputations, stabbings and cuttings..., multiple and sequential rapings..., and multiple rapists (gang-raping). Perpetrators commit psychological torture by a number of methods, but among the most brutal are raping and then sometimes kidnapping or killing family members in front of other family members, or forcing family members to rape family members (p. 6).

One gynaecologist in the DRC told Human Rights Watch (2002) that he had never seen atrocities such as those perpetrated on the rape victims he had treated during the war, including cases in which women’s clitoris and vaginal labia had
been cut off with razor blades. Describing the unspeakable rape and murder of her 20-year-old daughter, one woman from the DRC told interviewers that in May of 2001 four heavily-armed men – Hutu combatants – broke into their home and tied her husband to a pole. Then, they “went after my daughter, and I knew they would rape her. But she resisted and said she would rather die than have relations with them. They cut off her left breast and put it in her hand. They said, ‘Are you still resisting us?’” After mutilating her further, the men killed her (Ibid., p. 55). Unable to protect his wife and family in Darfur, a Sudanese man testified: “In February 2004, I abandoned my house because of the conflict. I met six Arabs [Janjaweed] in the bush. I wanted to take my spear and defend my family, but they threatened me with a weapon and I had to stop. The six men raped my daughter... in front of me, my wife and young children” (Amnesty International 2005, p.15).

**Background**

How are we to understand the pervasive extreme raping of civilian women during wartime? First, rape has always been used as a purposive “weapon of war” – to weaken and humiliate enemies by violating their women, and to terrorize and de-stabilize civilian communities in war zones. Its strategical intent notwithstanding, the raping that occurs during wars also has an opportunistic side, that is, its likelihood is enhanced by conditions of war that increase women’s vulnerability and men’s access to them. Whether, as in some wars, highly strategical (systematic and ordered, overseen, or at least encouraged by military authorities) or, as in other wars, more opportunistic – the raping of women and girls in the course of armed conflict reflects a universal understanding of women as male property or commodity, and sexual access to women (including by force) as male entitlement. Rooted in inherently-patriarchal militaries that foster masculine aggression, with raping and looting as normative rewards for victorious soldiering, and legitimated by patriarchal civilian structures that oppress and de-value women, the omnipresence of war-related violence against women seems intransigent. Although war rape is now designated in international law as both a crime against humanity and a war crime, it occurs in warring countries regularly and with virtual impunity.

Today’s largely intrastate wars occur in developing and transitional countries with considerable economic deprivation and political instability. Similar to most

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2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court “recognizes rape and other forms of sexual violence by combatants in the conduct of armed conflict as war crimes. When rape and sexual violence are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, they are considered crimes against humanity, and in some cases may constitute and element of genocide” (Amnesty International 2007, Stop violence against women. Rape as a tool of war: A fact sheet, http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/rapeinwartime.html). Relative to the level of war-related rape, however, there have been very few arrests or prosecutions.

3 Transitional countries are “2nd world” [global north] countries in flux from a collapsed, state-controlled political economy to a market economy; transitional countries with active or recently-ended (often secessionist) armed conflicts include former Yugoslavian republics or areas (Bosnia, Kosovo) and former Soviet republics or areas (Chechnya, Tajikistan).
countries in the world, women’s socio-economic status tends to be much lower than that of men; in countries undergoing conflict, women’s position tends to deteriorate further and more quickly than that of men. The African countries in the current sample are among the poorest and most politically fragile in the world, and the civil wars in them are among the most violent. These conditions further exacerbate women’s risk of violence.

Table 1 provides data on the nine African countries, listed in an order suggestive of the magnitude of their problems. The DRC is at the top of the hardship list. Its human development rank is the worst and GDP per capita the very lowest of the nine countries. Women’s literacy rate in the DRC is almost 27% below that of men’s, and their parliamentary representation is only 8%. In the three separate time periods, it has the highest possible rating on state fragility (a measure that takes into consideration both state legitimacy and state effectiveness). Somalia is close behind, although with fewer major war episodes in its history. Note that six of the nine countries are among the fifteen (out of 182) countries with the lowest human development ranks. And, even the highest per capita GDP (Sudan) is only around $2,000. That is, in some ways, identifying these countries as “worst off-best off is meaningless; compared with other countries in the world, their economic and political problems are all extremely challenging.

Another situation related to women’s risk of violence in these conflict countries is that their wars are typically very violent in general. As shown in Table 1, in the 12-year war in Rwanda, some 750,000 people were killed, the great majority during the 1994 genocide in the country. With the exception of Chad, and the lower-intensity wars in Ethiopia and Kenya, all countries show battle death numbers of 300,000 or more. And, these numbers are only of those killed as a direct result of warfare; that is, they do not count all who have died from war-related problems such as starvation and illness (often referred to as indirect deaths). Countless numbers of people remain injured or ill and without adequate medical resources.

The last columns in Table 1 provide the years of the current conflict in each country, along with Project Ploughshare’s (2009) description of the primary conflict issue. In most countries, the conflict is over state control (sometimes combined with state failure). In Kenya and Ethiopia, the primary issue has to do with state failure alone, and in the Southern conflict in Sudan, state formation has been the primary goal.

