D

Dipartimento

S

Scienze

E

Economiche

Working Paper

Department
of Economics

Ca' Foscari University of
Venice

Barbara Buchner
Carlo Carraro

US, China and the
economics of climate
negotiations

US, China and the economics of climate negotiations

Barbara Buchner

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Carlo Carraro

University of Venice, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, CEPR, CESifo and CEPS

Abstract

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B-US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.

Keywords

Agreements, Climate, Incentives, Negotiations, Policy

JEL Codes

C72, H23, Q25, Q28

Address for correspondence:

Carlo Carraro
Department of Economics
Ca' Foscari University of Venice
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe
30121 Venezia - Italy
Phone: (+39) 041 2349166
Fax: (+39) 041 2349176
e-mail: ccarraro@unive.it

This Working Paper (o QD se in inglese) is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca' Foscari University of Venice. Opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series (o QD se in inglese) is designed to divulge preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character

1. Introduction

In March 2001, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, announced that the US would not comply with the Kyoto Protocol in its present form. Following this decision, some countries reacted by strengthening their commitment to continue the Kyoto process, whereas other countries decided to fall in line with the US strategy (Cf. Section 2 below). In particular, Russia has adopted an ambiguous position, thus raising a lot of uncertainty as to whether and when the Kyoto Protocol will come effectively into force. This uncertainty has recently been resolved, because Russia decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on February 16, 2005.

However, the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol is still limited. Indeed, the US withdrawal and the new provisions included in the Marrakech agreement imply a strong decline in the global amount of GHG emissions to be actually abated. In addition, the US defection induces a decreasing demand for emission permits and consequently a decline in the permit price, namely the cost of a unit of carbon, thus reducing the incentives to abate emissions and invest in climate friendly technologies in all countries.¹

Accordingly, several doubts have emerged on the appropriateness and sense of pursuing the Kyoto Protocol in its actual form. In particular, the low environmental impact of this policy framework has induced new debates about the need to increase the number of participating countries. On the one

¹ Some studies highlight feedback effects that can mitigate the fall in the permit price. Strategic market behaviours can indeed modify the size of the expected changes in prices and abatement costs. In particular, these changes may be smaller than initially suggested. For example, banking and monopolistic behaviour in the permit market (Manne and Richels 2001; Den Elzen and de Moor 2001; Böhringer and Löschel 2001) or strategic R&D behaviour (Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo 2002) may limit the demand shift and reduce the decline of the permit price consequent to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.

hand, the need to involve the US again in international efforts to combat climate change is emphasised, while on the other hand the role and future participation of developing countries has assumed greater importance.

Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to analyse how climate negotiations may evolve after the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol and beyond 2012. The crucial question is what participation incentives are provided by the present constellation of Kyoto countries, and consequently what the future participation decisions of some key players might be. The most important of these key players is certainly the US. It is widely recognised that US participation would strongly increase the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, this paper addresses the following questions: Are there economic incentives for the US to move back to the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. does the US benefit from joining the current climate regime? What kind of climate regime could provide adequate economic incentives for the US to join a climate coalition? In order to reduce abatement costs, does the US find it profitable to sign a bilateral deal with a low abatement cost country?

Some of these questions have been explored in other recent papers. For example, in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) the effectiveness of an “issue linkage” strategy that links climate and R&D cooperation is assessed, whereas Buchner and Carraro (2004) analyse whether a climate regime entirely based on technological cooperation, without binding emission targets, could be supported by the US. In both papers, the main goal is to identify policy strategies that increase US participation incentives.

This paper also addresses the issue of participation incentives, but from a different viewpoint. Here the goal is to ascertain whether China, by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and eventually participating in an international emissions trading market, can provide the US with adequate economic

incentives to join a climate coalition and to achieve the emission targets defined in Kyoto. Let us stress that the focus of this paper is on economic incentives. There are several other political, cultural, environmental factors that could influence the US decision to adopt a more effective climate policy. These will not be addressed in this paper. However, the economic dimension of climate negotiations is a very important one (and it has often been considered as the most important one in the US). Therefore, this paper can provide a relevant, albeit partial, contribution to the analysis of the future evolution of international climate policy.²

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, it analyses the evolution which led to the current climate regime, by identifying the economic and political forces that are responsible for the present situation. Then, in Section 3, some game theory results on the economic incentives that China's participation in a climate agreement provides for the US to modify its decision on the Kyoto Protocol are discussed. The presence of China in a climate coalition could indeed reduce GHG abatement costs in a way that could make the Kyoto Protocol the most economically attractive climate strategy for the US. Therefore, this paper shows costs and benefits of China's decision to cooperate with the Annex B_{US} countries (all Annex B countries less the US and Australia) in controlling GHG emissions. In addition, the paper provides a quantitative game theory analysis of US participation incentives, both in the case of a single coalition in which the Annex B_{US} countries, China and the US participate, and in the case of a bilateral deal between China and the US (a two country coalition) which could be complementary to the Kyoto coalition. A final section summarises our conclusions.

² For a discussion of the political factors behind the role played by China and the US in climate policy negotiations see Zhang (2004).

2. Policy evolution after the Marrakech negotiations. A short overview

The political deal reached in Marrakech at the Seventh Conference of Parties (COP-7) has legally confirmed the existence of a “tri-polar climate change regime” (Egenhofer and Legge 2001), where the first group of cooperating countries consists of the industrialised countries less the US and Australia, the second one consists of the developing countries, while the last one is formed by the United States of America and Australia.

Within the other two major groups, some sub-groups can be identified. In particular, the group of industrialised countries can be divided into: (i) the European Union, including ‘its near abroad’; (ii) Russia; and (iii) the Umbrella Group, which after COP-7 still included Japan, Canada and New Zealand. After the US defection and given the EU commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, the Umbrella group countries and Russia achieved notable bargaining power in climate negotiations. As a consequence of the increased stringency of the 55% provision of Art. 25 of the Kyoto Protocol – and after the ratification of the EU, Japan and Canada – Russia has become the key player. Moreover, Russia also plays a special role in the prospective permit market, because of the amount of emission allowances (‘hot air’) that Russia possesses, at least in the first commitment period.

Another group of countries includes the developing countries, which are not bound by any emission reduction targets in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, being however already involved in mitigation activities through various obligations, e.g., reporting requirements. Nevertheless, since they are going to represent the largest future CO₂ producers, their participation in a climate agreement is necessary for emission reductions to attain a level consistent with the stabilisation of GHG concentration below 600ppmv. In addition, this involvement is also requested by the US to

consider the possibility of re-joining the international climate change control coalition.³

In light of this complex situation, what happened after the Marrakech Conference of the Parties? One month after COP-7, in December 2001, the EU had already made some progress by compiling a “Draft Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder” (EC 2001). The European Union announced the ratification of the treaty on May 31st, 2002. Moreover, within the context of COP-8 in New Delhi, the EU clearly stated that Kyoto must be considered as ‘the only show in town’, urging other countries to participate and criticising again the US for their refusal to ratify Kyoto (The Hindu, Oct. 24th 2002). The approval of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in October 2003 further confirms the commitment of the European Union⁴.

In Japan, the decision process towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol met with a number of contradictory signals. In January 2002, The Japan Times reported that Japan was planning to ratify the Kyoto Protocol early in 2002 (The Japan Times, Jan. 21st 2002).⁵ Despite these early promising signs, the ratification was postponed several times due to internal problems, first to March 2002 and then to late Spring 2002. Widely divergent views held by two government ministries over climate change control strategies –

³ The lack of participation by developing countries has been one of the main US criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol and was re-stated by the US Senate when voting against the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

⁴ The EU ETS covers about 45 percent of the total EU 25 GHG emissions, accounting for more than 12,000 fixed sources, and will start in 2005. This will create the world’s largest ever market of emissions rights. In addition, the so-called “Linking Directive” has entered into force. This enables firms to use credits from CDM and JI mechanisms in the EU ETS market.

