1. Frame Analysis: A Social Science Approach to Text
   1.1. Media Frames ................................................................. 3
   1.2. Collective Action Frames ............................................... 7

2. Frame Analysis, Persuasion, and Rhetoric .......... 11
   2.1. On Rhetoric ........................................................................ 11
       2.1.1. Means of Persuasion ...................................................... 12
       2.1.2. The Five Canons of Rhetoric ........................................... 13
           2.1.2.1. Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts? .................. 17
           2.1.2.2. Arrangement .............................................................. 19
           2.1.2.1. Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts? .................. 22
           2.1.2.1. Style: Rhetorical Figures ........................................... 23
           2.1.2.1.1. Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts? ............... 29

2 Frame Analysis and Rhetoric: A Missed Opportunity for a Fruitful Encounter? ........................................ 31

Bibliography ........................................................................... 37
1. Frame Analysis: A Social Science Approach to Text

When in 1972 Bateson wrote *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, he probably would not have predicted that his work would become central across different social science disciplines for the development of “frame analysis.” We owe to Bateson the first conception of frame as the set of interpretative frameworks that individuals apply to understand other people’s actions and words: past experience is internally categorized and used to face new events and situations. When Goffman (1974) borrowed Bateson’s interpretation of frames as mental constructs, he introduced the concept into sociology from anthropology. For Goffman, frames are “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974:21), found particularly in texts and with an ongoing dialogue between texts and mental processes; frame analysis aims to investigate processes of signification by looking at the way meanings become functional to organize social experience. From these early beginnings, different disciplines, from psychology to artificial intelligence, communication and media studies, linguistics, political science, anthropology, and sociology, have produced different frame approaches.¹

In this paper, we focus on frame analysis in the fields of communication and media studies and sociology (in particular, in social movement research). We trace both theoretical and methodological developments. We detail the longer and longer list of what to look for in a text that frame analysts came up with as they grappled with issues of measurement of frames in empirical investigations. We then show how twenty five hundred years of rhetoric would have provided frame analysts with a ready-made, and more comprehensive, list. With knowledge of rhetoric lost in the 20th century, frame analysts simply reinvented the wheel (as it often happens in the production of knowledge). A missed opportunity?
1.1. Media Frames

The idea that media provide audiences constructed versions of reality has been central to communication, media, and cultural studies. In *Making News*, one of the most cited books in the field, Tuchman (1978: 1; ix, 180; emphasis added) provides an early use of the word “frame:

“No news is a window on the world. Through its *frame*, Americans learn of themselves and others…”; “the media set the *frame* in which citizens discuss public events”; “news … imposes a *frame* for defining and constructing social reality.” It is with Gitlin, however, in another extremely popular book, *The Whole World is Watching* (1980), that the notion of frame was to become central: “What makes the world beyond direct experience look natural is a media *frame.*” (1980:6; original emphasis) Media frames are then “structures of cognition and interpretation” (Gitlin, 1980: 22), structures that change over time and become the “taken-for-granted conventional wisdom, the hegemonic definitions of how things are” (Gitlin, 1980: 303).

“To frame,” Entman would later write, in a definition that was to stick, “is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993: 52). Frames, then, define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, and suggest solutions.

It is one thing is to provide concepts and definitions and another to measure them. Tuchman and Gitlin take a qualitative approach to measuring. Tuchman (1978), although she does note some of the linguistic characteristics of news (1978:106) – short paragraphs and sentences, insistence upon facts, news as stories (built around “the who, what, when, where, why and how,” 1978:134), story line in the past tense and headline in the present – she is mostly interested in the broader aspects of framing, framing as the result of media organizational need
for “routinizing of the unexpected”: “typification” of news, location of news bureaus (e.g., in Washington, DC, in Wall Street), professionalization of journalists, “web of facticity” (i.e., the focus on events rather than issues. Gitlin similarly applies a “qualitative, literary approach” to news media with the aim of teasing out “those determining but hidden assumptions which in their unique ordering remain opaque to quantitative content analysis” (Gitlin 1980:303). But contrary to Tuchman, Gitlin focuses on media content, rather than media organizations. Chapter after chapter, news clip after news clip, Gitlin details the “framing devices” used by the *New York Times* and *CBS News* to describe the SDS movement of the 1960s: from early trivialization, polarization, emphasis on internal dissention, marginalization, disparagement by numbers, and disparagement of the movement’s effectiveness to later “reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities; emphasis on the presence of Communists; emphasis on the carrying of ‘Viet Cong’ flags; emphasis on violence in demonstrations; delegitimizing use of quotation marks … considerable attention to right-wing opposition to the movement” (1980: 27-28).

Entman, in his seminal review article on framing, recommends quantitative “content analysis informed by a theory of framing” as a way “to identify and describe frames” (1993: 57). By the time of Entman’s recommendation, Gamson had been toying for over a decade with content analysis as a way to measure frames. It is no doubt to Gamson that we must turn for the earliest attempts to measure frames quantitatively. Admittedly, his 1983[1980]² chapter is only “a first step in the analysis of the issue culture of social welfare policy” under Nixon (Gamson and Lasch 1983:402). But it does take the first steps in that direction: provide a set of stringent definitions of concepts, arrange these concepts in order of decreasing abstraction (a “signature matrix”)³, and propose the categories of the signature matrix as the coding scheme for a content
analysis of media material (Gamson and Lasch 1983:401). For the content analysis itself we have to wait a few more years (Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989). But Gamson and Modigliani’s analyses of issues of affirmative action (1987) and nuclear power (1989) do use content analysis on a systematic sample of media content, on the basis of the conceptual apparatus of the signature matrix as coding scheme. And while relying on quantitative content analysis as their main methodological tool, Gamson and Modigliani (1989:11) also provide qualitative analyses “especially of visual imagery... Here we attempt to present enough rich textual material so that readers can form their own independent judgments on the validity of our argument.”

In an unpublished paper presented at the 1991 annual convention of the “Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication,” Tankard et al. similarly “attempt to bridge the gap between a quantitative approach and a qualitative approach to the study of news.” (1991:1-2) Tankard et al. squarely focus on issues of measurement, and apply standard principles of content analysis (random sampling of articles, coding scheme made up of mutually exclusive categories created inductively, coders’ training and instructions, inter-coder reliability, quantification by counting occurrences of categories) to the quantitative measurement of a slippery concept. They provide a list of “framing mechanisms” based on 11 items – headlines and kickers, subheads, photographs, photo captions, leads, selection of sources/affiliations, selection of quotes, pull quotes, logos, statistics/charts and graphs, and concluding statements – and list a set of “indicators” based on “specific language and arguments [that] serve as indicators for each frame.” (1991:7) Tankard et al. tell us that these indicators are constructed ad hoc (“inductively”) and that they are specific to areas or domains of news content but, unfortunately, do not give any indication of how they should be constructed.
Building on Gamson’s work, Pan and Kosicki (1993:58-62) classified framing devices present in news discourse into four structures: syntactical, script, thematic, and rhetorical. Syntactical structures refer to the patterns of arrangement of words and phrases into sentences. Scripts refer to the narrative elements of a text, “the familiar five Ws and one H in news writing: who, what, when where, why and how,” a structure also known as story grammar (Pan and Kosicki, 1993:60). Thematic structures define how an issue, a theme, rather than actors and actions (a story), is discussed through hypothesis-testing elements (e.g., quotations, journalists’ reports). Finally, “[r]hetorical structures of news discourse describe the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects.” (Pan and Kosicki 1993:61)

Subsequent empirical media and communication research based on framing has relied on Gamson’s and Pan and Kosicki’s work for operationalization (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997; Van Gorp 2005, 2007). Tankard (2001) identifies two further approaches to frames beyond “media packages”: “framing as a multidimensional concept” – the different content-related dimensions of a story that may vary from story to story – and the “list of frames” approach – the different aspects of an issue, as underscored by framing devices and “framing mechanisms, or focal points for identifying framing,” i.e., headlines and kickers, subheads, photographs, photo captions, leads, selection of sources or affiliations, selection of quotes, pull quotes, logos, statistics, charts, and graphs, and concluding sections (Tankard, 2001:101). Again, framing mechanisms do not seem to add much new to Pan and Kosicki’s structural dimensions of discourse (i.e., syntactical, script, thematic, and rhetorical) (for a convenient summary of the main concepts and framing devices in the media literature, see Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
1.2. Collective Action Frames

Gamson’s work on media and social movements was seminal in the development of both media and collective action frames. But it was Benford and Snow (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Benford and Snow 2000) who provided the main theorization of collective action frames, understood as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). The final result of this conceptual elaboration is a complex system of nested categories, graphically summarized in Figure 1 for visual convenience.  