War conditions that exacerbate war rape: DRC-the “perfect storm”

As noted earlier, the rape problem in the DRC conflict is monumental – both in terms of prevalence and brutality. Perpetrators come from all of the many combatant groups, as well as from the civilian population affected by this very
violent war. While the number of battle or direct deaths in the conflict is very high, the number of total deaths is staggering – an estimated 5.4 million (Project Ploughshares 2009). Moreover, as noted, the country is very poor and politically unstable. In fact, the armed conflict in the DRC is akin to the perfect storm for violence against women and girls. The conflict is notable for its massive uprooting of the population – some two million are internally displaced (IDPs), over 360,000 refugees have fled to neighboring countries, and close to 200,000 refugees from elsewhere are residing in the DRC, mainly near its borders with other, also warring countries. Most heavily affected is the eastern part of the country, particularly the provinces of North and South Kivu. Inter-ethnic clashes over land and other resources have been a problem in this area for some time, but with the sudden arrival in 1994-95 of over a million Rwandan Hutu refugees – a number of whom were part of the Interhamwe militia who led the Rwandan genocide – tensions began to escalate. A re-vitalized Hutu Interhamwe force began to terrorize local populations and organized cross-border combat incursions into Rwanda. In fact, the war zone has expanded due to invasions by and spill over wars from several neighboring countries. Among the most ruthless of the emergent combatant groups has been the National Congress for the Defence of the Congolese People (CNDP), led by Tutsi rebel Laurent Nkunda. In the north, cross-border incursions by the very violent Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), have included abuses against DRC civilians. Members of both these groups are notorious for their brutal attacks on women and girls (Lifton 2003).

Nowhere is the combatant enmity and confusion greater than in the DRC: no less than a dozen combatant groups and numerous factions and sub-factions of them fight in one of the most deadly conflicts in the world. Fighting occurs virtually everywhere in the several lawless war zones in the eastern part of the country. Complicating matters further, of the nine countries bordering the DRC, three are engaged in active conflicts, three have just recently formally ended armed conflicts but some fighting continues, and all are or have been in some way involved in the DRC’s war. In spite of an arms embargo effected by the U.N., weapons continue to flow into the DRC, and armed banditry is on the rise. According to Amnesty International (2005), sources of arms sales to various groups in the DRC include companies from South Africa, Israel, the U.S., Britain, and several eastern European countries. Amnesty International (2004b) also notes that “tens of thousands” of women and girls, and some men, are raped at gunpoint by weapons-bearers.

Finally, the DRC conflict revolves around competition for a rich supply of minerals, including diamonds, gold, cobalt and coltan (an important component for computer technology). In a country marked by extreme poverty, control of such resources is an important advantage, and both government and rebel forces use mineral revenues to finance their armed fighting (Project Ploughshares 2009). Neighboring countries and international economic entities also participate in efforts to turn the extraction of this very poor country’s valuable natural resources to their own benefit. No fewer than 85 foreign companies, including ones from the U.S., Britain, Belgium & Germany, have a stake in DRC’s gem and mineral assets. In eastern DRC, Tutsi-backed Rwandan groups have had considerable control over
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diamond mines and other mineral resources. Uganda and Burundi were both cited in a 2003 United Nations report for their use of slave labor to loot coltan from the DRC (Taras-Ganguly 2010, p. 220).

In addition to its economic and political instabilities and the high war-related death rates, the “storm” in the DRC, then, highlights several conflict dimensions that shape the patterns of and intensify the level of war rape in the African conflict countries in the current sample: population displacement; ethnic politicization and discrimination; multiple combatant and other war-related groups; and external involvement and border issues.

**Population displacement**

Where countries have high levels of fleeing refugees and IDPs, women are particularly vulnerable. Also, in countries with large IDP settlements, and in those hosting large number of refugees in border areas marked by ongoing fighting, women are at risk both in and around refugee camps. Table 2 offers data on IDP and refugee populations in the nine African countries. At the top of the list for displacement problems are Sudan and the DRC – Sudan with close to five million IDPs and the DRC with some two million IDPs (and even higher numbers at their estimated peak). Each country also has several hundred thousand refugees elsewhere and is host to around 200,000 refugees. Somalia also has a big IDP and refugee problem, but hosts only a small number of refugees. Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda did have noteworthy IDP populations, but as these conflicts have wound down some, resettlement has gradually taken hold. Kenya, on the other hand, has had an upswing in IDPs in recent years, and, along with Chad, hosts particularly large numbers of refugees. Kenya and Sudan are on the World Refugee Survey’s (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009) list of the ten worst places for refugees. As indicated in the last column of Table 2, most of the countries have very high ratings on the indicator which reads: “Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries” (The Fund for Peace 2009).

Refugee and IDP settlements in war-torn countries typically lack security, leaving a “captive supply” of potential victims without protection against a multitude of potential attackers. As one woman resident of an IDP camp in northern Uganda told interviewers, “Rape is rampant here...[one] woman was recently harassed by two men who held her legs wide open and used a flashlight to observe her private parts and allowed another man to rape her while they observed” (United Nations Children’s Fund 2004, p. 20). A particularly dangerous but daily necessity for many women living in refugee and IDP camps is their trek outside of camp to collect firewood, retrieve water and forage for other survival materials. Médecins sans Frontières has reported that over 80% of rapes they have encountered among displaced women in Darfur occur when the women are searching for firewood or thatch outside of the camps (Larose 2005). In July of
2006, for example, 20 women left Kalma IDP camp in southern Darfur to look for firewood and were attacked by some 25 armed militia, some of whom wore army uniforms. During the attack, the men “beat the women with the butt of their guns and flogged them before raping seventeen [of them]” (World Organisation Against Torture 2006, p. 1). One young refugee girl living in Mille camp in Chad said that wherever they go outside of camp they are in danger from local men and that where they go to get firewood, men “tell us, ‘line up one by one’. They say, ‘stand two by two’, and they take us off like that and then they rape us. Sometimes this happens until evening. We have told the police, but the police say, ‘stay in your tent and nothing will happen’” (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005, p. 2). But, of course, this gathering of supplies, a gendered assignation, is essential to the survival of encamped women and their families.