⁵ Even if the ratification was postponed, on February 1st 2002 the government announced an anti-global warming bill in line with the Kyoto Protocol which would be implemented soon (Kyodo News, Feb. 1st 2002).

in particular over domestic measures to be taken to meet the emission targets – and uncertainties over the plans of other key players, e.g. Canada and Australia, were main reasons behind Japan's delayed ratification.⁶ Furthermore, although Japan did manage to achieve a number of concessions in Marrakech, business groups still were reluctant to support the Kyoto Protocol. They feared that the commitment to the Kyoto emission reduction targets could lead to a competitive disadvantage with respect to the US.⁷ However, despite these controversies, the Japanese Cabinet approved the Kyoto Protocol on June 4th, 2002.⁸

Russia has also had some difficulties in deciding on a clear position with regard to the Kyoto Protocol after the US withdrawal. The increase in its bargaining power has motivated Russia to further exploit its strong negotiating position. As the outcome of COP-7 demonstrated, the need to induce Russia to participate in the agreement translated into various concessions to Russia, e.g. less stringent targets or increased flexibility (e.g. increased sinks allowances). As a consequence, in March 2002, the Russian Energy Minister Igor Yusufov announced that Russia intends to ratify the Kyoto Protocol soon (RBC network, March 11th 2002). However, some weeks after this announcement, Russia emphasised that its ratification was far from guaranteed and would depend strongly on both the EU and Japan's

⁶ For more detailed information see for example (CO2e.com, Feb.13th 2002; Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 11th 2002; Christian Science Monitor, March 12th 2002; Japan Today News, Feb. 26th 2002 and Kyodo News, Feb. 21st 2002).

⁷ For more detailed information see for example (BBC, Jan, 3rd 2002; CO2e.com, Jan. 8th 2002; The Japan Times, Jan. 17th 2002; The Japan Times, Jan. 18th 2002).

⁸ Due to the strong links with the US economy, Japan is still particularly worried about the US plans on climate change control and there are signs that Japan plans to enhance its cooperation with the US on climate change control. Even before ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, Japan started preliminary talks with the US aimed at discussing how Japan and the US might cooperate to reduce GHG emissions (The Japan Times, Feb. 27th 2002; Japan Today News, Feb. 27th 2002). In early April 2002, government officials from Japan and the US agreed on 15 steps to prevent global warming (CO2e.com, April 5th 2002). Although Japan finally decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, its parallel initiatives with the US and its efforts to convince other countries of the advantages and necessity to participate in the Kyoto agreement demonstrate that Japan is still dubious and concerned about the present climate regime. See for example (Japan Today News, Jan. 19th 2002 and Japan Today News, Feb. 27th 2002; Japan Today News, June 4th 2002).

future strategies. Russian government officials said that Russia may delay ratification of the Kyoto Protocol until these countries give their official consent to buy carbon dioxide emission credits from Russia (Financial Times, March 22nd 2002; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 28th 2002). In addition, at a high level ministerial meeting in New Delhi during COP-8, Russia called upon all developed countries to comply, in particular those who are members of the UNFCCC, and also called on the need for the active future participation of the developing countries (The Hindu, Oct. 31st 2002).

Although never seriously threatening to formally defect, Russia clearly exploited its high bargaining power and continued to send contradictory signals with respect to its position on the Kyoto treaty. In particular, the Climate Change Conference, held in Moscow from September 29th to October 3rd, 2003, was tempered by announcements indicating that the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to come into force in the near future. President Putin's opening address explained that Russia's position had considerably changed during the last year. Putin said that Russia has not made a decision on whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and will not do so until it had finished studying the implications that ratification would have for the country, looking also at the benefits that could arise from global warming to a northern country like Russia (Cf. RFE/RL, Sept. 29th 2003). The insistence that more research is needed represented a further piece of Russia's strategic bargaining strategy, rather than indicating that it did not intend to ratify the Kyoto Protocol at all. The debate on the Kyoto Protocol was eventually closed when the EU linked Russia ratification to some concessions on Russia accession to the WTO (Cf. Buchner and Dall'Olio, 2004). This latter incentive, and the fact that Russia's industry and NGOs both were largely in favour of ratification⁹, induced the Duma and President Putin to ratify the

⁹ In particular, Russian industries see the potential benefits arising from joint projects where European countries invest in the introduction of cleaner technologies in Russian plants (see e.g. The International Herald Tribune, Oct. 28th 2003).

Kyoto Protocol on November 4, 2004. This decision opened the way to the coming into force of the Protocol on February 16, 2005.

An important step forward in the Kyoto process was achieved at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg from August 26th to September 4th, 2002¹⁰, where China announced it would ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Already in January 2002, China had expressed its favourable views on the Kyoto Protocol and surprised the world by calling it a “win-win deal for industrialised and poorer countries alike” and by pushing for an earliest possible enforcement of the treaty (Planet Ark, Jan. 18th 2002). This statement showed that China was getting serious not only about domestic environmental protection, but also about international cooperation to control climate change. China confirmed its willingness to participate in the Kyoto framework by approving the treaty on August 30th, 2002. Despite the lack of a reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions¹¹, Beijing's decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is generally considered as an important boost to the domestic and international fight against global warming (ABC Online, Sept. 3rd 2002).

After China, on September 2nd, 2002, Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced in Johannesburg that the Canadian Parliament would be asked to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by the end of 2002 (The Globe and Mail, Sept. 2nd 2002). Notwithstanding some strong criticisms on the Prime Minister's strategy by Canadian provincial governments (see, e.g., Toronto Star, Sept. 4th 2002), Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17th, 2002 (Toronto Star, Dec. 17th 2002).

¹⁰ For an overview on the key outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit see e.g., United Nations (2002).

¹¹ China has said it is open to exploring cooperation opportunities under the Kyoto agreement, in the short run and primarily with respect to financial and technical aid deals. Chinese officials emphasise that the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO₂ emissions, but is strictly opposing binding GHG reduction targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26th 2002).

During all the aforementioned discussions, the two main countries that refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the US and Australia, have been both nationally and internationally strongly criticised for “taking positions solely on the basis of national interests” (The Age, August 30th 2002). Subsequently, the US President George Bush was urged by a delegation of US congressmen to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, while the Australian Prime Minister John Howard softened his initial stance on Kyoto (ABC News, Sept. 4th 2002). Nonetheless, Australian Federal Environment Minister David Kemp then defended his country's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Sky News, Sept. 4th 2002). Both the US and Australia have justified their opposition to Kyoto by pointing at the lack of participation by the large developing countries above all.

This last remark is important, because no effective climate policy can be implemented without an active involvement of the US and Australia. Even though the Kyoto Protocol eventually came into force, its environmental effectiveness without the US and Australia is very low.¹² The US, the world's largest producer of GHG emissions, not only remains outside the Kyoto framework, but has also announced a weak alternative climate change policy. As a consequence, three issues need to be explored: (i) What are the economic incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto coalition or to form another parallel coalition cooperating on GHG emission reduction? (ii) What strategy can Japan, Russia and the EU try to implement in order to induce the US to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? (iii) Can climate cooperation better be achieved outside the Kyoto framework ?