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Collective action frames consist of both characteristic and variable features (Snow et al. 1986:467-76; Snow and Benford 1992:136-41; Benford and Snow 2000:614-22, 622-27). The characteristic features of collective action frames comprise three core framing tasks – diagnosis, prognosis, motivation – and discursive processes. Core framing tasks provide social movements “a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame [diagnosis], articulate an alternative set of arrangements [prognosis] and urge others to act in concert to affect change [motivation].” (Benford and Snow 2000:615)

Variable features concern those aspects of social movement frames that vary from movement to movement, from frame to frame: problem identification and direction/locus of attribution (also, issues of interest), flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity, interpretive scope and influence, and resonance. Problem identification and direction/locus of attribution refers to the problems or issues a frame focuses upon, flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity measures the degree to which frames are flexible and inclusive,
capable of embracing different issues (Benford and Snow 2000:618), and the related concept of interpretive scope and influence the degree to which frames are broad (“master frames” Benford and Snow 2000:618). Resonance deals with the question: how does a frame resonate with the members of a group it is attempting to mobilize? Does a frame strike shared inner chords or is it at odds with a target audience’s values and beliefs? (Snow and Benford 1988:198 1992:140)

Resonance is made up of credibility and salience. In turn, credibility depends upon a frame’s consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of frame articulators. Consistency refers to the fit between a Social Movement Organization’s (SMO) beliefs and claims, and its actions (Benford and Snow 2000:620). Consistent frames show no contradiction between an SMO’s beliefs and actions, words and deeds (Benford and Snow 2000:620) Empirical credibility refers to the extent to which frames show no contradiction between its claims and events in the world (Benford and Snow 2000:620). Finally, the credibility of frame articulators depends upon the degree to which the proponents of a collective action frame are credible in the eyes of their target audience (e.g., in terms of their status and knowledge).

A frame’s salience to targets of mobilization depends on its centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. Centrality addresses the question: are the beliefs and values represented in a frame crucial to the lives of the intended target audience? Experiential commensurability addresses a related question: is the frame consistent with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets? Finally, narrative fidelity refers to the extent to which frames resonate with the targets’ broad cultural narrations (“cultural resonance”) (Benford and Snow 2000:621-2).

Three sets of overlapping processes contribute to collective action frames: discursive, strategic, and contested (Benford and Snow 2000:623). Discursive processes, which are part of
frame characteristic features, refer to “the talk and conversations … and written communications of movement members” and consist of frame articulation and frame amplification (Benford and Snow 2000:623). ^10 Frame articulation “involves the connection and alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion.” (Benford and Snow 2000:623). Frame amplification (or punctuation ^11) refers to the foregrounding and backgrounding of specific issues, events, and beliefs (Benford and Snow 2000:623). ^12 Strategic or alignment processes “are deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: frames are developed to achieve a specific purposes–to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources” (Benford and Snow 2000:623). In their study on micromobilization, Snow et al. (1986) identify four main strategic alignment efforts: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation. ^13 Frame bridging “refers to the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.” (Benford and Snow 2000:624) Frame amplification “involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs.” ^14 (Benford and Snow 2000:624) Frame extension refers to a frame’s attempt to extend beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns deemed to be dear to its intended target audience (Benford and Snow 2000:624) Finally, frame transformation refers to an SMO’s involvement in changing old meanings and/or creating new ones (Benford and Snow 2000:624). ^15 The third framing process, contested process, deals with the contested nature of any construction of reality, whether internal or external to a movement (Benford and Snow 2000:625-7). The contested process is made up of counterframing, the setting up of alternative definitions and representations of reality (Zuo and Benford 1995:139), frame disputes/contests, the conflict between frames and counterframes, between a movement’s definitions of reality and that of its opponents (Benford 1993), and the
dialectic between frames and events, the complex interaction between events and frames, events and ideology.

By the early 1990s, this rich theoretical development on collective action frames was slowing down. Calls for more empirical work and applications of the concepts started multiplying (e.g., Gerhards and Rucht 1992:573; Benford 1997:411; Snow 2004:386). An empirical approach to frames raised two questions: 1. In which loci do social movements concretely express frames? 2. How can scholars recognize frames and their various features in these loci? The first question led to texts: speeches, pamphlets, radio and TV talks, media news, interviews. And once in the realm of texts, in dealing with the second question, frame analysts found themselves back to Gitlin’s and Gamson’s work, back to symbolic devices. But they also proposed new things. For instance, Gerhards and Rucht claim that frames should be studied in terms of “argumentative structures” and thematic components (1992:574). Johnston turned to “micro-discourse analysis” for help, to such textual elements as the social role of the actor producing the text, non-verbal cues of oral texts, interactional elements emerging in dialogical communication exchanges, and cross-references within the text (Johnston 1995:219). Like Pan and Kosicki before him (1993:60), Johnston also proposed story grammars as a means to uncover the “structural elements” of a frame in texts, particularly narrative texts (Johnston 1995:235-6, 2002:82).

Qualitative scholars have typically approached the measurement of frames by providing snippets of texts, selected as examples of specific frames. That is true even in cutting-edge empirical studies where frames occupy a central role in a paper’s explanatory model (e.g., Babb 1996; Diani 1996). It is also true in sophisticated quantitative papers that rely on content analysis to quantify features of a text while providing snippets of texts as frame exemplars (e.g., Cress
and Snow 2000; McCammon et al. 2004). Yet, when content analysis is used in papers that pay a great deal of attention to methodological issues\(^\text{16}\), the coding scheme is never published, so we do not know what exactly was measured (e.g., McCammon et al. 2004; McCammon et al. 2007; Snow et al., 2007) (for a convenient summary of frame primary concepts and of symbolic devices according to the social movement literature, see Table 2).

**TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

2. **Frame Analysis, Persuasion, and Rhetoric**

Much of what frame analysts do in their dealings with texts has to do with persuasion: whether to provide audiences with ready-made filters of reality or to win over public opinion and militants to a social movement’s cause. For twenty five hundred years the study of persuasion has been the purview of rhetoric, rhetoric as the “*ars bene dicendi*” the art (or science) of effective speaking/writing (Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* 2.17.37)\(^\text{17}\). And the purpose of effective speaking is persuasion, as Socrates tells Gorgias: “rhetoric is a producer of persuasion” (Plato, *Gorgias*, 453a). Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, states right at the start of the book (1356a): “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.” Quintilian (*Inst. Or.* 2.15.3) stresses that same point “that the function of oratory lies in persuading or in speaking in a way adapted to persuade.” Thereafter, the refrain that persuasion is the goal of rhetoric became standard.\(^\text{18}\)

2.1. **On Rhetoric**

Through the centuries, rhetoric has focused on different aspects of the art of persuasion: from the means of persuasive appeals, to the five canons of rhetoric, the functional parts of a text (the typical text, in classical times, being the oration, senatorial or judicial, and in medieval times, the
church sermon), and the stylistic embellishments of rhetoric (tropes and figures or schemes; Lausberg 1998: §§ 552-598, 600-910). Let us review next these rhetorical categories.

2.1.1. Means of Persuasion

It was Aristotle who, in Rhetoric, first divided the rhetorical means of persuasion (persuasive appeals) into three kinds (1357a): logos, pathos, and ethos (Kennedy 1999: 85). “The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory” (Aristotle, 1354a).

- **Logos** encompasses the appeals to reason, the logical arguments set out to prove the speaker’s conclusions (or disprove the opponent’s).
- **Pathos** refers to the appeals to emotion, aroused to predispose favourably an audience to one’s conclusions.
- **Ethos** establishes the orator’s good character as a way to build authority and credibility.

Although these three appeals can be analyzed separately, they work together in combination toward persuasive ends (Kennedy, 1999: 85; for easy summaries of classical rhetoric, see Murphy et al., 2003).19

2.1.2.1. Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts?

Classical rhetorical means of persuasion would provide the broad framework for understanding some of the features of frame analysis. Thus, the core task of motivation, the motivational call to arms, the rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, may find the basis for a call to action in any of Aristotle’s three means of persuasion. Frame analysts’ reasoning devices (in their different forms of thematic devices or argumentative structures; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Pan and Kosicki 1993) can be thought of as appeals to logos or reason. After all, as Perelman writes in his *The Realm of Rhetoric*
“The aim of argumentation is not to deduce consequences from given premises; it is rather to increase adherence of the members of an audience to theses that are presented for their consent. … [Yet] argumentation does not aim solely at gaining a purely intellectual adherence. Argumentation very often aims at inciting action, or at least, at creating a disposition to act.” Nothing could be more true for collective action frames. Ethos would similarly allow us to understand the frame variable feature of the credibility of frame articulators.

2.1.2. The Five Canons of Rhetoric

The rhetorical tradition has handed down a five-fold classification of rhetoric, the so-called five canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. First broadly introduced by Aristotle, the classification was canonized in the first century BC in Rhetorica ad Herennium (I.3) and in Cicero’s De Inventione (I.VI.9-VII) and De Oratore (I.XXI.142) (Herrick 2001:96).

– Invention (inventio), or argument-creation, comprises what is being said, “the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one’s cause plausible” through topics of argumentation (Cicero De Inventione I.VII.9).

– Arrangement (dispositio) focuses on the functional parts of discourse and their order in sequential units, notably: introduction (exordium), narrative or statement of facts (narratio), outline of what follows (partitio or divisio), main body of the speech containing logical arguments as proof (confirmatio or argumentatio), refutation or counterarguments of one’s opponent (refutatio), and conclusion with final plea (peroratio).

– Style (or elocution) (elocutio), the third canon of rhetoric, addresses how (rather than what, the realm of invention) something is said. Style is not just a text’s
superficial ornamentation but the rational choice of how to express ideas through words.