**Ethnic politicization and discrimination**

Clearly, in each of the African countries, ethnic or ethnic-religious clashes have been a factor in the current armed conflict. Indeed, Gurr (2003) place all nine countries squarely in their “ethnic wars” model of state failure, a model in which the major predictors of the wars were “discrimination” and a “history of upheaval”. Ethnic wars, they found, occur in poor, weak and isolated states, where particular minority groups are at a disadvantage.

Women and girls known or believed to be affiliated with particular ethnic groups are at especially high risk of war rape and other brutal assaults. The most obvious case is the Rwandan genocide, where Tutsi and moderate Hutu women and girls were the targeted victims of massive rape and murder. With the conflict spilling over from Rwanda into the DRC, Congolese women identified as Tutsi or Hutu have become routinely singled out for rape by combat groups claiming to seek revenge for either one or the other of these two groups. In Darfur, many of the black African rape victims have reported that the perpetrators have used racial slurs and said that “they wanted to make more Arab babies”. There is, however, disagreement as to whether rape in Darfur is part of an ethnic cleansing campaign initiated by the ethnic groups (Polgreen 2005, p. A19). In fact, Taras and Ganguly (2010) strongly argue that many so-called ethnic conflicts in central Africa are best understood as state-manipulated and involve “the ethnicization of a struggle for power and a battle over natural resources” (p. 213). They argue that Sudanese President al-Bashir, for instance, has promoted ethnic and racial polarization, and that to this end his administration has armed and encouraged a “loose alliance” of nomadic Arabs, now known as the Janjaweed militia, to fight against the Zurga (a negative term for “blacks”) rebels. Although there has been a history of disputes over land, water and grazing rights in the area between Arab nomadic herders and the black African farmers, these were not specifically ethnic disputes before the al-Bashir racialization of them. There is some evidence that al-Bashir’s real interest is in the defeat of black African rebels (who have been demanding their rights after years of neglect and discrimination), and in gaining control of the area to pave the way for substantial oilfield investment by the Chinese and other international
players (Ibid.). Relatedly, the Hutu-Tutsi disjunction which has plagued not only Rwanda, but the Burundi and DRC conflicts as well, has a “divide-and-rule” colonial history.

As Taras and Ganguly note, upon its takeover of Rwanda, Belgium favored the 15% minority Tutsi population, discriminating against the majority Hutus. Although Hutus and Tutsis (with extensive intermarriage and a shared language and culture) were not easily distinguishable, in 1931 the Belgian colonial administration issued ethnic identity cards, requiring the local population to identify as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. This manipulated alignment continues today, as various rebel groups – in the DRC, for example – take sides as or at least in concert with Hutus or Tutsis, regardless of their actual ethnicity or ideology. The manipulation of ethnicity for political gain by governments and rebel leaders alike may be lost on combatant recruits; however, the latter may themselves use ethnicity to legitimize their rape and abuse of local women. In some instances, a generalized or specific enemy affiliation serves as the legitimation. Abducted from their village in one raid by the Janjaweed, for example, a group of nine African Darfurian women were taken to the militia’s camp, where they endured multiple rapes and abuse – that is, the “rapes continued through the day. Kicked and beaten, their hands bound behind their backs, the women lay side by side on the dusty earth”...beneath the “scorching sun”. “The victims were told they were they were the rebels’ whores and daughters...and when they cried out, they were threatened with death” (Dealey 2005, p. 43).

In Ethiopia, a male detainee at a military base told Human Rights Watch how the soldiers raped women detainees, while accusing them of supporting the insurgent Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): “Most of the women were being raped...I saw with my own eyes two girls being raped at different times...One girl was raped by five soldiers” (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Whether through an ethnic or simply enemy connection, here again the violence is taken out on the bodies of civilian women as appendages or affiliates of male combatants. Politicized group hatred further devastates the lives of women who become pregnant as a result of war rape, as they and their babies are often rejected and abandoned. Abducted by Hutu militia during the Rwandan genocide, Claudin and her sister were held in their camp, where they were repeatedly raped and forced to do domestic chores for their captors. When they eventually escaped, Claudin was pregnant. She sought refuge at her uncle’s house, but, she said “My uncle didn’t welcome me in the house. He asked me who was responsible for my pregnancy. I said if I am pregnant, then it must be the militias, and I said that many of them had raped me. He said I shouldn’t enter into his house carrying a baby of Hutus” (Amnesty International Magazine 2007, p. 20).

**Multiple combatant and other war-related groups**

Conflicts in all the sample African countries involve numerous combatant groups that often split into factions and sub-factions whose alliances are sometimes murky (see Project Ploughshares, 2009, for a full list of parties to the conflict in
In Darfur, for example, rebels fighting the al-Bashir government and its Janjaweed militia include the now joined Sudanese Liberation Movement/Sudanese Liberation Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) (which claims to have broken of from JEM, and which, according to JEM, is now aligned with the government), and the National Redemption Front (NRF) (another breakaway faction). There is also the Popular Forces Army (PFA), made up mainly of Arab tribes and based in Chad, as well as several other tribal factions, some of whose alliances are not ethnically-based.

In the Chad conflict, the Resistance Nationale, an alliance of the three principal groups (the UFDD, the RFC and the UFDD-F), is the largest insurgent force, but also in combat is the Rally of Democratic Forces (FaFD), an (ethnic) Zaghawa group; the Rally for Democracy and Change (RLD), which operates from Sudan; and the United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD), composed of eight different factions, and also thought to be aligned with the Sudanese government.

