Agenda

06 Giu 2022 12:15

Vasiliki Skreta - Informed information design

Meeting Room 1 (San Giobbe Economics Campus) + Live streaming (ZOOM)

Vasiliki Skreta, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas (USA)

Informed information design

Abstract

A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define interim-optimal mechanisms, a subset of incentive-compatible mechanisms that are optimal in the sense that the informed designer cannot credibly find an alternative mechanism that strictly improves his interim payoff. We prove that an interim-optimal mechanism exists and that every interim-optimal mechanism is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the informedesigner game. An exante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is when it is ex-post optimal. Likewise, the unraveling outcome in disclosure games is interim optimal. We provide a belief-based characterization of interim-optimal mechanisms and compare them with ex-ante optimal ones in common economic environments. In settings with strategic complements and binary actions, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We compare interim optimality to other solutions of informed-principal problems.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM: https://unive.zoom.us/j/84826503534 - Meeting ID 848 2650 3534

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (EcSeminars; CVera)

Link

https://unive.zoom.us/j/84826503534

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