– Memory (memoria) refers to the complex art of memory, of committing to memory not only a specific public speech, but also the vast store of knowledge that may be required in public debates.

– Delivery (pronuntiatio or actio) refers to the way a discourse is presented to the audience through voice and gestures.

Since memory and delivery were often excluded from the realm of rhetoric in post-classical treatises of rhetoric, we will focus here on the first three canons: invention, arrangement, and style.

2.1.2.2. **Invention: The topics**

“Invention – Cicero writes in his *De inventione* (I.VII.9) – is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one’s cause plausible.” Of all aspects of rhetoric, “inventio … is extremely difficult” (*Ad Her.* II.1) And that discovery, in classical rhetoric, relies on topics. “If we want to track down some argument we ought to know the places or topics… the region of an argument” (*Cicero Topica* I.II.7-8) (Greek *topoi*, Latin *loci*, literally “places”; invention from Latin *invenire* to find).21 It was Aristotle who first introduced topics in his *Rhetoric* as the places where to find arguments and divided them into special topics (Book 1, Chapter 3) and common topics (Book II, Chapter 23).22

– **Special topics** refer to the specific content of an argument. Aristotle discusses three special topics, resulting in the three main species of rhetoric: judicial (or forensic), deliberative (legislative), and epideictic (ceremonial) (*Aristotle* 1358b-1359a, 1359b-
1377b). Each species is defined by its subject matter and its relation to time (past, present, future).

- **Deliberative (or political) oratory** initially centered on legislative politics. Its primary purpose was to get the audience to engage in action through exhortation and dissuasion. As such, deliberative oratory is concerned with future events that could benefit or harm society. Four topics of invention, grouped in pairs, have been advanced as pertaining to deliberative oratory: good/unworthy and advantageous/harmful (or pleasant/unpleasant).

- **Judicial (or forensic) oratory** originally addressed the sphere of forensic argumentation, oriented towards speeches of either accusation or defense. The judicial orator used narratives of past events to defend or accuse an individual in court. Two main topics of invention are commonly associated with this branch of oratory: the just and the unjust (or the right and the wrong).

- **Epideictic oratory** is mainly used to praise or blame people or events. It is concerned with present events, e.g., ceremonies or speeches in general. Epideictic oratory uses two specific topics of invention, virtue and vice (or honorable/dishonorable).

- **Common topics** refer to lines of argument that apply equally well to all three species of rhetoric. Aristotle deals with common topics in *Rhetoric* (1397a-1403a). Cicero later dedicates a short book (*Topica*) to the issue, listing 17 topics broadly classified into: definition, comparison, relationship, circumstance, and testimony.²³

  - **Definition** involves the definition of the issue at hand, linking something to the larger group to which it belongs. The subtopics of *division* (the whole and
its constituent parts), *genus/species* (something as part of a larger class or
*genus*), and *subject/adjuncts* (the essential of something, or subject, and the
accidental or adjuncts).

- **Comparison** looks at things for their *similarity/difference* and *degree* (more
and less, inferior and superior). Comparison, of particular importance to
Aristotle because it is the basis of metaphor, is a topic closely related to
relationship.

- **Relationship** builds connections between things, of *cause/effect* (the effects of
a given cause or the causes contributing to given effects, one of the main
sources of argument), *antecedent/consequence* (the relation between former
and consequent events), *contraries* (the relation between opposite elements),
*contradictions* (concerning the truth or falsity of two propositions). *Definition*
and *division* also establish relationships of a thing to its group and a whole and
its constituent parts.

- **Circumstances** deal with the subtopics of the *possible/impossible* and *past
fact/future fact* to establish the probability of something (whether it is possible
or impossible, past fact or not, and the combination of these two axes).

- **Testimony** comprises as set of subtopics that deal with external sources of
bolstering one’s argument: *authority* (depending upon the expertise and
character of an individual called upon to uphold one’s argument), *rumors* (the
gossips still used today to discredit others), *maxims or proverbs* (using famous
saying or precept), but also the *supernatural*, laws, precedents, or examples,
and oaths, vows, or pledges.24
2.1.2.1.1.  Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts?

In the topics of invention frame analysts would have truly found a treasure chest of helpful concepts. Nearly all main frame concepts have equivalents in this part of rhetoric. Certainly, the special topics would provide the foundations of the three framing tasks of diagnosis and prognosis. Judicial (or forensic) oratory uses past events to provide argumentations for what is just and unjust (right and wrong), similarly to diagnosis which expresses moral indignation by highlighting unjust conditions. The topics in judicial oratory useful for diagnosis are: incentives for wrongdoings, states of mind of wrongdoers, kind of persons wronged, classification of just and unjust actions, and comparative evaluation of unjust actions (Kennedy 1999:86-87). Deliberative oratory, with its paired topics of invention of good/unworthy and advantageous/harmful, focuses on future events to ascertain what action would benefit or harm society, similarly to prognosis, the proposed solution to the diagnosed problem. Epideictic rhetoric, the rhetoric of blame (Lat. vituperatio, Gr. psogos) and praise (encomium) for what is honorable or dishonorable could explain the attributional function of frames as this function attributes blame to culpable agents (diagnosis) and moral responsibility for engagement in future collective action (prognosis).

Among the common topics, the topic of definition and its subspecies, to the extent that they draw attention to how something is defined (e.g., an issue, an action), could help understand diagnosis and the punctuating function of the frame characteristic features since this function highlights specific societal elements. The common topic of relationship (particularly, cause/effect) can explain some frame characteristic features: diagnosis, to the extent that this involves the attribution of causality (Snow and Benford 1992:138; also Snow and Benford 1988:200) and, together with its subtopics of cause/effect, antecedent/consequence, contraries, and contradictions, articulation (discursive processes), the connection and alignment of events
and experiences, and bridging (strategic alignment process). It can also such frame variable features as issues of interest and their attributions since this function assigns effects to internal and external causes. Counterframing and frame disputes fundamentally involve the use of such subtopics of relationship as contraries (the relation between opposite elements) and contradictions.

Topics, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Definition may involve relationship and comparison, and relationship and comparison often go together (particularly, similarity/difference and degree). That is certainly the case in amplification, one of the central categories of rhetoric. Indeed, for Quintilian, in “amplification and attenuation, there lies all the orator’s power” Inst. Ora. 8.3.89). Crucial to amplification is the use of certain topics (e.g., relation or comparison, 8.4.21). And amplification covers both res and verba. You can amplify by adding more things (res, literally), more substantive issues, or you can amplify by means of words. In the Renaissance, the Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus would reiterate Quintilian’s points in a long treatise first published in 1512, with the title De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum Copia (Copia: Foundations of the Abundant Style), with new editions in 1514, 1526, 1534. In one of the beginning sections of Copia, Erasmus writes (1978:301):

The abundant style quite obviously has two aspects. … subject-matter [res] and expression [verba]. Richness of expression involves synonyms, heterosis or enallage, metaphor, variation in word form, equivalence, and other similar methods of diversifying diction. Richness of subject-matter involves the assembling, explaining, and amplifying of arguments by the use of examples, comparisons, similarities, dissimilarities, opposites, and other like procedures …

Peacham, who was deeply influenced by Erasmus, would similarly write (1593:120):
And forasmuch as the principall part of Eloquence standeth by increasing and diminishing, distributing and describing, comparing and collecting: I will first shew what amplification is, how it is divided, the use of it, and also what matters and causes are meetest for it, and after I will proceede to the particular treatise of every figure in their severall orders. “Amplification … consisteth … either of words or of things.”

We find amplification behind some of the key framing concepts, from mobilizing potency to amplification (or elaboration), extension, and scope and influence.

To the extent that amplification and its contrary attenuation involve simple operations of addition and subtraction, rhetorical amplification can help explain transformation which entails changing old meanings and/or generation new ones. More generally, the rhetorical tradition proposes four categories of change (Quintilian’s quadrupartita ratio, Inst. Or. 1.5.38; Lausberg 1998:§462): addition, subtraction, transposition, and substitution. These are rhetorical strategies for the manipulation and variation of discourse at various levels – word forms, sentences, paragraphs, entire texts or speeches – and across different levels of rhetoric from invention to style.

Finally, the topic of testimony, with its various subtopics, would help frame analysts understand some aspects of resonance, one the frame variable features, notably, the credibility of frame articulators and empirical credibility. Narrative fidelity can also be increased through recourse to such external sources as testimony.