Not only do the proliferation of and changes in armed groups and their alliances provide for a sizeable supply of potential perpetrators, but the situation makes the recognition of assailants difficult, thus lessening their accountability. In their report on sexual violence in the DRC, Human Rights Watch (2002) noted that women and girls found it difficult to identify their rapists and “said only that their assailants were ‘armed men in uniform’ or, simply, ‘men in uniform’”. Also, the uniforms of rebels, militia and government soldiers were often similar, “making it difficult to be sure which military unit or armed group is represented by the assailant” (p. 25). Moreover, combatants may change affiliations over the course of time, sometimes swayed by a more lucrative offer from another group. Adding to the problem is the use in these wars of private militia, who often have little accountability to any reliable authority. Indeed, lack of accountability to and control by group leaders, shown to be a factor in the commission of opportunistic war rape (see Butler et al., 2007, for an example of this “principal agents” argument), is commonplace in these African armed conflicts.

As law and order break down in war-ravaged areas, banditry by armed gangs increases. Adele N, spent several months in a hospital after being gang-raped by nine robbers who broke into her house in Burundi: “When they arrived, I was eating with the children. They asked for money. I said I didn’t have any. They began to beat me on my face and back with a gun. They said I was lying, that they knew I’d sold things at the market.... All nine of them raped me” (Amnesty International 2004a, p. 14). In one study of Somali women in Kenyan refugee camps, Human Rights Watch (1997) found that most rape victims were attacked by armed bandits at night or when they went to the outskirts to herd goats or collect firewood. In most cases the women and girls were “gang-raped at gunpoint, some by as many as seven men at a time. In the vast majority of cases, they were also robbed, severely beaten, knifed or shot” (p. 2). Women who had undergone FGM often had their vaginal openings torn or cut by these rapists.

Fear of reprisal by one or another of the various armed groups becomes even more ominous in an environment of lawlessness. Fifteen-year-old Jeanette T. told how soldiers whom she believed to be Tutsi broke into her family’s house in
eastern DRC, cut her father, and raped and abducted her mother and three sisters. After several days, her mother returned home, but her sisters remained missing. Her father, said Jeanette, wanted to go find them, but the “neighbors said that if he did that the Tutsi would exterminate the whole family” (Human Rights Watch 2002, p. 36).

**External involvement and border issues**

Obtrusive external involvement in the African conflict countries has a long history. Colonial policies that politicized ethnicity, promoted local clashes over survival resources, set up artificial boundaries, and discriminated against women still plague much of sub-Saharan Africa. On the heels of independence for most of the countries in the region, competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for new allies caused further disruption; in pursuit of their own self-interests in Africa, the “cold war” competitors from the global north propped up corrupt (or corruptible) African regimes.

Additionally, lasting peace in any one of the African countries in the sample depends on peace in one or more of its neighbors (Taras-Ganguly 2010). Back and forth fighting between Rwanda and the DRC has reduced stability in each of these countries. Also, as fighting recently renewed in eastern Congo, Burundi became more unstable. From Chad, various rebel groups conduct attacks on Sudan, and there are reported alliances between some Chadian rebel groups and the Sudanese Janjaweed militia.

As combatants move from country to country, women and girls in border areas are vulnerable – either as targeted or opportunistic victims. Along the borders of warring countries, rebel groups, government soldiers and government-backed militia set up encampments, and in these same border areas, thousands upon thousands of civilians fleeing the violence in their home towns settle in refugee or IDP camps. In a number of cases, combatants have infiltrated refugee camps, hiding among the residents, planning future attacks and regularly assaulting resident women and girls. Sprawling refugee camps along the Chad/Sudan border, and along Kenya’s borders with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have severe rape problems in and around them. An estimated 230,000 refugee from Darfur, for example, live in 12 camps along the Chad-Sudan border. Both Chadian and Sudanese rebels have infiltrated the camps, carrying out various human rights abuses, including sexual attacks, abductions and the illegal recruitment of child soldiers (Kahn 2008; Amnesty International 2007a). The usually weaponless refugees are no match for the armed combatants.

Perhaps most detrimental regarding the current availability of weapons in the African conflict countries were the many years of U.S. and Russia cold war-arming of these nations, resulting in immense stockpiles of small arms and light weapons that are used today, traded and re-traded, by both military and civilian forces in and across sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the weapons that are newly purchased by the conflict countries in the eastern and southern parts of Africa come from outside the region (Wezeman 2009). Excluding sales to South Africa, the largest suppliers of
conventional arms to the region in recent years have been Russia and China, but many other countries, including France, Iran, Israel, Italy, Romania, Ukraine and the U.S. (Ibid.), are also suppliers. In the last few years, Rwanda has received ammunition and small arms from stockpiles in Albania and Bosnia, and the DRC and Uganda have also been supplied arms by countries in Eastern Europe. According to William Church, director of the London-based Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies, direct arms sales to east African countries increased from less than $1 million in 2003 to over $25 million in 2006 (Shabazz 2007). In recent years, close to 40% of U.S. weapons sales to Africa have gone to countries in east Africa and the Horn of Africa (Ibid.).

Weapons also come from neighbors. Certain Kenyan ethnic groups are reportedly supplied arms by Somalia and Ethiopia, and Chad and Eritrea are believed to serve as a weapons source for the rebel SLM/A in Sudan. DRC rebels receive weapons from Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Southern Sudanese insurgency benefitted from military assistance from Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda (see, for additional arms sources, Project Ploughshares 2009).

The accessibility of small arms and light weapons contributes enormously to war violence against women. Rapes are frequently accompanied by serious, weapon-inflicted injuries, including bayonet or gunshot wounds to the victim’s genitals. From South Kivu, 25-year-old Corrine tells, for example, how a soldier forced her at gunpoint into some bushes where he raped her and then shot her, virtually destroying her uterus and bladder (Amnesty International 2005, p. 15). In Ethiopia in 2007, one woman described how army soldiers took her and another ten women to a nearby forest, where they “started beating us with thick sticks. They beat me very hard until I fell to the ground. This time while lying on the ground I was raped. I don’t know how many men raped me. Other women were raped too... After the rape, some of the soldiers continued beating women, others were strangled with a rope but didn’t die. In our group, we were shot. I was hit behind the left shoulder with a bullet” (Human Rights Watch 2008, p. 61). Although levels and patterns of sexual violence vary across the warring countries, women’s stories of weapon-secured rape, rape with a weapon, and injury or murder with a weapon come from everywhere.