¹² Several simulations suggest that the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol would be low even with the US and Australia (Cf. Böhringer, 2003). The problem is that the Kyoto Protocol sets weak emissions limits that are unlikely to reduce global warming. However, the participation of the US is still crucial, both because the US is the largest world GHG emitter and because without US participation it is very difficult to start a negotiation on abatement targets for the developing countries.

This paper addresses the first question, by looking at the economic incentives for the US to participate in future climate regimes.¹³ In particular, the analysis presented in the next sections will be centred on the role of China and on the new economic incentives that China's participation in an international permit market may provide to the other countries.

3. An applied game-theoretic analysis of the role played by China in possible future climate regimes

The first climate regime that we plan to analyse using the FEEM-RICE model¹⁴ is the one in which the European Union, Japan, the Former Soviet Union (the so called Annex B-US countries) and China cooperate to reduce GHG emissions.¹⁵ This is not to claim that a climate regime with Annex B-US countries and China is the most likely scenario. We simply aim to quantify the benefits that China's participation in a cooperative effort to control GHG emissions could provide to the Annex B-US countries. Therefore, as a first step, we analyse gains and losses that would result from the formation of a climate coalition formed by the European Union, Japan, Russia and China. To achieve this goal, we quantify changes in welfare, emissions, abatement costs and R&D investments induced by the formation of this coalition. These changes are computed with respect to the values of the above variables in the present Annex B-US regime, namely a coalition formed by the EU, FSU and Japan, which we thus consider as our benchmark, or business-as-usual scenario. In this benchmark scenario, which follows the coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU, FSU and Japan meet their Kyoto targets in the first commitment period and

¹³ As stated in the Introduction, the second question is partly answered in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002), whereas the third question is addressed in Buchner and Carraro (2004).

¹⁴ Cf. Nordhaus and Yang (1996). Our version of RICE has been proposed in Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2003). A short description of the FEEM-RICE model is in the Appendix.

¹⁵ Given the geographical disaggregation of the FEEM-RICE model, it is not possible to account for the presence of Canada in the coalition. Moreover, Russia cannot be distinguished from the other countries of the Former Soviet Union.

beyond (see below), whereas the other countries set their abatement levels unilaterally.¹⁶

As stated above, our main goal is to assess whether the presence of China in the coalition provides sufficient economic incentives for the US to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we analyse whether China's adoption of quantitative emission limits provides new incentives for the US to cooperate within the Kyoto cap-and-trade framework. After China's decision, GHG abatement costs may indeed become much lower and may therefore make the Kyoto Protocol the economically most attractive climate strategy, even for the US.

To address the above issue, we need to consider a second scenario in which a coalition formed by the US, EU, FSU, Japan and China adopts policies to reduce GHG emissions. Again, changes of welfare, emissions, abatement costs and R&D investments induced by the formation of this coalition are going to be quantified using the FEEM-RICE model. This makes it possible to compare the net benefits of a large coalition in which the US participates, with the net benefits gained if the US is out, but China is in. However, the US may decide to participate in the international effort to control GHG emissions not by joining the Annex B_{US} coalition, but by forming another parallel coalition with China. Therefore, we will compute the economic consequences of this third scenario and compare its strengths and weaknesses with those of the other two scenarios.

As shown in the Appendix, the FEEM-RICE model is a version of Nordhaus' RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) in which endogenous and induced technical change are represented. In this version, technical change plays a twofold role: on the one hand, via increasing returns to scale, it yields endogenous growth; on the other hand, by affecting the

¹⁶ Therefore, in our BAU, the US and other countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol may reduce emissions, although in a non cooperative manner.

emission/output ratio, it accounts for the adoption of cleaner and energy-saving technologies.¹⁷ In addition, international technological spillovers are accounted for.

In the FEEM-RICE model, six countries/regions (US, EU, Japan (JPN), Former Soviet Union (FSU), China (CHN) and rest of the world (ROW)) optimally set the intertemporal values of four strategic variables: investments, R&D expenditure, abatement effort and net demand for emission permits.¹⁸ When no coalition forms, each country/region maximises its own individual welfare given the other countries' strategy. When coalitions form, countries belonging to the same coalition maximise their joint welfare. Given the interdependency of countries' decisions, the equilibrium values of the policy variables are obtained by solving a dynamic open-loop Nash game between the six countries/regions.

Three important assumptions qualify our results. First, it is assumed that all countries/regions which adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement meet the Kyoto constraints from 2010 onward.¹⁹ We therefore adopt the so-called 'Kyoto forever' hypothesis (see, for example, Manne and Richels 1999 and many others). As a consequence, our reference to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement is partly imprecise because, for the sake of brevity, we will sometimes call 'Kyoto Protocol' or 'Kyoto/Bonn agreement' a 'Kyoto

¹⁷ The FEEM-RICE model has already been used in Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnovo and Galeotti (2001), Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002), Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2002), Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) and in Buchner and Carraro (2004). A brief description is contained in the Appendix.

¹⁸ Notice that, in all climate regimes, abatement is a strategic variable, which is optimally set at its welfare maximising level by countries both inside and outside the coalition. Coalition members adopting the emission targets decided in Kyoto may decide to reduce emissions below the target.

¹⁹ The use of the 'Kyoto forever' hypothesis may be seen as a strong assumption. However, the CO₂ concentration levels implicit in this assumption (if RICE is a good description of the world) coincide with those in the A1B scenario (IPCC 2001) which can be considered the "median" scenario among those currently proposed. We thus use the "Kyoto-forever" hypothesis not because it represents a realistic scenario, but as a benchmark with respect to which policy alternatives can be compared.

forever’ scenario. In another paper, Buchner and Carraro (2003b) we test the robustness of the results with respect to changes in the assumption about future commitments.

Second, it is assumed that all countries adopt cost-effective environmental policies. In particular, cost-effective market mechanisms (e.g. emission trading) are chosen over ‘command-and-control’ measures in order to guarantee the efficient implementation of environmental targets. Please note that our analysis focuses only on CO₂. There are other man-made greenhouse gases and the Kyoto Protocol takes some of them into account. Moreover, both the Bonn agreement and the subsequent Marrakech deal emphasise the role of sinks in meeting the Kyoto targets. However, in the FEEM-RICE model only CO₂ emissions are accounted for.

Third, when China belongs to a climate coalition, it is assumed that it adopts quantitative emission limits. However, China’s emission targets over time are assumed to coincide with its business-as-usual emission levels, which take into account unilateral emission reductions that may be decided by China.²⁰ This implies that when China enters a coalition and decides to cooperate on GHG emission abatement, it becomes a net supplier of permits.

Our analysis focuses on changes in the main economic variables (welfare, as measured by discounted future consumption levels, R&D expenditure, global CO₂ emissions and abatement costs, for which an indicator is the equilibrium price in the permit market²¹) with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario in which the Annex B-_{US} coalition forms. Results shown below must be interpreted as an application of a game-theory model designed to

²⁰ This scenario is often assumed in the literature on climate policy (see for example Criqui and Philibert 2003).

²¹ As we have said, a permit market is assumed to be implemented by all coalitions and even by singletons (domestically). Therefore, in our competitive setting, the price of permits is equivalent to an emission tax.

identify incentive mechanisms and the economic factors behind them, rather than to provide realistic figures on the outcomes of future policy scenarios.