**2.1.2.3. Arrangement**

The idea that texts are characterized by distinct functional parts that follow each other in specific, prescribed orders goes back to the early days of rhetoric (see Aristotle Rhetoric 1414b). A six-part division in introduction (exordium), narrative (narratio), partition (the plan of the speech),
confirmation (or proof, *confirmatio*), refutation (*reprehensio*), and peroration (or conclusion, *conclusio*) was to become standard, as found in *De Inventione* (I.XIV.19) Cicero’s earliest rhetorical treatise, written approximately at the age of twenty in a “rigid, pompous, and didactic manner of presentation” yet, ironically, to become the standard for excellence through the middle ages (Murphy et al. 2003:158-9). Three of the six parts of a classical oration are of particular interest in relation to the concerns of frame analysis: narrative/statement of facts, proof, and refutation.25

“Narrative is an exposition of events that have occurred or are supposed to have occurred.” (*De Inv.* I.XIX.27; on narration see Quintilian *Inst. Or.* IV.2.1-132) One of the rhetorical exercises Aphthonius prescribes is on narrative. Aphthonius, a teacher active at Antioch between the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century BC, left a booklet of exercises (the *progymnasmata*) that became very popular “in European grammar schools throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Latin translations …frequently reprinted.” (Clark 1952:260) He writes: “The tale is concerned with six considerations: the personal agent, the thing done, at what time, in what place, in what manner, and for what cause.” (Nadeau 1952:265)

A narrative “should be brief, clear, and plausible.” (Cicero *De Inv.* I.XX.28) A narrative is plausible (*probabilis*; Quintilian uses the adjective “credible,” *credibilis*; IV.2.52; *very similis* in the Ad *Herennium* I.14, I.16) when “it seems to embody characteristics which are accustomed to appear in real life… if the story fits with the nature of the actors in it, the habits of ordinary people and the beliefs of the audience.” (*De Inv.* I.XXI.29) “[N]arrative credibility [also] depends upon narrator’s authority” (*Inst. Or.* IV.2.125). The purpose of narrative is not simply a statement of facts but persuasion (*Inst. Or.* IV.2.21, 31). As a result, silence and emphasis must
govern the choice of narrative facts (Inst. Or. IV.2.77, 83). In Cicero’s words: “the speaker must bend everything to the advantage of his case, by passing over all things that make against it which can be passed over, by touching lightly on what must be mentioned, and by telling his own side of the story carefully and clearly.” (De Inv. I.XXI.30) The narrative “must start sowing the seeds of proofs,” of the mitigating or aggravating circumstances of a case in a trial that are the proper subject of the next part of an oration: confirmation or proof (Inst. Or. IV.2.54; the theory of circumstances is also known as peristasis; see Robertson 1946:9-10).

“Confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by marshaling arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case.” And those arguments pertain to both “attributes of persons and of actions.”26 (De Inv. I.XXIV.34) For person, Cicero lists such attributes as name, sex, race, place of birth, family, age, but also height, physical strength and appearance, intelligence, and other personality traits. Among the attributes of action, we find time, space, reason, manner, or outcome. Quintilian, in his Institutio Oratoria closely follows Cicero’s treatment in dealing with the credibility of a story (the extent to which it squares with the character of the person and time and place and other characteristics of the action) (Inst. Or. 4.2.52). Of the 10 methods of amplification Erasmus discusses in Copia, Method 8, consists in the use of “the circumstances peculiar to the case … peristases … partly of non-personal … details … place, instrument, time … partly of personal details: race, country, sex, age…” p. 591). According to Erasmus, “one can perceive the true orator anywhere in the speech by the way details of this sort are aptly added to the mixture in the appropriate place. … this feature pervades the whole speech…” (p. 592)

“The refutation is that part of an oration in which arguments are used to impair, disprove, or weaken the confirmation or proof in our opponents; speech.” (De Inv. I.XLII.78) As Cicero
tells his reader, refutation relies on the same forms of invention of confirmation “because any proposition can be attacked by the same methods of reasoning by which it can be supported.” (De Inv. I.XLII.78) Confirmation and refutation are also two of Aphthonius’s *progymnasmata*, in fact, the only two rhetorical exercises, according to Aphthonius, that encompass within themselves “all the power of the art.” (Nadeau 1952:268, 270)

2.1.2.1.2. *Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts?*

At the level of arrangement, frame analysts would have found more ammunition for their conceptual armory. The theory of circumstances, as found in narrative and confirmation, would have given Pan and Kosicki’s (1993:60) and Johnston’s (1995:235-6, 2002:82) a solid foundation for their recommendation of using “story grammars” to uncover the “structural elements” of a frame in texts. After all, the 7 loci of *peristasis*, as laid out by Aphthonius in his *progymnasmata*, are nothing but the five Ws and H of story grammars: Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why (on narrative and the history of the five Ws in rhetoric, see Franzosi, 2011). Narrative would similarly help them with the variable feature of resonance. Both aspects of resonance – credibility and salience – depend upon rhetorical characteristics of narrative (it must be plausible or credible). In particular, empirical credibility depends upon the rhetorical circumstances of the issue. Some of Quintilian’s remarks on narrative shed further light on other aspects of frame analysis and their link to narrative. Quintilian’s “narrator’s authority” is nothing but the credibility of frame articulators. Similarly, Quintilian’s recommendation of the use of narrative silence and emphasis finds a parallel in social movement frames, in the highlighting of issues in both diagnosis and strategic processes (or alignment), where both amplification and transformation require backgrounding and foregrounding of issues.
Confirmation and refutation, on the other hand, would help shed light on aspects of the contested framing process: counterframing and frame disputes (rhetoric has nothing to say about the dialectic between frames and events, a modern problem linked to the study of media effects). And that refutation can depend upon a range of forms of appeal: logical, emotional, ethical, or by the use of wit or eloquence (Corbett and Connors 1999:278-9).

The various sections “Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts?” should leave the reader no doubt about the answer to that question. Indeed, frame analysts would have found in rhetoric a plethora of useful concepts.

**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**

As the snapshot picture of Table 3, on the relationship between framing and rhetorical concepts, shows, all the main concepts of frame analysis find an equivalent in rhetoric. Yet, rhetoric has not exhausted all its possibilities of usefulness to frame analysts. There is more on offer.

**2.1.2.1. Style: Rhetorical Figures**

An orator, to be effective in persuading, must accomplish three goals, according to Cicero: “instruct his listener [docere], give him pleasure [delectare], stir his emotions [movere]” (Cicero, *Brutus*, 185; *De optimo genere oratorum* I.3).²⁷ To these three goals of the orator there correspond three different styles: “the plain style for proof, the middle style for pleasure, the vigorous style for persuasion.” (Cicero *Orator*, 69; see also *De Or.* II.XXVIII.128-129 and *Brutus*, 185).²⁸

The basic ingredients of style have traditionally fallen under the rubric of tropes and schemes (generally subsumed under the term “figure” in modern rhetoric although in earlier periods the term figure was a synonym for scheme; Lausberg 1998: §§ 552-598, 600-910).
Sherry, in his *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550), would write: “thys darre I saye, no eloquente wryter maye be perceiued as he shulde be, wythoute the knowledge of them[figures].”

Already in classical rhetoric we find a discussion of figures.29 Both tropes and schemes involve a change in the “forme of words, oration, or sentence, made new by art, differing from the vulgar maner and custome of writing or speaking” as Peacham writes in his *The Garden of Eloquence* (1593:1). But while the trope changes the meaning of words or sentences, the scheme (or schemates or the Latin *figura*)30 Roman rhetoricians divided the figures into *figures of speech* (*verborum exornationes* or *figurae verborum*) related to verbal expression, and *figures of thought* (*sententiarum exornationes* or *figurae sententiarum*), related to ideas and arguments (and therefore, closely related to topics of invention) (e.g., *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV.13 and IV.46; Quintilian *Inst. Or.* 9.1.17). In Peacham’s words (1593:1): “A Trope is an artificial alteration of a word, or a sentence, from the proper and natural signification to another not proper, but yet nigh, and likely.”31 Trope or figure, the purpose of their use is the same: to “add strength to arguments and give them grace” (Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* 9.1.2).

The number of rhetorical figures grew considerably over the centuries, the Renaissance, with its obsession for classification, bringing out an explosion of terms and sub-terms, from the single-minded emphasis on metaphor by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* and the handful of early “Gorgian figures” to the 64 figures that two centuries later appear in Book IV of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.32 Donatus, introducing a distinction in rhetorical figures between tropes and schemate, in the sections *De schematibus* and *De tropis* of his *Ars Maior* states that there are many schemes, but that the most important ones are only 17 and provides definitions for each; similarly, he lists and defines 13 tropes. Later medieval grammarians and rhetoricians were more prolific in their lists. Alexander of Villa-Dei’s *Doctrinale* (1199) treats 80 figures and Evrard of
Béhune *Graecismum* (1212) covers 103 figures (Camargo 1983: 106; on the number of figures in medieval rhetorical textbooks, see also Murphy 1974:183, 185, 189, 190). And in the Renaissance that number climbed to 132 figures with Susenbrotus and to nearly 200 with Peacham.\(^{33}\)

Medieval rhetoricians also set in motion a process of increasing specialization on tropes and figures. The last part of the popular 1\(^{st}\) century BC *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Book IV dealing with rhetorical figures) started being circulated separately from the rest of the book. Some of the key medieval texts on rhetoric (and grammar) closely followed Book IV of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: from Donatus’s *Ars Maior* (4\(^{th}\) century AD), with its two brief sections *De tropis* and *De schematibus* (and these too were being circulated separately from the rest of the *Ars Maior*) to the Venerable Bede’s *De schematibus et tropis* (written in 701; in Halm 607-618; also partly translated in Copeland and Sluiter, 2009: 267-71). The medievalists’ interest in rhetorical figures continued well into the Renaissance with several new specialized texts, from Petrus Mosellanus’s *Tabulae de Schematibus et Tropis* (1516) to Johannes Susenbrotus’s *Epitome troporum ac schematum* (1540), Richard Sherry’s *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes*, the first treatise in English vernacular (1550), Henry Peacham’s *The Garden of Eloquence*, *Containing the Most Excellent Ornaments, Exornations, Lightes, Flowers, and Forms of Speech, Commonly Called the Figures of Rethorike* (1577, 1593), John Hoskins’s *Directions for Speech and Style* (circa 1600).\(^{34}\)

Little by little, this emphasis on style translated into an emphasis on figures, figures on the four master tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony), and these on metaphor, metaphor taking over the field as the “‘trope of tropes’ (Sojcher), ‘the figure of figures’ (Deguy)”.\(^{35}\) As Genette put it: “[A]t the beginning of the twentieth century, ‘metaphor’ was one
of the rare terms to survive the great shipwreck of rhetoric.” (1982:114) Thus, twentieth-century social scientists working on frames were in good company when they narrowly and generically focused on metaphors as a means to study frames.