**Rape patterns in the sample African countries**

Table 3 provides a look at by-country variations through a bifurcated categorization of war rape patterns, along with level of sexual violence ratings, in the nine African countries (adapted from my earlier [Farr 2009, p. 14] categorization of war rape patterns in 27 cross-regional conflict countries). Highlighted are the issues discussed above – population displacement, ethnic polarization, multiple combatant groups, and external involvement and border issues – as they are relevant to the conflict within each pattern category. In this African rendition of patterns, war rape in five countries has been categorized as “field-centered: opportunistic: universal perpetrators”, a pattern in which rape is perpetrated with relatively equal frequency at all sites in the war field (homes, town
spaces, roadsides, checkpoints, etc.), appears overall to be more opportunistic than strategic (ordered or encouraged as a war strategy), and is perpetrated on a wide scale by members of all combat-related groupings (government soldiers and police, militias, insurgents, bandits). In the DRC, Uganda, Chad and Burundi, members of violent rebel groups have not only engaged in routine sexual violence, but have also recruited large numbers of children for soldiering and domestic and sexual enslavement (United Nations 2009b).

In the other four countries, the pattern is described as “state-led/targeted: government/militia heavy perpetrators”, a pattern in which rape seems to be more systematic and targeted at particular ethnic or putative enemy-affiliated groups, and where the most frequent perpetrators appear to be government soldiers and government-backed militia. Also, many of the rapes take place during questioning or detention in a military facility.

Note that these patterns reveal prominent rather than absolute or mutually exclusive traits; that is, in both patterns, there is targeted as well as opportunistic rape, and in both patterns, some members of all war-related groups are perpetrators. Also, some conflict countries are harder to place than others; Chad, for instance, seems to fit marginally into the field-centered/opportunistic pattern, as there are also numerous recent reports of security force and police rapes perpetrated during the questioning and detention of civilians (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 2006). Security forces have also been implicated in many cases of sexual violence against female detainees during and following the post-election violence in Kenya (Human Rights Watch 2010); however, armed civilian gangs have been responsible for myriad rapes of displaced women and girls – from the Rift Valley to Nairobi (“IRIN news” 2008). Finally, as new groups enter the combatant arena and other shifts in war conditions occur, the sexual violence patterns can change.

As also shown in Table 3, two measures have been employed in an effort to quantify the level of war rape in a particular country. Butler’s (2007) sexual violence incidence rating of 163 countries (42 of which are on Project Ploughshares’ list of current or recently-ended armed conflicts) was based on references to sexual violence, by government security forces only, referred to in the 2003 country human rights reports put out by Amnesty International and by the U.S. Department of State. My measure uses the multiple prevalence sources summarized in the Appendix of my article on extreme war rape (Farr 2009) to rate each of the African countries on level of sexual violence perpetrated by any war-related group over the course of the country’s current or recently-ended (Rwanda) conflict. Note that by both measures, all countries in the sample have a war rape problem, ranging from the scales’ high of “4” to a mid-level “2”.

As have Butler et al., I also warn that the lower ratings could reflect a deficit of reports or studies.

Butler et al.’s (Appendix, Table A1, 2007, p. 682) rating guide (relevant to the 9 sample countries, i.e., ratings from “4” to “2”) reads: 4=rape, sexual assault, or sexual abuse by security forces was used as a tool of war or a systematic weapon of war; 3=numerous reports of rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces, which were routine, common, widespread, systematic, reported repeatedly; or rape, sexual assault, and the threat of rape against detainees and their family members was used as a tool of torture to extract information, to intimidate and to punish; 2=reports, there continued to be
In spite of the less-than-perfect quantifications, it is notable that countries with the highest sexual violence ratings have many of the harshest war-related conditions. The DRC and Burundi, for example, are among the poorest countries and have extremely fragile states, high war death rates, and at the height of their conflict had sizeable IDP populations (for Burundi, especially in relation to its small – 7.5 million – population). Sudan and Rwanda are somewhat better off economically, but they are highly fragile politically, and their wars also have very high death rates. Sudan has an enormous IDP problem, and at the height of the Rwandan conflict, the IDP problem was also substantial, again especially relative to its population of 9.0 million.

While all of the sample countries have war conditions that exacerbate war rape, the two rape patterns do show some differences. Compared to the countries with the state-led rape pattern, countries with the field-centered pattern lack (or lacked at the height of their armed conflicts) strong heads of state and stand-out, state-run militias. Countries with the state-led pattern, on the other hand, tend to have aggressive regimes with powerful regime-backed militias. Perhaps most obvious is Sudan with the brutal counter-insurgency led by the al-Bashir administration and backed up by the Janjaweed militia. In Rwanda, the prime minister at the (1994) height of the war is believed to have been a major player in orchestrating and encouraging Hutu militia to massacre Tutsis, and in Ethiopia the current administration has led an aggressive counter-insurgency against several rebel groups, most notably today in the southern Ogaden region of the country. Somalia is the exception in this category; yet, here, very aggressive and powerful “warlord” and Islamic opposition groups have led violent and temporarily successful campaigns to install themselves as the country’s head. Also, the Transitional Federal Government has itself been at the forefront of campaigns against allegedly anti-government civilians.