3.1 A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan and China

Let us start by examining the economic consequences of the formation of a climate coalition in which four countries/regions – EU, FSU, JPN and CHN – cooperate to reduce GHG emissions. An emission trading market is implemented and all cooperating countries are allowed to trade in this market without restrictions.²² The coalition formed by the EU, FSU, Japan and China plays a dynamic open loop Nash game with the other world regions. The equilibrium of the game determines the values of welfare changes that will be used to assess a country's incentive to participate in a given coalition.

Figure 1 shows the impacts on welfare, emissions and R&D investments of the climate coalition formed by the EU, FSU, Japan and China. When these countries cooperate to reduce GHG emissions, the permit price is obviously lower than in the case of the Annex B-_{US} coalition. The estimated change of the permit price is -78.6%. The reason for this massive decline of the permit price is China's participation in the permit market, which implies an increase in the supply of emission permits. The large boost to the supply side of the emission market is taken to be an expected result since, under our assumptions on future commitments, China can sell permits whenever its emissions are below the business-as-usual levels.²³

²² This assumption is not consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, in which China is allowed to participate only in CDM projects. However, our analysis is a counterfactual analysis, designed to assess what would happen if China could be involved in the emission permit market.

²³ In another paper, we test the robustness of equilibrium outcomes to changes in the scenarios defining abatement targets in the second commitment period and beyond. See Buchner and Carraro (2003b).

Thanks to this reduction in the permit price, the EU and Japan can achieve their own emission targets at a lower cost than in the case of the Annex B. US coalition. Hence, the two countries reduce their total abatement costs.

Figure 1: The role of China in the coalition with Japan, EU and FSU.

T

However, this new low-cost opportunity to comply with the Kyoto targets induces both the EU and Japan to invest less in R&D. Environmental-friendly technologies and cheap abatement possibilities thereby confirm themselves as possible substitutes (as already shown in Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti, 2002). Both the EU and Japan reduce their R&D expenditures with respect to the “Kyoto forever” case (see Figure 1 again). As a consequence of the lower abatement costs and the reduced expenditure in R&D, both countries increase their total welfare.²⁴

²⁴ Let us stress that the cost reduction and welfare increase for the EU and Japan is computed with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario and not with respect to the BAU scenario. Therefore, we do not claim that the EU and Japan gain by adopting a climate policy. They gain when China enters the coalition with respect to the case in which China is out and cooperation takes place only between the EU, Japan and Russia. By contrast, if we compare welfare for coalition members in the coalition the EU, Japan and Russia (without US and China) with respect to the BAU welfare, then the EU and Japan suffer a loss (the amount of the loss depends on the amount of “hot air” sold in the market). Therefore, climate policy as defined by a “Kyoto forever” scenario may be costly for the EU and Japan.

Russia suffers a high welfare loss from China's participation in a climate regime. The main reason is the lower price in the permit market induced by China's supply of permits. In addition, the presence in the market of a second large permit supplier clearly lessens the bargaining power of Russia, which previously controlled the permit market. By giving up its monopoly position, Russia reduces its profits from selling permits.

When cooperating on emission reduction, China obviously loses out in comparison with the alternative case in which China free-rides on the other countries' emission reductions. However, at the same time, China would profit from a large emission trading market. The net result of these two effects is a small welfare loss. This small loss could easily be compensated for by the existence of ancillary benefits, both environmental and economic, which are not yet accounted for by our model. A particular characteristic of the new situation is the large expansion of China's R&D investments. The reason is that China – like Russia in the Annex B-_{US} coalition – over invests in R&D to increase its sales in the emission trading market. By strongly investing in technological innovations, China can gain profits in the permit market. With respect to the Annex B-_{US} case, China increases its R&D by more than 70%.

What are the implications of China's participation in the climate coalition for the environmental effectiveness of the protocol? Notwithstanding China's participation, total emissions increase. The reason is that China has emission targets over time that coincide with its business-as-usual emission levels. In addition, emissions in the other cooperating countries slightly increase due to the lower incentives to undertake emission-reducing R&D.

As a consequence of the increased emissions, welfare in the US becomes lower because of the higher environmental damages arising from the growth

in emissions.²⁵ As already stated, the main reason why emissions increase is the decline in total R&D. R&D is lower because the increase in R&D efforts by China cannot offset the fall in R&D experienced by all the other participating countries. The EU and Japan face lower incentives to carry out R&D due to the large supply of emission permits. In addition, Russia reacts to the entrance of a new large permit supplier by strongly lowering its R&D investments since its incentive to undertake strategic R&D is lower.

In short, the participation of China in the climate coalition will have two negative effects on the US economy. First, the US experiences higher damage from climate change because of total higher GHG emissions. Second, the US misses the opportunity to abate its own emissions at the much lower marginal cost (permit price) that the participation of China yields. Are these two effects sufficient to induce the US to change its mind and ratify the Kyoto Protocol?

3.2 A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan, the US and China

In the previous section, the participation of China in the climate coalition was shown to provide benefits to the EU and Japan, but damages to the US economy. Would then the US benefit from joining the climate coalition? In order to address this question using the FEEM-RICE modelling framework, we must analyse the economic implications of a coalition consisting of Europe, Japan, FSU, the US and China, with only one free-rider (the Rest of the World). Figure 2 and Table 1 show our results. Figure 2 illustrates changes with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario. Table 1 shows the changes with respect to “Kyoto forever”, considering both the present scenario and the one discussed in the section 3.1.

²⁵ As noted by one referee, this may be a result peculiar to the RICE model. Other models, which take adaptation into account, suggest the USA may not lose from climate change and may even gain, an important factor contributing to the US’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the RICE model has no adaptation and a damage function in which temperature increases induce output losses. A version of the model with adaptation is provided by Bosello (2004).

Figure 2: The role of the US and China in the coalition with the EU, Japan and FSU.

Table 1: Changes in welfare, emissions and R&D in two expanded coalitions with respect to the “Kyoto forever” scenario

	Coalitions	
	(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)	(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)
Welfare USA	-6.23%	-9.46%
Welfare JPN	10.84%	4.97%
Welfare EU	10.60%	4.69%
Welfare CHN	-5.67%	13.86%
Welfare FSU	-21.54%	-19.71%
Emissions	3.26%	-17.90%
R&D USA	2.15%	4.13%
R&D JPN	-2.05%	-1.78%
R&D EU	-6.13%	-4.89%
R&D CHN	71.83%	140.20%

R&D FSU	-66.40%	-43.16%
--------------------	---------	---------

First, notice that China would be the big winner in the case of US participation. China would profit from a very large permit market, where it could supply an even larger amount of permits than in the scenario examined in section 3.1. Therefore, China's permit supply would be enhanced by strategic over-investments in R&D. With respect to the already large amount of R&D investments in the previous scenario, the enlarged coalition would induce almost a doubling of China's R&D expenditure. China would be the main permit seller in the emission market, thus benefiting more than other countries from US participation.

Russia would like to profit from the larger emission market as well. It thus increases its strategic R&D investments in order to have more permits at its disposal, after having strongly reduced its expenditure in R&D in the previous scenario (compared to the Marrakech situation, Russia still decreases its R&D by more than 40%, but R&D increases compared to the case in which China but not the US cooperates). Therefore, Russia increases its supply of emission permits with respect to the previous scenario.

The demand for permits also increases because of US participation in the trading market. The net effect estimated by our model is an increase in the permit price. Notice, however, that the permit price is still 63.08% lower than in the Annex B-US scenario in which it is assumed that only the EU, Japan and Russia trade permits.

Notwithstanding a permit price higher than in the Annex B-US + China climate coalition – which implies higher profits from selling “hot air” – Russia is still the main loser in this scenario. However, its welfare loss with respect to the Annex B-US coalition is lower than in the previous scenario, because of the increased demand for permits induced by US participation.