And yet, it would be a mistake to think that Renaissance rhetoricians, with their specialized treatment of figures separate from the rest of rhetoric, were unaware of the complex relation between different parts and levels of rhetoric (on this point, see Sister Miriam Joseph 1947:34, 36; Ragsdale 1965; Varga 1983:88-89; Vickers 1988:319). Neither in classical nor in Renaissance rhetoric was there such disconnect. No doubt, both Cicero and Quintilian were well aware of the nature of rhetoric as an organic whole where the various parts and levels are all interrelated. At the end of his Topica and after a series of (rhetorical) questions, Cicero remarks (23.87): “Our next task is to consider what topics are suited to each question.” He goes on to list the topics most suitable for the different types of speeches (deliberative, judicial, epideictic) (24.91) and for the different parts of speech (e.g., introduction, narrative, conclusion) (26.97). But if that is true for topics, when it comes to “the figures’ function … Cicero is disappointing.” (Vickers 1970:98; see also Brennan 1960:60) With little interest in taxonomy, Cicero did not go beyond providing a simple list of figures without naming them (e.g., Orator 39.135-139, De Oratore 3.201-205; despite his cursory treatment of figures “Cicero knew his trade” and used a large number of rhetorical figures very effectively for his purposes; Vickers 1988:312). We have to wait for the Rhetorica ad Herennium, traditionally wrongly attributed to Cicero, and for Quintilian for a more extensive treatment of the figures. The last book (Book 4) of the ad Herennium is wholly dedicated to the discussion of 64 figures, with definitions, examples of use, and, occasionally, functions and pitfalls (e.g., “personification may be applied to a variety of things… It is most useful in dealing with amplification and appeal to pity”, IV.66). Quintilian
dedicates two books (8 and 9) of his *Institutio Oratoria* to figures, defining each figure, providing examples of its use, and, although mostly interested in general principles, occasionally commenting on a figure’s function and its relationship to means of persuasion (logos, pathos, ethos) and parts of speech.

Renaissance rhetoricians were no less aware of the connection between style and the rest of rhetoric (invention in particular) *even* when they wrote specialized treatises on figures. Indeed, “it would be a mistake to regard the treatises of the figurists as limited to a discussion of style in the narrow sense.” (Sister Miriam Joseph 1947:34) Both Melanchton and Peacham, for instance, while classifying figures along the traditional lines (of words and thought, tropes) they also provide separate classifications by means of persuasive appeals (Sister Miriam Joseph 1947:38-39). Thus, in his *Elementa rhetorices* (1531), Melanchthon (1531:48-54) classified approximately forty of the figures of thought under selected topics of logic (definition, division, cause, contraries, similitudes, genus, circumstances and signs) (Sister Miriam Joseph 1947:38-39). Among 16th century English rhetoricians, Peacham stands out for his innovative approach to figures. In the second edition (1593) of his *The Garden of Eloquence*, Peacham divided his 193 figures (Crane 1954:11) into three orders: a first order of grammatical figures (“figures of words”), and a second and third order of “figures of sentences”, with the second order figures being mainly of pathos and the third of logos. (Peacham 1593:120)

Peacham does not content himself with depicting the relationship between means of persuasions and figures in broad paint strokes. For each figure, he also provides a brief section titled “The use of this figure” where he specifies what the figure should be used for (and in a subsequent section titled “The Caution” he also warns the reader about pitfalls to avoid in the use of the figure). Thus, for pathos, among the figures of exclamation, *ecphonesis* can be used “to
expresse the greatness of our affections and passions, and thereby to move the like affection in our hearers” (1593:63) and mempsis can be similarly used “to move compassion” (1593:66); and for logos, amplification “was first devised to increase causes” and parenthesis “serveth to confirme the saying by the interposition of a reason, and to confute the objection by the timely prevention of an answere” (1593:198-99). It is in the detail of Peacham’s use of the figures that we find proof of his deep understanding of figures in their relation to ethos or epideictic rhetoric (e.g., Prosographia … pertaineth to many purposes, as to praise, to dispraise, to delight, and to engrave in perpetuall memory the descriptions of great persons” (1593:136); similarly, “Eulogia … tendeth to the extolling and praise”).

Compared to Peacham, other 16th century English rhetoricians (e.g., Sherry, Puttenham, Hoskins) are much more traditional in their approach to figures, with their long lists of figures made up of definitions and examples. Yet, even these authors reveal a deep understanding of the close connection between figures and other parts of rhetoric. And that deep understanding is there even in the contemporary French rhetorician Peter Ramus, often attributed with dealing a fatal blow to rhetoric – after all, it was Ramus who relegated the domain of rhetoric to style, invention and arrangement being part of dialectic in his scheme. As Peter Mack argues, Ramus strongly believed that dialectic and rhetoric should be studied together, making the separation hardly relevant (Mack 2011:142-145).

Perhaps not surprisingly, at the end of a learned excursus of rhetorical authors, spanning from Aristotle’s times to the 18th century, Vickers concludes: “A figure has always a function.” (1970:121) And that function is linked not just to style (lexis or elocutio) but to all other parts of rhetoric, from invention (through topics) to arrangement (different figures are more suitable for different parts of speech), from species of rhetoric (deliberative, judiciary, epideictic) to means
of persuasion (pathos, logos, ethos) (on rhetoric as an organic whole, see our convenient summary of Table 4).48

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

2.1.2.1.1. Anything of Use Here to Frame Analysts?

“Every figure – writes Varga (1983:86) – should be defined as part of elocution, but at the same time it should be mentioned in relation to the topic within which it usually appears and functions, in the chapter on invention.” That task has yet to be fully carried out. Aphthonius, in his *progymnasmata*, clearly lists the topics to be used in each exercise, but there is no mention of figures. Roman rhetoricians only made passing references to the function of figures in relation to broader aspects of rhetoric (notably, means of persuasion). Most Renaissance rhetoricians followed suit, albeit adding more figures to the list and, occasionally, introducing more formal classifications.49 In modern times, Sister Miriam Joseph (1947:36) provides perhaps the only exhaustive classification at hand of some 200 Renaissance figures in “groups fulfilling four fundamental functions”: grammar, logos, pathos, and ethos (see Ragsdale 1965 and Vickers 1970:93-121 for a later classification of figures along similar lines).

In the lack of a consistent and agreed upon classification of rhetorical figures, we attempt to follow up on Varga’s recommendation by bringing together in Table 5 what we know from various authors about figures in relation to topics and means of persuasion.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The table is not meant to be exhaustive – a task that would prove to be elusive, given that different authors worked with different figures or used the same figure for different purposes. But, fluid and changing as the number and classification of figures have been over the long course of the history of rhetoric, they do highlight an important point: that general rhetorical
goals (e.g., of logos, pathos, ethos) are achieved through concrete and specific rhetorical mechanisms rooted in the effective use of language through topics and figures. And there is the problem, “a fundamental problem,” in Varga’s rendering: “the lower the level [of rhetorical mechanisms], the more precisely we can describe it. … The highest levels [e.g., logos, pathos, ethos] are the most powerful and the least precise; that is the problem” (1983:91).