In the state-led category, conflicts have also involved more severe and singular ethnic or religious fractures (although often politicized ones, as described earlier): in Sudan, the Arab-dominated oppression of and counter-insurgencies against African blacks in both the south and Darfur; in Rwanda, the Hutu massacre of Tutsis and alleged Tutsi affiliates; in Somalia, the Islamic opposition groups (backed by Eritrea) vs. the more religiously moderate transitional government (backed by Ethiopia); and in Ethiopia, the current fracture between the Somali population in the Ogaden region and the Ethiopian government. While ethnic

reports, or some reports of rape, sexual assault or sexual abuse by security forces, which occurred sometimes, or remained a problem. Minimum criteria for Farr’s “4” to “2” rating were: 4=multiple reports referring to widespread, regular or systematic raping, as well as at least 3 studies from different sources finding thousands of rapes (at least 1 study), at least/about 40% women raped in one area, or at least hundreds of rapes in one area or victims treated in one facility; 3=multiple reports referring to widespread, regular raping and at least 3 studies from different sources finding hundreds of rapes (at least 1 study), at least/about 25% women raped in one area, or at least 100 rapes in one area or victims treated in one facility; 2=at least 3 different reports from different sources referring to widespread, regular raping, including 1 study documenting at least 100 rapes, at least/about 10% women raped in one area, or at least 50 victims treated in one facility. For each of the countries with Farr ratings of “4”, there were more than a dozen reports that dealt with widespread, regular raping.
issues certainly have been a factor in the conflicts in the field-centered countries, the ethnic clashes (with the exception of Burundi) have been more diverse, with the lines of division often less than clear. The DRC is, as usual, a prime example.

Finally, most of the governments of the state-led countries have been actively involved in one or another neighbor’s wars: the al-Bashir administration has, most agree, funded and supported rebel groups in Chad and provided them with bases in Darfur (Project Ploughshares 2009); Rwanda has had a heavy combat presence in eastern DRC; and the Ethiopian government has deployed troops in Somalia. With the exception of Uganda’s (and to a much lesser extent, Burundi’s) involvement in the DRC conflict (see Taras-Ganguly 2010), governments of the field-centered countries have not been principal players in their neighbors’ conflicts.

As I have suggested, the rape patterns and categorization here outlined are meant to serve as an initial framework for further examination of relationships between war rape and particular kinds of or conditions in today’s armed civil conflicts.

**Organizing resistance: challenges and directions**

The violence against women in the complex armed conflicts occurring in some central and eastern African countries today has no easy resolution. Efforts to ameliorate the suffering of women in these war zones are thwarted not only by the ongoing conflicts themselves, but also by state actions and inactions. First, war-ravaged states are unlikely to commit much of their limited resource base to programs addressing violence against women in war zones. Second, any material support the state might offer often goes only to government-allied groups. In fact, according to some (Fallon 2008; Tripp 2000), progressive women in sub-Saharan Africa’s evolving democracies were initially held back by established large women’s organizations, which often had been started under autocratic regimes, and whose existence was tied to their ongoing support of ruling parties.

In certain cases, states have openly suppressed progressive women’s organizations, as well as human rights and aid groups that deal with women’s issues. In March of 2009, for example, Sudan’s President al-Bashir expelled thirteen international aid agencies from Darfur and dissolved three local relief groups; with these moves, the network of gender-based violence services that had developed over the past five years was essentially destroyed (Hamilton 2009). Similarly, in the town of Balad Hawa in Somalia, the fundamentalist al Shabaab rebel group shut down three grassroots women’s organizations: the Halgan Businesswomen’s Organisation, the Sed Huro Human Rights Organisation, and Farhan Women for Peace. Maalim Daaud Mohmed, the al Shabaab “chairman” of the town, told the newsgroup Reuters that his group took “this step after we recognised that women need to stay in their homes and take care of their children... Islam does not allow women to go to offices” (Ahmed 2009, p. 1). And, in 2009, the Charities and Societies Proclamation law went into effect in Ethiopia – the law bans any NGO that receives more than 10% of its funding from outside the country from participating in work in Ethiopia that promotes human and democratic rights,
equality, and the efficiency of law enforcement and justice. The law casts a pall over the work of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) (partnered internationally with the NGO Equality Now); EWLA has worked tirelessly against bride abduction and in support of rape law reform, and the group also operates shelters for women survivors of violence (The International Center for Not-for-profit Law 2010; Women’s Action 2008).

On the other hand, in the absence of a strong or interested state, civil society has thrived in some of the sample countries. In the eastern DRC, for example, Human Rights Watch (2002) has reported that the “scale and horror of sexual violence” has “prompted churches, human rights associations, women’s rights groups” and others to set up clinics where rape survivors can get medical and other assistance (p. 76). USAID (2009) has also found civil group enthusiasm in the DRC, where they have funded local NGOs and community-based organizations working with rape survivors. USAID reports that most of the local organizations are run by survivors themselves, who “determine the community’s needs, design activities and then monitor and evaluate progress” (p. 1). Since 2002, this work has aided over 20,000 survivors and their families. Another DRC effort, the Congolese Women’s Campaign Against Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (www.rdcviolencesexuelle.org), was organized by women’s associations in eastern DRC to step up the fight against sexual violence in the region. The Campaign is run by seventeen DRC women’s association members, with support from two Canadian organizations: the Coalition for Women’s Rights in Conflict Situations, and Rights and Democracy. Local-international partnerships are important for local women’s groups in the impoverished, war-torn African countries, as the mobilization of resources relies on locating and linking up with more affluent donors and providers.

