Game Theory

Academic year
2016/2017 Syllabus of previous years
Official course title
Game Theory
Course code
PHD006 (AF:245095 AR:131650)
ECTS credits
Degree level
Master di Secondo Livello (DM270)
Educational sector code
2nd Semester
Course year
You are expected to be familiar with standard material in analysis and
probability at the level of Chapter 19 in Tadelis (2013). This is required summer reading.
Some previous knowledge of game theory is expected, roughly equivalent to Part I and II
of Tadelis (2013). Part I will be taken for granted: this is required summer reading. Part II
will be covered in class at a brisk pace; for students unfamiliar with game theory, this is
recommended summer reading.
This course covers contents from a standard first-year graduate-level
course in noncooperative game theory, repackaged and simplified for a target audience of
doctoral students in management. It has also a fresh mandate to branch out over modern
treatments in organisational economics.
The textbook for this class is Tadelis (2013). The second reference is the source for the
material on which the essay is going to be based.
• S. Tadelis (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press.
• R.. Gibbons and J. Roberts (2013), The Handbook of Organizational Economics,
Princeton University Press.
There are several alternative presentations, with different degrees of difficulty. Here are a
few suggestions, as well as a good source of solved exercises (available only in Italian, alas).
• G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, third edition,
Addison-Wesley.[Chapters 7 and 9.]
• M. Maschler, E. Solan and S. Zamir (2013), Game Theory, Cambridge University
• M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein (1994), A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press.
• M. LiCalzi (1995), Teoria dei Giochi, Etas-Kompass. (Collection of solved exercises.)
Summer reading (Required)
• S. Tadelis (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press. [Part I
and Chapter 19.]
Summer reading (Recommended)
• S. Tadelis (2013), Game Theory: An Introduction, Princeton University Press. [Part II.]
Grading is comparative. Three homework sets will be distributed,
and solutions made available. Homework is going to be graded if the School provides a
teaching assistant: this is likely, but not yet con rmed at this time.
If there will be a teaching assistant, grading is going to be based on the nal written
exam (45%), three homework sets (10% each), class participation (5%), and a nal essay
on organisational economics (20%). The nal essay consists of a critical written discussion
about the contents of a chapter of your choice from the Handbook of Organizational Eco-
nomics; the essay should be between 10 and 15 pages long. Each student is required to pick
a di erent chapter, con rming his choice with the instructor; in case of con
ict, the usual
\ rst-come, rst-approved" applies.
Rules for homework: You can discuss the exercises with your colleagues as much as you
like. (There is a lot to learn from your fellow students.) However, a set of solutions can
have at most two coauthors. If a set of solutions has more than one author, all coauthors
get the same grade. A student cannot have the same coauthor in more than one homework.
Late homework is not accepted.
Students who are not enrolled at Ca' Foscari may audit the class (provided they obtain
permission from the instructor) but their work is not graded. They cannot coauthor or
hand in homework, but they can participate in the problem-solving process and write up
their own solutions.
There will be fteen meetings, mixing up lectures and practice ses-