It is at the lowest level of rhetoric, at the level of figures and their function in relation to broader rhetorical categories, that frame analysts would have found in rhetoric a range of useful tools of analysis – tools useful not only for the development of frame analysis conceptual apparatus (see Table 4) but also for the concrete measurement of frames with a variety of specific devices well beyond metaphors and generic catch phrases. The data in Table 5 allows us to ground in a set of specific rhetorical figures found in concrete language use the highly abstract concepts, both frame analytical and rhetorical, displayed in Table 4. Thus, the motivational framing task does not just find an equivalent in abstract rhetorical means of persuasion (or motivational call) but in specific figures (e.g., enthymeme, sorites, or syllogismus for logos; adhortatio, adynaton, or cataplexis for pathos; anamnesis, litotes, or paronomasia for ethos). Similarly, amplification is not the result of the use of abstract common topics (in particular, comparison and relationship), but of these topics as expressed in concrete instances of figures, as first listed by Melanchthon in his third-order figures,50 with Susenbrotus (Epitome 1540 2.2.3), Peacham (The Garden of Eloquence 1593:119), and Hoskins (Directions for Speech and Style circa 1600) following that lead. We leave it to the reader to use the data in Table 5 to check the correspondence between figures and broader rhetorical categories, in particular, means of appeal and topics. One thing should be clear: What one finds in texts when dealing with persuasion goes well beyond metaphors and generic catch phrases.
Johnston’s view of the “text as a holistic construct” (1995:221) would have found a sympathetic ear among classical and Renaissance rhetoricians with their organic view of rhetoric as an integrated whole. His reference to “discursive cues … the nonverbal channels of information [that] also convey meaning… [such as] inflection, tone, pitch, cadence, melodic contours of speech” would find in the rhetorical canon of delivery a rich tradition (1995:228). The “micro-discourse analysis” he proposes, the attention he advocates for the micro aspects of text and their relationship to macro structures, finds parallels in rhetoric, as highlighted in Table 5. An understanding of the categories of elocution/style would have also given greater concreteness to Pan and Kosicki’s generic reference to syntactical structures (1993:59). Although syntax is beyond the realm of rhetoric and more appropriately belongs to grammar, many of the rhetorical figures have to do with syntactical structures or, more generally, with linguistic elements of style. Cicero dedicates nearly half of his Orator to the discussion of those figures, without specifically naming them, that contribute to “the two things that please the ear: sound and rhythm.” (Orator 44-236; quote 163) In Melanchton, Susenbrotus, and Peacham you find a first order of figures more closely akin to grammatical figures and further classified according to their function: repetition (e.g., Epanaphora, Ploce, Paroemion), omission (e.g., Zeugma, Asyndeton), conjunction (e.g., Polysindeton, Homeoteleuton), and separation (Paranomasia, Membrum, Taxis).

2 Frame Analysis and Rhetoric: A Missed Opportunity for a Fruitful Encounter?

Dealing with persuasion and texts, surely, frame analysts should have come across rhetoric. But anyone looking for rhetoric in the large body of scholarly work produced by frame analysts will be disappointed. Rhetoric only makes fleeting appearances. In a rare glimpse on the relation between frame analysis and rhetoric, Gamson and Lasch suggest that “tropes or figures of speech” provide an alternative terminology for these devices (1983:399). Similarly, Pan and Kosicki write: “Rhetorical structures of news discourse describe the stylistic choices made by
journalists in relation to their intended effects.” (1993:61) But beyond these cursory references to rhetoric, frame analysts have ignored rhetoric. Gerhards and Rucht, in a study that deals with “argumentative persuasion” (1992:586) never use the word “rhetoric” and never mention Toulmin’s argumentative model, one of the most important twentieth-century developments in rhetoric (1969). Gerhards and Rucht are hardly alone in their neglect of 2500 years of rhetorical writing. As our summary of Table 6 shows, rhetoric only makes fleeting appearances, and even then with no more than a handful of lines at best. Instead, gropingly looking for answers to their quest (as the publication dates of development show in Tables 1-3), frame analysts introduced new concepts and new terminology (but with an impoverished content) for very old ideas.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

How did this happen? That frame analysis should have ignored rhetoric. That frame analysts, in developing an approach that deals at its core with issues of persuasion, should not have followed in the footsteps of generations of school pupils that for twenty five hundred years poured their souls in the study of rhetoric. Because however scant schools were, and however little pupils learned in those schools, they learned rhetoric. Rhetoric, after all, was one of the cornerstones of the trivium, the three ways, the foundation of all education until as recently as two centuries ago: grammar, rhetoric, and logic (or dialectic). The trivium (and rhetoric) was not an early curriculum, but a curriculum that was repeated at varying levels of depth and difficulty throughout a student’s learning life. Only at the BA level in university would the arts of the quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) be taught, followed by the supreme teaching of philosophy.

According to the ratio studiorum, the comprehensive curricular plan of studies adopted by the Jesuit colleges in the second half of the 16th century, pupils entering the college at age 10 or
11 would spend their first five years studying grammar, then one year of humanities, and a further year of rhetoric (Lang, 1952: 288; Moss, 1986: 138). Elizabethan English grammar schools “encouraged a range of rhetorical skills” – Mack lists and discusses eleven such rhetorical skills (2002: 32-46) – the school syllabi often extolling high praises for the study of rhetoric (Mack, 2002: 46, 45). The study of rhetoric continued at university. At Cambridge, BA students dedicated their first year, out of four, to the study of rhetoric; at Oxford, students dedicated two beginning terms, out of sixteen of their BA course, to the study of grammar and four terms to rhetoric (Mack, 2002: 51; more generally, see the entire chapter on “Rhetoric and dialectic at Oxford and Cambridge”, Mack, 2002: 48-75).

In schools, pupils learned rhetoric through a variety of pedagogical means, from exercises, letter writing, essays, orations, debates, commonplace books. Both Cicero and Quintilian prescribed rhetorical exercises, traditionally called *progymnasmata*, as part of the hard graft of learning (Clark, 1952: 259). The very last words of the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* insist on this point: “All these faculties we shall attain if we supplement the precepts of theory with diligent practice.” (IV.69) All Renaissance rhetoricians, from Agricola to Erasmus, Melanchthon and Soarez, drove the same point home: that learning required continuous exercise. From the medieval tradition of the *ars dictaminis*, Renaissance rhetoricians inherited the practice of letter writing. Among the requirements of Jesuit colleges were daily practices in writing and oral public declamations and disputationes (taking both sides of an argument, *argumentum in contrarias partes* or *in utramque partem*) and, monthly, the writing of a complete oration. To this not-short list of rhetorical exercises, the Renaissance added the commonplace book, collections of quotes on various topics (originally, moral issues, such as honor, virtue, vice, beauty, life, death, friendship, hate, but later expanded to include theological, philosophical, historical, and
scientific issues). Quintilian best expresses the point of these exercises: not learning by rote, where pupils mechanically apply a set of rhetorical rules, through which “they will only achieve dumb knowledge” (X 119), but repeated exercise so that the intelligent application of the rules most appropriate for a specific case becomes natural and unconscious (see Leff, 1983: 34):

(Quintilian X 125):

But it is only by constant practice that we can secure that, just as the hands of the musician, even though his eyes be turned elsewhere produce bass, treble, or intermediate notes by force of habit, so the thought of orator should suffer no delay owing to the variety and number of possible arguments, but that the latter should present themselves uncalled, and just as letters and syllables require no thought on the part of a writer, so arguments should spontaneously follow the thought of the orator.

By the end of the 16th century, the flurry of Renaissance titles on rhetoric by Valla, Agricola, Erasmus, Melanchthon, Ramus and others ultimately exhausted the topic. Under the combined attack of Kantian continental philosophy (for Kant “rhetoric … produced nothing but fraudulent discourse”, White, 1997:25) and English utilitarian philosophy (Bentham saw “rhetoric as the very antithesis of rational discourse” White, 1997:26), the nineteenth century led to “the suppression of rhetoric” (see White’s essay title 1997). No surprise if, in 1936, in the Mary Flexner lectures delivered at Bryn Mawr College, I.A. Richards would tell his audience: “I need spend no time, I think, in describing the present state of Rhetoric. … So low has Rhetoric sunk that we would do better just to dismiss it to Limbo than to trouble ourselves with it” (1936:3).

A handful of years later, Dorothy Sayers would tell an Oxford audience that today’s students have lost the “tools of learning.” They “learn everything, except the art of learning.” (Sayers, 1948: 1) They learn “subjects,” more and more subjects in fact, but they “have lost the tools of
learning – the axe and the wedge, the hammer and the saw, the chisel and the plane – that were so adaptable to all tasks.” (Sayers, 1948: 12) Regretfully, modern students go through a “new and extended Quadrivium without passing through the Trivium.” (Sayers, 1948: 12) The trivium was the house of rhetoric.

No doubt, when medieval and especially Renaissance students approached a text, they did so with a wide range of tools (Mack, 2002: 46). Sayers’s “tools of learning” lost, it is perhaps not surprising that late 20th century social scientists dealing with the persuasive aspects of texts would disregard rhetoric and develop a long and complex list of interrelated terms and definitions of their own, something they called frame analysis. That they should have accomplished this in twenty five years, instead of twenty five hundred years, is perhaps remarkable. Perhaps, a missed opportunity.
Printed Primary Sources