Networking and coalition building within the country also enhance program efforts. Some alliances have broad mandates in working to improve the lives of women in their country, but commonly include sexual violence among their various actions and programs. The Rwanda Women’s Network (RWN - www.rwandawomennetworking.org), for instance, is a national NGO committed to the socio-economic welfare of women in Rwanda. The RWN has included among its activities assistance to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in recognition of the horrendous effects of the 1994 genocide on Rwandan women and children. Other alliances have more specific foci. For example, a network of Sudanese women’s organizations, referring to itself as “the section 149 alliance”, formed in 2009 to fight for the reform of section 149 of north Sudan’s Penal Code, whereby a failed rape prosecution puts women victims at risk of being charged with adultery. Under this Penal Code, the punishment for adultery by a single woman is 100 lashes; for married woman the punishment is death by stoning (Women’s groups in Sudan 2009). Formed in 2003, the South Kivu Women’s Media Association (AFEM), an association of 40 female media professionals, creates and disseminates programs focused on women, with outreach to rural woman in this war-affected region of the DRC. Says group representative Juilenne Baseke, “We try to get raped women to speak up and put them on the airwaves so that the entire community understands that rape is a crime” (Soguel 2008, p. 2).
Over the past two years, the Association has pinpointed focal sites in South Kivu for identifying and collecting testimony from survivors of sexual violence. In its first year alone, in its partnership with more than 200 radio clubs in South Kivu, the Association reached 10,000 rural women. The Federation of Women Lawyers of Kenya (FIDA) also documents sexual and gender-based violence in Kenya, in particular that emanating from the post-election violence in 2007-2008 and other recent conflicts. In the words of Patricia Nyaundi, FIDA’s executive director, “By documenting these testimonies [of rape survivors], we are taking this opportunity to give women who underwent horrific ordeals a chance to tell their stories, to create historical evidence that this actually happened” (Anyangu-Amu 2010, p. 1).

An even older such effort, operating in Uganda since 1994, Hope After Rape (HAR) is a voluntary women’s NGO formed to help prevent and raise awareness about sexual and gender-based violence, and to provide support for survivors. Part of HAR’s mission is to “initiate communication and collaboration with other organisations involved in work with survivors of sexual abuse and other forms of gender-based violence” (see http://www.har.org). That is, an NGO formed by women’s networking is itself engaging in further networking to raise awareness and take action against war-related sexual violence.

International aid organizations, often working in concert with local associations, have been valuable providers of direct services to war rape survivors in conflict areas. One of the most active of these is Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), which has treated sexual violence survivors’ injuries and provided them with testing and treatment for HIV-AIDS and other STDs in all of the African conflict countries in the sample. Following a major round of fighting in Bunia in eastern DRC, MSF set up a clinic in the city, where between July and December of 2003, it treated over 8,000 patients. Almost half of the women treated said they had been gang-raped, and over half had been raped more than one time; over a quarter of the survivors had been abducted and held anywhere from two days to several months (Médecins sans Frontières 2004). And, in response to an increased need in 2003, MSF opened a health clinic for women survivors of sexual violence in Bujumbura in Burundi, and in the same year, started programs for rape survivors in two separate hospitals in Burundi (Ibid.).

International-local affiliations have also contributed to women’s peace building efforts in the African conflict countries. In Ethiopia, for instance, Oxfam has partnered with the local Research Center for Civic and Human Rights Education to help set up women’s peace councils in areas of heavy conflict. One such council is located in the Moyale area of southern Ethiopia, near the border with Kenya. Here the women’s council helps mediate indigenous conflicts over land and other resources, and provides forums for women to talk about the effects of war on them and their families. Noting the importance of including local men in their awareness sessions, Mako Daleach, a Moyale peace council member says, “When we try to sensitize them on the importance of peace, there is no man who opposes us”. (McCabe 2007, p. 2).

Of considerable relevance for women’s local peace building work has been the United Nations’ Resolution 1325 (2000) affirming “the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls”, and urging member states to
“ensure” increased representation and participation of women at all levels in conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. In the war-torn African countries, as elsewhere, women are often excluded from formal decision making on and the drawing up of peace accords (Jama, 2010; International Crisis Group 2006), but with Resolution 1325, some of this is changing.

According to the International Crisis Group (2006), in Sudan, the DRC and Uganda, an “array of women’s organisations and women leaders are doing remarkable work” in the area of peacebuilding, albeit often “under difficult circumstances” (p. 1). Of the three countries, the Crisis Group continues, Uganda has the most advanced and best organized women’s peace movement. Its success is due in great part to its reliance on local autonomy as well as networking across regions to share experiences, conflict resolution training practices, and strategies for trauma counseling for war violence survivors. Women in Somalia have also been successful in mobilizing financial resources for peace meetings and in engaging civil society in peace work (Jama 2010). As Jama notes, the Somalian women’s work goes even further by recognizing the importance of “sustainable livelihoods, education, truth and reconciliation” to the peace process (p. 2).

In Rwanda, an awareness of the importance of women’s contributions to post-conflict nation re-building has translated into their greater formal political power. Following the 1994 genocide, which left the country with a 70% female population, President Paul Kagame appointed a number of women to high-level government positions and supported a new Constitution that reserved a minimum of 30% of parliamentary seats for women. Today, Rwanda is the only country in the world in which women hold a national legislative majority (55% in the lower house) (Kristof and Dunn 2009).

