Agenda

15 Dic 2021 12:15

Roberto Rozzi - How homophily impedes high skill investments decisions in the labor market

Meeting Room 1 (San Giobbe Economics Campus) + Live streaming (ZOOM)

Roberto Rozzi, PhD Student, Department of Economics, Ca' Foscari University of Venice

Abstract: In this paper, we study how social preferences influence skills investment decisions of agents in a sender-receiver set-up, where the receiver has to pay to observe some pieces of information. We show that under homophily, the decision-maker always has no incentive to screen candidates deeply, and therefore, they have no incentive to invest in their skills. Under heterophily, the decision-maker has an incentive to screen candidates deeply, provided that the information's cost is low enough. Therefore, candidates have an incentive to invest in their skills in this case.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM: https://unive.zoom.us/j/89938070342 - Meeting ID 899 3807 0342

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (InSeminars)

Link

https://unive.zoom.us/j/89938070342

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