Bibliography


n
n


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tasks</strong></td>
<td>select aspects of reality and make them salient; promote problem definitions; promote causal interpretation; promote moral evaluation; propose solutions to defined problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Frame Primary Concepts and Symbolic Devices According to the Media Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic Devices</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasoning/Thematic</strong></td>
<td>Roots consequences appeals to principles hypothesis/testing elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Framing/Rhetorical</strong></td>
<td>Metaphors Exemplars catch phrases Depictions Images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syntactical</strong></td>
<td>words dispositions phrases dispositions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Script</strong></td>
<td>story grammars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Frame Concepts According to the Social Movement Literature
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>First Level</th>
<th>Second Level</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Tasks</td>
<td>Diagnosis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Snow and Benford 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prognosis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivational</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic Features</td>
<td>punctuating</td>
<td>attributional</td>
<td>Snow and Benford 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Features</td>
<td>issues of interest and their attributions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Snow and Benford 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mobilizing potency</td>
<td>Amplification (or elaboration)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resonance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scope and influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing Processes</td>
<td>discursive</td>
<td>articulation</td>
<td>Snow et al. 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategic (alignment)</td>
<td>amplification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bridging</td>
<td>extension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transformation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>counterframing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>internal disputes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dialectic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>frame/events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic Devices&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argumentative structures</td>
<td>thematic components of an argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relations among thematic components of an argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic elements&lt;sup&gt;56&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>items defining the speech situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>items showing the social role of the message producer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possible non verbal cues (if oral text)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interactive elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elements generating an holistic view of the text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic Structures</td>
<td>story grammars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Frame Primary Concepts and Symbolic Devices According to the Social Movement Literature
Table 3: Frame Analysis and Rhetoric: Concepts side-by-side
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Typologies</th>
<th>Categories of Rhetorical Items</th>
<th>Sub-categories of Rhetorical Items</th>
<th>Rhetorical items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of Persuasion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logos</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathos</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethos</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Species of Rhetoric</strong></td>
<td>Deliberative (or Political)</td>
<td>Exhortation/dissuasion</td>
<td>- Good/unworthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial (or Forensic)</td>
<td>Accusation/defence</td>
<td>- Right/wrong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epideictic</td>
<td>Praise/blame</td>
<td>- Virtue/vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Five Canons of Rhetoric</strong></td>
<td>Invention</td>
<td>Common topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of definition</td>
<td>- Genus/species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of division</td>
<td>- Whole/parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of comparison</td>
<td>- Subject/adjuncts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Similarity/difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Cause/effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Antecedent/consequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Contraries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of relationship</td>
<td>- Contradictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of circumstances</td>
<td>- Possible/impossible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of circumstances</td>
<td>- Past/future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of circumstances</td>
<td>- Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Maxims or Proverbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Rumors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Oaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- Precedent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of testimony</td>
<td>- The supernatural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Topics of notation and conjugates</td>
<td>- Various figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arrangement</strong></td>
<td>Of order</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Various figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Style</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Diction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Sentence structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delivery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Figures of thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Figures of speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Gesture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Levels and Categories of Rhetoric
Table 5: Classification of figures by means of persuasion and topic of invention
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Scholar</th>
<th>Rhetorical concept/term</th>
<th>N. Sentences</th>
<th>N. Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Gamson and Lasch</td>
<td>Tropes or figures of speech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Gamson and Modigliani</td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2, 3, 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Gerhards and Rucht</td>
<td>Persuasive communication</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>574, 586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Argumentative persuasion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Pan and Kosicki</td>
<td>Syntactical structure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Story grammar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rhetorical structure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lexical choices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Tankard</td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Johnston</td>
<td>Story grammar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Rhetorical Concepts/Terms Mentioned in Framing Literature\(^{57}\)
Endnotes

1 Benford and Snow (2000: 611), Pan and Kosicki (1993: 56-57), Snow and Benford (1992: 136), Tannen (1993: 15). In psychology and artificial intelligence scholars have also devised a series of kindred concepts (e.g., scheme and script). For a more in-depth treatment, see Tannen (1993: 15-21).

2 The 1983 chapter, in fact, had been published in December 1980 as a CRSO Working Paper No. 221.

3 Gamson’s broader concepts rely on Bateson’s and Goffman’s definition of frames as a “central organizing idea for understanding events related to the issue in question” (Gamson and Lasch 1983: 398). Media produce “interpretative packages” through framing and reasoning devices (generically referred to as “symbolic devices”; Gamson and Lasch 1983: 399; namely, elements clearly identifiable and measurable in texts. Framing devices (i.e., metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images) “suggest how to think about the issue,” reasoning devices (i.e., roots, consequences, and appeals to principle) provide justification (Gamson and Lasch 1983: 399).

4 The sample of both studies includes commentaries and cartoons from ABC, CBS, NBC, Newsweek, Time Magazine, U.S. News and World Report, a regionally stratified sample of 50 metropolitan daily newspapers and of the 10 largest-circulation daily newspapers in each of five regions (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 152, 1989: 10).


7 The discussion in this section follows the classification scheme found in Benford and Snow (2000). During the over decade-long period of development of their conceptual framework, in fact, Benford and Snow grouped differently some of their frame categories, albeit keeping definitions by and large consistent. Thus, in Snow and Benford (1988), diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation are introduced as core framing tasks under no other category. But in Snow and Benford (1992:137), they introduce a more complex conceptual scheme where core framing tasks are subsumed under other concepts. In particular, frames have “characteristic features” and these features consist of punctuation, attribution, and articulation. Diagnosis and prognosis are subsumed under attribution; motivation is not mentioned. In Benford and Snow (2000:615), the classification scheme changes yet again. Characteristic features now comprise core framing tasks (diagnosis, prognosis, motivation) and discursive processes (articulation and amplification or punctuation, but in 1992 punctuation was classified under frame characteristic features).
The concept of resonance similarly changes overtime. In Snow and Benford, 1988, empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity are referred to as “phenomenological constraints” to the mobilizing potency of a frame, i.e., its ability to mobilize a target audience (Snow and Benford 1988:208). In Snow and Benford, 1992, empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and ideational centrality or narrative fidelity are the constituent components of resonance (Snow and Benford 1992:140). In Benford and Snow, 2000, resonance becomes a more complex category made up of credibility and salience, each in turn made up of consistency, empirical credibility, credibility of frame articulators, and centrality, empirical commensurability, narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000:619).

The concept of mobilizing potency similarly shifts overtime. In Snow and Benford, 1988, potency is affected by core framing tasks and a set of constraints (in later work to be formally subsumed under resonance). In Snow and Benford, 1992, potency is affected by a frame’s restricted/elaborative feature and resonance, i.e., by some of a frame’s variable features, but not its characteristic features of the core framing tasks. In Benford and Snow, 2000, we find a similar characterization of mobilizing potency in terms of variable features.

8 Gamson (1992) provides a set of core elements that overlap with those of Snow and Benford (1988). He distinguishes among three specific frame components: injustice, agency, and identity. The injustice component provides the moral connotation of the frame. The agency component refers to the possibility to alter problematic conditions. It denies the immutability of the social order and supports the efficacy of social action. The identity component provides the sort of self-awareness any social movement raises for both internal and external purposes.

9 In Benford and Snow (2000:618) this feature is referred to as “problem identification.”

10 Gamson explores the way people discuss and frame political ideas in the context of focus groups (1992). The author shows how frame articulation and amplification provide the first steps for the formulation of political ideas.

11 In 1992, Snow and Benford use the concept of punctuation and not articulation, but with the same basic meaning.

12 Gamson explores the way people discuss and frame political ideas in the context of focus groups (1992). The author shows how frame articulation and amplification provide the first steps for the formulation of political ideas.

13 See also Tarrow (1992:188).

14 Snow et al. (1986:469-70) suggest “two varieties of frame amplification: value amplification and belief amplification.” “Value amplification refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for
any number of reasons.” Belief amplification deals with “five basic beliefs: … (1) … about seriousness of the problem, issue, or grievance in question …; (2) beliefs about the locus of causality or blame …; (3) stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence…; (4) beliefs about the probability of change or the efficacy of collective action…; and (5) beliefs about the necessity and propriety of ‘standing up.’”

For Gerhads and Rucht “frame bridging is central for mobilization processes because it forms the connection between the level of mesomobilization and that of micromobilization” (1992:584). Reiter et al. (2007) recognize this connection between meso and micromobilization in the Global Justice Movement, where the “condensation” of different problematic issues in a “meta-target” - neoliberal globalisation - bridges different local movements (Reiter et al. 2007:68).

From sampling of documents to inter-coder reliability, methods used to assess the role of frames.

Also “bene dicendi scientia” (Quintilian Inst. Or. 2.14.5). Grammar, on the other hand, is the “recte loquendi scientia,” the art (or science) of correct speaking/writing (Quintilian Inst. Or. 1.4.2; see Lausberg 1998: §§ 11, 17).

From Martianus Capella to Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidore (in Copeland and Sluiter 2009: 162, 190, 197, 224, 241). Still centuries later, Soarez will repeat that refrain. It is that connection between rhetoric and persuasion that rendered rhetoric suspicious in the public eyes from the start. Socrates, in his dialogue with the self-declared rhetorician Gorgias clearly takes the view that there is nothing good about rhetoric (Plato, Gorgias, 461a, 463a, 466a, 463d; see also Cicero’s doubts, De inv. I.1). As a result, rhetoricians insisted on the moral obligations of the orator who must be “a good man skilled in speaking” (Quintilian, Inst. Or. 12.1.1), a refrain repeated through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

During the late Middle Ages, the concept of logos tended to have different interpretations; pathos and ethos became psychological means of persuasion primarily used by Christian preachers to address the people (Murphy 1981: 111, 276-277).

To be precise, “we do not know what person or what school established the so-called ‘five canons’” (Murphy 1990:242). But Aristotle dedicates the first two books of his Rhetoric to the discussion of invention and its special and common topics. In Book 3 he discusses at length issues of lexis and taxis, of style and arrangement (chapters 1-12 and 13-19 respectively). He only cursorily deals with delivery in chapter 1. There is no mention of memory, the other faculty that an orator needs to be effective.