The violence in today’s wars in African and other countries surrounds women and girls, who are both targeted victims and caught in the cross-fire. The overwhelming majority are civilians, and when fighting intensifies, they are attacked in their homes and villages, and eventually in flight. As refugees or internally displaced persons, their risk of victimization is also high; that is, there really is no escape. War rape may be justified by perpetrators as an act against an enemy (that is, an enemy’s women), or as part of the spoils of war. But the fact is that women are sexually attacked because they are women, and, during war, they are more vulnerable than ever. In the lawlessness of war, members of the multiple combatant groups, armed with guns and other weapons, rape women and girls with impunity. But, as the above examples indicate, women in the central and eastern African countries in this sample have joined together in resistance and are working to protect one another, provide support to survivors, and introduce policies to reduce the violence. The hope is that war rape and the efforts to confront it will receive greater international attention and action, and that fledgling local-international partnerships will lead to sustainable practices for women’s security in these worst of situations.
### Table 1
Selected Conflict and Country Conditions in War-ravaged Neighboring Central and Eastern African Countries, by Human Development Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HD rank (n=182)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (PPP US$)</th>
<th>Female literacy (men's)</th>
<th>% women in parliament seats</th>
<th>State fragility (6 to 1 scale) 08 01 05</th>
<th>Major war episodes (1960-2004)</th>
<th>Current conflict: state issue</th>
<th>Direct deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CongoDR:</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 6 67</td>
<td>1990- control/failure</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia:</td>
<td>175.5e</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>6 6 66</td>
<td>3 1988- control/failure</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad:</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 6 66</td>
<td>3 1965- control/failure</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi:</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5 6 6</td>
<td>7 1988- control</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia:</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5 6 6</td>
<td>7 2002- failure</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda:</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6 6 6</td>
<td>7 1990-2002 control</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda:</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>-16.3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5 6 6</td>
<td>6 1987- control</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan:</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>-19.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6 6 6</td>
<td>5 2003- Def control/failure</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya:</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4 5 4</td>
<td>5 1991- failure</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Somalia is not rated in the Human Development Report, but its rank is here estimated based on data on Somalia from other sources on the HD Index indicators.

* While Project Ploughshares (the source for this column) lists wars as active in all of the sample countries but Rwanda, the Center for Systemic Peace lists wars in Burundi and Uganda as currently inactive, but active within last 5 years, and war in Rwanda as currently inactive, active within last 20 years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Pop. (in millions)</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>Peak IDPs</th>
<th>Refugees elsewhere</th>
<th>Refugees hosts</th>
<th>Failed State rating: Massive Ref/IDP emergencies (10-1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>(36.2)</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>6,700,000</td>
<td>341,000[397,013]</td>
<td>233,900</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>(57.5)</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>361,400[367,995]</td>
<td>192,700</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>(9.8)</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>531,200[559,153]</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>(30.7)</td>
<td>437,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>15,500[7,548 ]</td>
<td>155,400</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>276,600[281,592]</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>(34.3)</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>0[9,688]</td>
<td>377,400</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>(77.4)</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>61,900[63,862]</td>
<td>201,700</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>(9.0)</td>
<td>dk</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>59,000[72,530]</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>(8.9)</td>
<td>168,467</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>76,700[55,105]</td>
<td>330,500</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* On list of 10 worst places for refugees, World Refugee Survey 2009 (Kenya), 2008 (Kenya, Sudan).
### Table 3
**War Rape Patterns in Sub-Saharan Central and Eastern African Countries, by Level of Sexual Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field-centered/opportunistic: universal perpetrators</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence*</th>
<th>Notable war-relevant issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>by security forces (Butler et al.)</td>
<td>security forces (Farr)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4-0 scale]</td>
<td>[4-1 scale]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC: 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDPs/refs/ref host; multiple, cross-border combatant groups/neighborhood; neighbor wars; border issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi: 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDPs/refs; ethnic dyad fracture; neighborhood; neighbor wars; border issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda: 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDPs; ethnic issues; aggressive rebel group; neighbor’s wars/in neighbor’s war; border issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad: **</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>refs host; ethnic issues; multiple combatant groups; neighbor wars; border issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: 2</td>
<td>3***</td>
<td>refs host; ethnic clashes; multiple combatants/neighborhood; neighbor wars; border issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State-led/targeted: government/militia heavy perpetrators</th>
<th>Level of sexual violence*</th>
<th>Notable war-relevant issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan: 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDPs/refs/ref host; ethno-religious fracture; multiple, cross-border combatant groups/neighborhood; neighbor wars; in neighbor’s war; border issues; state militia military power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda: 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IDPs; ethnic dyad fracture; multiple cross-border combatant groups; neighbor wars/in neighbor’s war; border issues; state military power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia: 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IDPs/refs; ethno-religious fracture; multiple, cross-border combatant groups; neighbor wars/in neighbor’s war; border issues; “warlord” military power</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia: 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>refs host; ethno-religious fracture; cross-border combatants; neighbor wars/in neighbor’s war; border issues; state military power</td>
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</tbody>
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* Butler et al.’s (2007) sexual violence incidence rating on a 5-point scale from a high of 4 to a low of 0 was based on the frequency with which sexual assaults by security forces (including military, government-supported militia, police and prison guards) were mentioned in 2003 country reports on human rights put out by Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State. Farr’s ratings on a 4-point scale were based on accumulated (over the course of the war) reports by various researchers and organizations (see Farr, 2009) documenting wartime sexual assault by any war-related group.

** Chad’s fit in this category is marginal. Some reports emphasize that rape was perpetrated by all combatant groups, while others emphasize rape by security forces.

***The only country with inter-rater disagreement (on the Farr scale) was Kenya. Of the 4 raters, 3 assigned Kenya a “3” (one of whom indicated that the choice between “3” and “2” was difficult), and 1 assigned Kenya a “2.” Farr’s rating for Kenya (as well as its categorical placement) is, consistent with the others, based on reports of sexual violence in the course of its armed conflict. Important to note, however, is the additional massive raping of largely Somali and Sudanese women in and around the refugee camps located in northwestern and northeastern Kenya. Perpetrators include Kenyan, Somali and Sudanese combatants and civilians.
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