Given the higher permit price, the EU and Japan face higher abatement costs and therefore suffer a decrease in their welfare with respect to the scenario in which the Kyoto/Marrakech coalition is enlarged by China only. However, if we compare their performance in the scenario in which both China and the US adopt the Kyoto Protocol with their performance in the Annex B-_{US} “Kyoto forever” scenario, we find that the larger permit market and the consequently relatively lower permit price still leads to a small increase in welfare for both Europe and Japan (see Figure 2).

Let us now consider the US. The two negative effects previously emphasised have been offset. On the one hand, the US participates in a permit market where the equilibrium price is quite low (63.08% lower than in the Annex B-_{US} scenario even though larger than in the absence of the US participation). On the other hand, total emissions are much lower and therefore the US suffers less damage from climate change.

However, total welfare in the US does not increase (see Table 1). Even though the loss is small, it is clear that the adoption of the Kyoto targets entails a cost for the US. The net loss is small because China supplies permits at a low price and because total emissions decrease. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient to increase total US welfare with respect to the case in which it free-rides.

Therefore, the decision by China to comply with the Kyoto Protocol indeed creates a new environment in which it would be easier for the US to re-join the Kyoto climate coalition. However, the new incentives provided by China’s participation in the permit market are not sufficient to yield a positive change in US welfare when it commits to its “Kyoto forever” target. The reason is twofold: first, as said, the US moves from a situation in which it free-rides to a new one in which it cooperates and therefore increases its GHG emission abatement; second, when the US cooperates, it commits to its Kyoto target until 2100 (the time horizon of our optimisation

runs). Therefore, short term benefits from low abatement cost options are offset by long term costs from meeting the target beyond 2012.

The big winner in this scenario would be the environment. As said, total emissions decrease by more than 20% with respect to the climate regime analysed in section 3.1. This result was expected, given that all big GHG emitters cooperate to achieve climate change control. This climate regime is thus the most environmental effective among those examined within this study.

3.3 A fragmented climate regime consisting of the US with China and the EU with Russia and Japan

There is a third scenario that could result from the economic incentives arising from the implementation of an emission trading market and from cooperation on GHG emission abatement. There is some evidence that a two-bloc climate regime, consisting of the Kyoto countries (EU, Japan and Russia) plus a bilateral cooperation between China and the US may not be unrealistic. Ever since the US and China normalised their diplomatic relations in the late 70s, cooperation on environment, science and technology matters has been a mainstay of U.S.-China relations²⁶. In February 2002, Presidents George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin agreed to establish a U.S.-China Working Group on Climate Change which now promotes and monitors bilateral research cooperation on climate change focusing on various key areas of policy and science.

²⁶ In particular, the Agreement Between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology was one of the first between the two countries, signed during Deng Xiaoping's historic visit to the United States in January 1979. There are now more than 30 protocols under this umbrella agreement covering everything from earthquake science to fisheries, agriculture, forestry, energy, nuclear safety, meteorology, space technology, high energy physics, the environment, nature conservation, water resources management, biology, medicine, transportation and telecommunications.

For more information see <http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/BilateralActivities.html>

Furthermore, China's recent decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the country is aware that benefits from ratification could be high because of its role as the largest permit seller. Chinese officials emphasise that the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO₂ emissions, but it is strictly opposing any binding GHG reduction targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26th, 2002).

Without binding commitments and given the high amount of "hot air" which can be expected from this region, China is a very attractive partner in climate change control activities, as already evidenced by the ongoing bilateral agreements between China and several other countries.²⁷ This is why the US may be able to convince China to cooperate under a joint climate pact. In this way, the US could achieve two goals: (i) to satisfy domestic political requirements by involving developing countries in their climate strategy; (ii) to reap high benefits from a large bilateral emissions market (the US and China together account for more than one-third of world-wide CO₂ emissions, a share which is becoming larger and larger). In particular, the US could drastically decrease its abatement costs through emission trading and China could profit from selling a large amount of permits.

What would then be the main consequences of a two-bloc climate regime with a first bloc formed by the EU, Japan and the FSU and a second bloc formed by the US and China? Some of these consequences are shown in Figure 3.

First of all, it is clear that both the US and China lose in comparison with the case in which they free-ride. However, the loss for the US is small and could be compensated for by some ancillary benefits from GHG emission

²⁷ Apart from the collaboration with the US, a bilateral cooperation on climate change has also been initiated with Australia in September 2003: see the official declaration at <http://www.deh.gov.au/minister/env/2003/mr24oct203.html>.

abatement that are not taken into account in our model. In addition, due to the overall lower emission levels than in previous climate regimes, the welfare loss is the smallest among those attained by the US when it participates in a climate coalition.

Figure 3: A two bloc climate regime: 1) US and CHN; 2) EU, FSU and Japan

Even the loss for China is small – and even smaller when compared to the regime in which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms – and ancillary benefits, both environmental and economic, could be considerable.²⁸ In a recent companion paper (Buchner and Carraro, 2003a), we show that the two-bloc climate regime is what would be most preferred by both the US and China when they do not free-ride. Namely, it is the most preferred

²⁸ This conclusion is based on our analyses of economic incentives but neglects other dimensions of the problem. As argued by Zhang (2004), the proposal of a China-US bilateral regime may not be in the interest of China from the following perspectives: How does China value the importance of maintaining unity of the Group of 77? What lessons has China learned from bilateral negotiations with the United States regarding accession to the WTO? What is the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it would rejoin the Kyoto Protocol only if major developing countries take on greater commitments? What are the implications of the US strikingly reversed position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi for initiating discussions on joint accession by the US and China? However, the economic model adopted for our analysis is not designed to deal with these political issues.

among those in which they undertake some cooperative emission abatement. Nonetheless, both the US and China suffer welfare losses from participating on the two-bloc climate regime. Can it therefore be a likely outcome of future negotiations on climate change control as suggested in Stewart and Wiener (2003)? The answer to this questions was already partly negative in Zhang (2004), where political considerations were the core of his remarks. In this paper, we add an economic perspective that also only partly supports the idea of a two-bloc climate regime, at least from the point of view of the US and China.

Let us consider the EU, Japan and FSU. The inclusion of China in a coalition with the US is slightly beneficial for the Kyoto/Marrakech climate bloc, because of the enhanced environmental effectiveness of this two-bloc regime. Indeed, GHG emissions are almost 20% lower than in the benchmark case, and also lower with respect to total emissions in the climate regime in which the coalition (Annex B-_{US} + China) forms. However, the coalition (Annex B-_{US} + China) is the one most preferred by the EU and Japan because the absence of China from the Annex B-_{US} coalition increases marginal abatement costs and thus induces welfare losses for the EU and Japan.

The two-bloc climate regime is characterised again by a large expansion of China's R&D investments. China over invests in R&D to increase its sales in the bilateral emission trading market. The segmentation of the trading market also explains why R&D investments within the Annex B-_{US} coalition do not change. However, if the comparison is made with the coalition (Annex B-_{US} + China), then it can be seen that R&D investments become higher for all Annex B-_{US} countries. The reason is again the larger marginal abatement costs when China is not a seller in the permit market where the EU and Japan trade. This induces higher investments in R&D in the EU and Japan and also strategic R&D investments in Russia and the rest of FSU, which find it optimal to increase its supply of permits.

In short, the two-bloc climate regime discussed in this section could be beneficial to EU, Japan and Russia, even though less beneficial than other regimes, particularly for the EU and Japan. By contrast, Russia may favour the two-bloc regime, because of the higher economic benefits that it could reap in the trading market with EU and Japan when China trades permits only with the US. However, the two-bloc regime reduces welfare in the US and China (even though the economic loss is the smallest one among all climate regimes that we analysed). Therefore, other mechanisms must be designed to enhance participation incentives for the US and China.

Among these mechanisms, issue linkage is an obvious candidate. In previous paper (Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori, 2002) we have shown that a technology-based issue linkage is unlikely to induce the US to re-join the Kyoto coalition. Mainly because of the lack of credibility of the proposed mechanisms. However, issue linkage, e.g. based on trade concessions, could work better with China, in the same way in which it helped to induce Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

The basic problem that remains unresolved is how to enhance US participation incentives. The economic mechanisms described in this paper does not seem to be sufficient. Those described in Buchner and Carraro (2004) – based on the technology protocol proposed by Barrett (2002) – are sufficient, but unlikely to produce relevant GHG emission reductions. Therefore, other policy strategies, possibly complementary to the Kyoto framework, need to be identified and carefully assessed (see Aldy, Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Barrett and Stavins, 2004; for a first step into this direction).

Nonetheless, there is a result in this paper that cannot be neglected. If the US, for some environmental or political reasons, decides to enhance its effort to control GHG emissions and chooses to participate in an

international trading scheme, than a bilateral deal with China would be more beneficial for the US (in terms of economic gains) than participation in a global trading scheme.

4. Conclusions

This paper has analysed the evolution of climate change policy after the Marrakech negotiations, focusing on the one hand on the economic forces which have led to the emergence of the present climate regime and on the other hand on the implications of this situation for the future of climate negotiations.

Our analysis has drawn attention on the role of China and of the new economic incentives that China's adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and its participation in the international permit market could provide. What emerges from this analysis is a situation in which the decision of China to participate in the climate coalition is beneficial for both the EU and Japan, because it lowers abatement costs. However, China's participation penalises Russia, because it lowers Russia's profits from selling permits.

We have shown that the US is also damaged by China's participation in the coalition with the EU, Japan and Russia. The reason is the increase in GHG emissions induced by the lower incentives to adopt climate friendly technologies. In addition, the US misses the opportunity to abate emissions at the low abatement cost that China's participation induces. Therefore, one may wonder whether the US would be better off by cooperating with China – as well as with the EU, Japan and Russia – on GHG emission control. The answer is negative. Although cooperation provides some benefits, total welfare does not increase and the US is still better off by free-riding on the other countries' (small) emission reductions.

However, cooperation between the US and the other countries could take a different form. For example, the US could propose a bilateral deal to China

that may be induced to cooperate with the US rather than with the Annex B._{US} countries. In this scenario, the US and China form their own bilateral permit market, whereas the EU, Japan and Russia trade in a second different market. We have shown that, in this scenario, the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime is greatly increased and welfare losses are small in all countries.

Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. The participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto group (even when it includes China). However, a two-bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B._{US} countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.

Is it sufficient to suggest that climate change negotiations could take a new direction by abandoning the Kyoto framework to adopt a new multi-bloc approach similar to the one prevailing in international trade negotiations? Probably not. The above conclusions need cautious consideration. In particular, our empirical analysis focuses on economic incentives, whereas recent climate negotiations have shown that decisions are often taken on the basis of political, strategic, social or even ethical considerations. In addition, the model used in our analysis is a simplified representation of the world economic system, even though it captures the main economic mechanisms and the related incentive schemes. However, our analysis clearly suggests that China can play a very important role in future climate negotiations.

A further development of our analysis could be the comparison of different multi-bloc climate regimes. Blocs could be identified at regional level (e.g.

EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) or could be defined by political or environmental interests (e.g. G77, AOSIS). Including more climate coalitions in the analysis could of course change the ranking of the regimes. Some preliminary results are in Buchner, and Carraro (2003a), where the economic consequences of the formation of a wide range of partial and/or regional climate coalitions are analysed.

Another research direction is the integration of a mix of policy instruments in our analysis of participation incentives. Therefore, not only emission trading, but also other policy tools could be implemented and their relative effectiveness in enhancing participation could be assessed.

Acknowledgments

This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Climate Change Modelling and Policy Unit at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. The authors are grateful to Igor Cersosimo for great research assistance and to the participants to the 2nd World Congress of Environmental Economists in Monterey, June 2002, to those at the ECF Annual Conference in Berlin, November 2002, and at the ESRI International Conference in Tokyo, March 2003, for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

- ABC News Online, Kyoto protocol gets boost as China signs, September 3rd, 2002.
Online at www.abc.net.au
- ABC News Online, Kemp addresses Earth Summit, defends Govt position on Kyoto, September 4th, 2002. Online at www.abc.net.au
- Aldy, J.E., Barrett, S. and R. Stavins (2003), 'Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures,' *Climate Policy*, 3(4), 373-397.
- Barrett, S. (2002), *Environment and Statecraft*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, S. and R. N. Stavins (2004), 'Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements', *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, forthcoming.
- Asahi Shimbun, Bureaucratic battle raises hurdle for emissions control, February 11th, 2002.
Online at <http://www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/K2002021100204.html>
- BBC, Japan cools on climate pact, January 3rd, 2002. Online at www.news.bbc.co.uk
- Böhringer, C. (2003), 'The Kyoto Protocol: A Review and Perspectives', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 2003, vol. 19, issue 3, pp 451-466.
- Böhringer, C. and A. Löschel (2001), 'Market Power in International Emissions Trading: The Impact of U.S. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol', ZEW Discussion Paper 01-58, Mannheim.
- Bosello, F. (2004), 'Timing and Size of Adaptation, Mitigation and R&D Investments in Climate Policy', mimeo, FEEM, Milan.
- Buchner, B., C. Carraro, and I. Cersosimo (2002), 'Economic Consequences of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Kyoto/Bonn Protocol', *Climate Policy* 2, 273-292.
- Buchner, B. and C. Carraro (2003a), 'Regional and Sub-global Climate Regimes', forthcoming in C. Carraro and C. Egenhofer, eds., *Bottom-up Approaches towards a Global Climate Agreement*, E. Elgar.
- Buchner, B. and C. Carraro (2003b), 'The Future of the Kyoto Protocol: Some Scenarios', Report prepared for the ESRI Collaboration Project on Environmental Issues, ESRI, Tokyo.
- Buchner, B. and C. Carraro (2004), 'Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Regime', Nota di Lavoro 61.04, FEEM, Milan.

- Buchner, B., C. Carraro, I. Cersosimo and C. Marchiori (2002), 'Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation', CESifo Working Paper No. 688 (8). Forthcoming in A. Haurie and L. Viguiet, eds., *Coupling Climate and Economic Dynamics*, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Buchner, B. and S. Dall'Olio (2004), 'Russia: the Long Road to Ratification', FEEM Nota di Lavoro 151.04, Milan.
- Buonanno, P., C. Carraro, E. Castelnovo, and M. Galeotti (2001), 'Emission Trading Restrictions with Endogenous Technological Change', *International Environmental Agreements. Law Politics Economics* 1 (3), 397-395.
- Buonanno, P., C. Carraro, and M. Galeotti (2002), 'Endogenous Induced Technical Change and the Costs of Kyoto', *Resource and Energy Economics*, 524, 11-35.
- Christian Science Monitor, Japan irked by US stance on Kyoto. March 12th, 2002. Online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0312/p07s01-woap.html>
- CO2e.com, Japan plans voluntary emissions regulations: E&E Publishing, January 8th, 2002. Online at www.co2e.com
- CO2e.com, Japan to ratify Kyoto Pact by late August: Jiji Press, February 13th, 2002. Online at www.co2e.com
- CO2e.com, Japan, U.S. agree on 15 steps on global warming: Jiji Press, April 5th, 2002. Online at www.co2e.com
- Coe, D.T. and E. Helpman (1995), 'International R&D Spillovers', *European Economic Review*, 39, 859-887.
- Criqui P. and C. Philibert (2003), 'Capping Emissions and Costs', in: How to make progress post Kyoto: RFF-IFRI workshop, Paris, 2003/03/19, Institut Français des Relations Internationales; Resources for the Future.
- Den Elzen, M.G.J. and A.P.G. de Moor (2001), 'The Bonn Agreement and Marrakesh Accords: An Updated Analysis', RIVM Report 728001017/2001.
- Egenhofer, C. and T. Legge (2001), 'After Marrakech: The Regionalisation of the Kyoto Protocol', CEPS Commentary.
- European Commission (2001), *Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder*, Brussels.

- Eyckmans, J. and H. Tulkens (2001), 'Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem', CORE Discussion Paper 9926 and CLIMNEG Working Paper 18, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
- Financial Times, EU policies could mean Russia backs out of Kyoto climate agreement - MP, March 22nd, 2002. Online at <http://www.FT.com/>
- Goulder, L.H. and K. Mathai (2000), 'Optimal CO₂ Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change', *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, **39**, 1-38.
- Griliches, Z. (1979), 'Issues in Assessing the Contribution of R&D to Productivity Growth', *Bell Journal of Economics*, **10**, 92-116.
- Griliches, Z. (1984), *R&D, Patents, and Productivity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- IPCC (2001), *Third Assessment Report*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Japan Today News, Japan seeks help to get U.S. to rejoin Kyoto talks, January 19th, 2002. Online at www.japantoday.com
- Japan Today News, Japan to urge Canada to ratify Kyoto Protocol, February 26th, 2002. Online at www.japantoday.com
- Japan Today News, Japan, U.S. discuss global warming, February 27th, 2002. Online at www.japantoday.com
- Japan Today News, Japan to urge U.S., Russia to ratify Kyoto pact, June 4th, 2002. Online at www.japantoday.com
- Kyodo News, Anti-global warming bill in line with Kyoto pact, February 1st, 2002. Online at www.kyodo.co.jp
- Kyodo News, Australia, Canada may skip Kyoto Protocol: METI official, February 21st, 2002. Online at www.kyodo.co.jp
- Manne, A. and R. Richels (1999), 'The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objectives?', in J. Weyant, ed., *The Cost of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation*, Special Issue of the *Energy Journal*, 1-24.
- Manne, A.S. and R. Richels (2001), 'US Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: The Impact on Compliance Costs and CO₂ Emissions', Working Paper 01-12, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.
- Nordhaus, W.D. and Z. Yang (1996), 'A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies', *American Economic Review*, **4**, 741-765.

Nordhaus, W.D. (1999), 'Modelling Induced Innovation in Climate-Change Policy', paper presented at the IIASA Workshop on Induced Technological Change and the Environment, Laxenburg, June 21-22.

Planet Ark (Reuters), China says Kyoto pact benefits both rich and poor, January 18th, 2002. Online at www.planetark.org

Planet Ark (Reuters), Brazil Cardoso wants Bush to fight for environment, January 28th, 2002. Online at www.planetark.org

RBC Network, Russia to ratify Kyoto soon, March 11th, 2002
Online at http://www.pointcarbon.com/article_view.php?id=1721

Reuters, Putin undecided in Kyoto, snubs U.N. appeals, September 29th, 2003.
Online at www.reuters.com

RFE/RL, Russia: Putin remarks start off international climate conference on sour note, September 29th, 2003. Online at www.rferl.org

Romer, P. (1990), 'Endogenous Technological Change', *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, 1002-1037.

Stewart, R and J. Wiener (2003), *Reconstructing Climate Policy*, American Enterprise Institute Press.

Sky News, Australia warms to Kyoto, September 4th, 2002. Online at www.sky.com/

The Age, Australia, US urged to be less selfish, August 30th, 2002. Online at www.theage.com.au

The Globe and Mail, Kyoto a go, PM says, September 2nd, 2002. Online at www.globeandmail.com

The Hindu, US in EU's firing line on climate change, October 24th, 2002. Online at www.hinduinnnet.com

The Hindu, Russia seeks commitments on climate change, October 31st, 2002. Online at www.hinduinnnet.com

The International Herald Tribune, Russia needs the Kyoto treaty, October 28th, 2003.
Online at www.iht.com

The Japan Times, Carbon tax stuck in detour to Kyoto, January 17th, 2002. Online at www.japantimes.com

The Japan Times, Emissions-trading plan put on back burner, January 18th, 2002. Online at www.japantimes.com

The Japan Times, Activating the Kyoto treaty, January 21st, 2002. Online at www.japantimes.com

- The Japan Times, China could help Japan by taking its money and cutting its Kyoto target, January 26th, 2002. Online at www.japantimes.com
- The Japan Times, U.S.-Japan climate talks set for March, February 27th, 2002. Online at www.japantimes.com
- The Toronto Star, Slow up on Kyoto, OM told, September 4th, 2002. Online at www.thestar.com
- The Toronto Star, Chrétien ratifies Kyoto, December 17th, 2002. Online at www.thestar.com
- United Nations (2002), Johannesburg Summit 2002: Key outcomes of the summit.
- Weyant, J.P. (1997), 'Technological Change and Climate Policy Modeling', paper presented at the IIASA Workshop on Induced Technological Change and the Environment, Laxenburg, June 26-27.
- Weyant, J.P. and T. Olavson (1999), 'Issues in Modelling Induced Technological Change in Energy, Environmental, and Climate Policy', *Environmental Modelling and Assessment*, **4**, 67-85.
- Yomiuri Shimbun, Russia may drag feet on Kyoto, March 28th, 2002. Online at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/>
- Zhang, Z.X. (2004), 'Climate Change Policy' (Comment on "Practical Climate Change Policy" by Richard B. Steward and Jonathan B. Wiener), Issue in Science and Technology, a publication of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring).

Appendix: The FEEM-RICE Model

The FEEM-RICE model is an extension of Nordhaus and Yang's (1996) regional RICE model of integrated assessment, which is one of the most popular and manageable integrated assessment tools for the study of climate change (see, for instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens 2001). It is basically a single sector optimal growth model which has been extended to incorporate the interaction between economic activities and climate. One such model has been developed for each macro region into which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union, and Rest of the World).

Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and emission abatement that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of climate change) is used for investment and consumption and is produced according to constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, which combines the inputs from capital and labour with the level of technology. Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. There is a wedge between output gross and net of climate change effects, the size of which is dependent upon the amount of abatement (rate of emission reduction) as well as the change in global temperature. The model is completed by three equations representing emissions (which are related to output and abatement), carbon cycle (which relates concentrations to emissions), and climate module (which relates the change in temperature relative to 1990 levels to carbon concentrations) respectively.

In our extension of the model, technical change is no longer exogenous. Instead, the issue of endogenous technical change is tackled by following the ideas contained in both Nordhaus (1999) and Goulder and Mathai (2000) and accordingly modifying Nordhaus and Yang's (1996) RICE model. Doing so requires the input of a number of additional parameters, some of which have been estimated using information provided by Coe and Helpman (1995), while the remaining parameters were calibrated so as to reproduce the business-as-usual scenario generated by the RICE model with exogenous technical change.

In particular, the following factors are included: first, endogenous technical change affecting factor productivity is introduced. This is done by adding the stock of knowledge in each production function and by relating the stock of knowledge to R&D investments. Second,

induced technical change is introduced, by allowing the stock of knowledge to affect the emission-output ratio as well. Finally, international technological spillovers are also accounted for in the model.

Within each version of the model, countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, which yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium (see Eyckmans and Tulkens 2001, for an explicit derivation of first order conditions of the optimum problem). This is a situation in which, in each region, the planner maximises social welfare subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and the climate module, given the emission and investment strategies (in the base case) and the R&D expenditure strategy (in the endogenous technological change case) of all other players.

The Standard Model without Induced Technical Change

As previously mentioned, it is assumed for the purpose of this model that innovation is brought about by R&D spending which contributes to the accumulation of the stock of existing knowledge. Following an approach pioneered by Griliches (1979, 1984), it is assumed that the stock of knowledge is a factor of production, which therefore enhances the rate of productivity (see also the discussion in Weyant 1997; Weyant and Olavson 1999). In this formulation, R&D efforts prompt non-environmental technical progress, but with different modes and elasticities. More precisely, the RICE production function output is modified as follows:

$$Q(n,t) = A(n,t)K_R(n,t)^{\beta_n}[L(n,t)^\gamma K_F(n,t)^{1-\gamma}] \quad (1)$$

where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of technology and K_R , L , and K_F are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labour, and physical capital.

In (1), the stock of knowledge has a region-specific output elasticity equal to β_n ($n=1,\dots,6$). It should be noted that, as long as this coefficient is positive, the output production process is characterised by increasing returns to scale, in line with current theories of endogenous growth. This implicitly assumes the existence of cross-sectoral technological spillovers within each country (Romer, 1990). In addition, it should be noted that while allowing for R&D-driven technological progress, we maintain the possibility that technical improvements can

also be determined exogenously (the path of A is the same as that specified in the original RICE model). The stock accumulates in the usual fashion:

$$K_R(n, t+1) = R \& D(n, t) + (1 - \delta_R)K_R(n, t) \quad (2)$$

where $R \& D$ is the expenditure in Research and Development and δ_R is the rate of knowledge depreciation. Finally, it is recognised that some resources are absorbed by R&D spending. That is:

$$Y(n, t) = C(n, t) + I(n, t) + R \& D(n, t) \quad (3)$$

where Y is net output (net of climate change effects as specified in the RICE model), C is consumption and I gross fixed capital formation.

At this stage the model maintains the same emissions function as Nordhaus' RICE model which will be modified in the next section:

$$E(n, t) = \sigma(n, t)[1 - \mu(n, t)]Q(n, t) \quad (4)$$

where σ can be loosely defined as the emissions-output ratio, E stands for emissions and μ for the rate of abatement effort. The policy variables included in the model are rates of fixed investment and of emission abatement. For the other variables, the model specifies a time path of exogenously given values. Interestingly, this is also the case for technology level A and of the emissions-output ratio σ . Thus, the model presented so far assumes no induced technical change, i.e. an exogenous environmental technical change, and a formulation of productivity that evolves both exogenously and endogenously. In the model, investment fosters economic growth (thereby driving up emissions) while abatement is the only policy variable used for reducing emissions.

Induced Technical Change

In the second step of our model formulation, endogenous environmental technical change is accounted for. It is assumed that the stock of knowledge – which in the previous formulation was only a factor of production - also serves the purpose of reducing, *ceteris paribus*, the

level of carbon emissions. Thus, in the second formulation, R&D efforts prompt both environmental and non-environmental technical progress, although with different modes and elasticities.²⁹ More precisely, the RICE emission-output relationship is modified as follows:

$$E(n,t) = [\sigma_n + \chi_n \exp(-\alpha_n K_R(n,t))][1 - \mu(n,t)]Q(n,t) \quad (4')$$

In (4'), knowledge reduces the emissions-output ratio with an elasticity of α_n , which is also region-specific; the parameter χ_n is a scaling coefficient, whereas σ_n is the value to which the emission-output ratio tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. In this formulation, R&D contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emission-output ratio - and therefore the overall level of pollution emissions - on the other .

Knowledge Spillovers

Previous formulations do not include the effect of potential spillovers produced by knowledge, and therefore ignore the fact that both technologies and organisational structures disseminate internationally. Modern economies are linked by vast and continually expanding flows of trade, investment, people and ideas. The technologies and choices of one region are and will inevitably be affected by developments in other regions.

Following the work of Weyant and Olavson (1999), who suggest that the definition of spillovers in an induced technical change context be kept plain and simple (in the light of a currently incomplete understanding of the problem) , disembodied, or knowledge spillovers are modelled (see Romer 1990). They refer to the R&D carried out and paid for by one party that produces benefits to other parties which then have better or more inputs than before or can somehow benefit from R&D carried out elsewhere. Therefore, in order to capture international spillovers of knowledge, the stock of world knowledge is introduced in the third version of the FEEM-RICE model, both in the production function and in the emission-output ratio equation. Equations (1) and (4') are then revised as follows:

²⁹ Obviously, we could have introduced two different types of R&D efforts, respectively contributing to the growth of an environmental knowledge stock and a production knowledge stock. Such undertaking however is made difficult by the need to specify variables and calibrate parameters for which there is no immediately available and sound information in the literature.

$$Q(n,t) = A(n,t)K_R(n,t)^{\beta_n}WK_R(n,t)^{\varepsilon_n}[L(n,t)^\gamma K_F(n,t)^{1-\gamma}] \quad (1')$$

and:

$$E(n,t) = [\sigma_n + \chi_n \exp(-\alpha_n K_R(n,t) - \theta_n WK_R(n,t))][1 - \mu(n,t)]Q(n,t) \quad (4'')$$

where the stock of world knowledge:

$$WK_R(j,t) = \sum_{j \neq i} K_R(i,t) \quad (5)$$

is defined in such a way as not to include a country's own stock.

Emission Trading

As mentioned above, throughout the analysis we assume the adoption of efficient policies. As a consequence, the model also includes the possibility of flexibility mechanisms. In particular we compare the two cases in which emission trading takes place amongst all original Annex I countries (including the US), first with one in which trading is allowed amongst Annex 1 countries without the US, and then one in which emission trading takes place amongst all Annex I countries without the US and Russia.

When running the model in the presence of emission trading, two additional equations are considered:

$$Y(n,t) = C(n,t) + I(n,t) + R \& D(n,t) + p(t)NIP(n,t) \quad (3')$$

which replaces equation (3) and:

$$E(n,t) = Kyoto(n) + NIP(n,t) \quad (6)$$

where $NIP(n,t)$ is the net demand for permits and $Kyoto(n)$ are the emission targets set in the Kyoto Protocol for the signatory countries and the BAU levels for the non-signatory ones. According to (3'), resources produced by the economy must be devoted, in addition to

consumption, investment, and research and development, to net purchases of emission permits. Equation (6) states that a region's emissions may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of sales of permits. Note that $p(t)$ is the price of a unit of tradable emission permits expressed in terms of the *numeraire* output price. Moreover, there is an additional policy variable to be considered in this case, which is net demand for permits NIP .

In terms of the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility subject to its individual resource and capital constraints, now including the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given emission (i.e. abatement) strategy of all the other players and a given price of permits $p(0)$ (in the first round this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net demand for permits is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised as a function of the market disequilibrium and each region's decision process starts again.