“The term ‘topic’ – Leff wrote – incorporates [such] a bewildering diversity of meanings” that “it would be futile
to attempt to understand the topics as a single, coherent doctrine.” (Leff, 1983:23-24)

22 This division was later adopted by other rhetoricians (e.g., Cicero and Quintilian). Cicero and Quintilian, however, also introduced different classifications of topics (e.g., between topics associated with the person and with the act as part of the theory of circumstances (Leff 1983:24; Lausberg 1998: § 374; Mortensen 2008: 37, 53).

23 For the history of topics and their changing numbers see Sister Miriam Joseph (1947:22-31). See also Lanham (1991:167-168). For a lengthy discussion of these topics and subtopics, adapted for the modern reader, see Corbett and Connors (1999: 87-121).


25 The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium lists the same six parts, but recommends flexibility in ordering them (III.17).

26 These attributes, as they may be offered in both narratio and confirmatio in connection with either the plausibility of the story told (I.XXI.29) or of the arguments made, is also known as the mitigating circumstances of a case (on these points, see Robertson 1946:9).

27 Cicero did not use consistently this terminology (in particular, movere is also referred to as conciliare, concitare, flectere). Yet, the terminology docere, movere, delectare was to become standard through the centuries (e.g., Quintilian, Inst. Or. Premium, Book 8 paragraph 7, 12.2.11, 12.10.59).

28 The division in three styles was to become standard through the centuries (e.g., Rhetorica ad Herennium IV.VIII.11, without reference to the three different goals of an orator; Quintilian Inst. Or. 3.2). You will still find it in Melanchton (Istitutiones Rhetoricæ 1529:13).

29 A handful of rhetorical figures used by Gorgias of Leontini in his Encomium of Helen (fifth century B.C.), although not labeled them as such by him, are known as the “Gorgian figures”: antithesis, isocolon, homoeoptoton, homoeoteleuton, and paronomasia (Murphy et al. 2003:141). These figures were used to create the symmetric Gorgian style discussed by Cicero (e.g., Orator 92, 95, also 80-86).

30 Bede, in his De schematibus et tropis, “On figures” writes: “The grammarians, using a Greek term, call this schema, we rightly call it a ‘dressing,’ ‘form,’ or ‘figure,’ because through it discourse is so to speak dressed up and ornamented.” (in Copeland and Sluiter 2009: 267). For the equation of the two terms, see Susenbrotus (Epitome troporum ac schematum, 1540: 8).
See also Wilson in his 1577 *The Garden of Eloquence*, Melanchthon in his *Istitutiones Rhetoricae* (1529: 15), Susenbrotus in *Epitome troporum ac schematum* (1540: 8-9; for the exact same definitions, see also Donatus and Bede in Copeland and Sluiter 2009: 97, 268).

It is not known how the handful of Gorgian figures (never named, in any case, by Gorgias, Murphy et al. 2003:133) and Aristotle’s emphasis on metaphor turned into the 64 *exornationes* of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (on this issue, see Murphy 1990:242). For sure, neither Gorgias nor Aristotle were interested in the taxonomy of figures, the *ad Herennium* being the first extant ancient rhetorical treatise to classify figures (Murphy et al. 2003:133-34).

See Corbett and Connors 1999:378; Mack 2002:85; for listings of Renaissance figures, see Taylor 1937; Dupriez 1984; Lanham, 1991; Sonnino 1968; for a comparative table across 16 different authors from classical to Renaissance times, see Sister Miriam Joseph 1947:35.

On English style manuals, see Mack (2002:84-95); see also Mack (2011:208-227) for Renaissance manuals of tropes and figures.


Cicero acknowledges that some topics are polysemically suited to deal with more questions, although probably better suited for specific questions. On the polysemic nature of figures (rather than topic) see the general discussion by Vickers (1988:307-334, passim).


For example, for pathos: *dissimulatio* induces laughter (Quintilian *Inst. Or*. 9.2.14); *asynedeton* “produce[s] outbursts of emotion” (9.3.50, 9.3.54); for logos: *praesumptio* is used to anticipate critiques to our arguments and usable anywhere in a speech but, particularly, in the introduction (9.2.16); *dubitatio* adds credibility to speech (9.2.19); “*enthymeme* is not [only] used to prove something but also to ornate the sentence” (8.5.9-10); “The other tropes left to describe are not used for meaning, but to embellish speech and to amplify it” (8.6.40). More generally, in reference to logos, Quintilian writes: “As far as proofs are concerned, the use of figures lends strengths to our arguments and makes them penetrate in the judges’ souls without making them aware of this” (Inst. Or. 9.1.19). He also adds that figures are very effective for pathos, in moving the audience (9.1.21) and for ethos, in endearing a character (9.1.21).
At a general level, Quintilian, following Aristotle (Rhetoric 1414b), states: “The same ornaments are not suitable for demonstrative, deliberative, and judiciary causes.” (Quintilian Inst. Or. 8.3.11 Italian; also 8.3.13-14) He also states: “we must clarify with which metaphors, which figures, which concepts, and finally with which collocation we can achieve our purposes.” (Inst. Or. 8.3.41)


A classification of figures in three orders was first introduced by Melanchton and, in slightly different form, by Susenbrotus (who acknowledges Melanchton’s influence upon his classification), both authors serving as the basis for Peacham’s classification (on this point, see Brennan 1960:64-66).

“The first order containeth those figures which do make the oration plaine, pleasant, and beautifull, pertaining rather to words then to sentences, and rather to harmonie and pleasant proportion, then to gravitie and dignitie”. (pp. 40-41) Peacham further subdivides the figures of this first order according to their function: repetition (e.g., Epanaphora, Ploce, Paroemion), omission (e.g., Zeugma, Asyndeton), conjunction (e.g., Polysindeton, Homeoteleuton), and separation (Paranomasia, Membrum, Taxis).

Again, in Peacham’s words: “Figures of Sentences are those by which either our affections are elegantly expressed [pathos], or matters mightily magnified [logos].” (p. 91)

“The difference between the figures of words, and the figures of sentences is great, found both in their formes and effectes, for the figures of wordes are as it were effeminate, and musicall, the figures of sentences are manly, and martiall, those of words are as it were the colour and beautie, these of sentences are as the life and affection, which are divided into figures of affection [pathos], and figures of Amplication [logos].” (p. 91)

Sherry’s Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550) provides a long list of names and definitions with some examples of their use, but also includes a brief section on topics of invention (e.g., amplification through comparison, circumstances) and makes occasional remarks about the purpose of a figure, particularly in its relation to pathos (e.g., “Pathopeia… … expressyng of vehement affeccions and perturbacions, of ye whych ther be two sortes. The fyrste called Donysis, or intencion, and some call it imaginacion, wherby feare, anger, madnes, hatered, enuye, and lyke other perturbacions of mynde is shewed and described… Another forme is called Oictros, or cõmiseracion, wherby teares be pyked out, or pyty is moued, or forgeuenes …”, §§ 67-68).

George Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie, first published in 1589, is dedicated to the study of poetry, one third of the book dealing with ornament. Like all the other treatises, The Arte of English Poesie defines each
ornamental figure, provides examples of its use, and unlike other treatises, is very explicit about what the reader should see in the example. After all, his audience is not the learned scholars, but the “Ladies and young Gentlewomen, or idle Courtiers, desirous to become skilful in their owne mother tongue, and for their private recreation to make now & then ditties of pleasure”. Contrary to Peacham, Puttenham does not discuss the function of the figures. Yet, even in poetry, “the world of nought” rather than the political or judicial worlds, ornament is not simply for delight. There are, in fact, “two sortes” of ornament, “one to satisfie & delight th'eare onely by a goodly outward shew fet vpon the matter with wordes, and speaches smothly and tunably running: another by certaine intendments or sence of such wordes & speeches inwardly working a stirre to the mynde”. Puttenham calls *auricular* the figures that “satisfie & delight th'eare onely” and *sensible* the ones that “geue it [speech] efficacie by sence.” He would write: “a figure is euer vsed to a purpose, either of beautie or of efficacie: and these last recited be to no purpose, for neither can ye say that it vrges affection, nor that it beautifieth or enforceth the sence, nor hath any other subtilitie in it, and therfore is a very foolish impertinency of speech, and not a figure.”

We find a similar approach to figures in John Hoskins’s short treatise *Directions for Speech and Style* (circa 1600): a list of figures, grouped in figures for varying, amplifying, and illustrating, with definitions, examples, caveats. Hoskins shows a keen awareness of the use of figures in relation to other parts of rhetoric to achieve specific purposes. Thus, *accumulation*, a figure of amplification (the “heaping up of many terms of praise or accusing” (epideictic rhetoric) and where “the use of this amplification to be in anger, detestation, commiseration, and such passions as you, seeming thoroughly possessed with, would willingly stir in others.” (pathos).

46 For such stereotypical presentation of Ramus’s work, see Perelman (1982:3-4).

47 On the role of Agricola, Vives, Melanchthon, and Ramus in revolutionizing the field of rhetoric ultimately relegating rhetoric to the study of style (figures of speech, in particular) see Mack (1992).

48 Categories in the table are presented left-to-right hierarchically, with rhetorical items below/inside sub-categories of rhetorical items, which in turn are below/inside categories of rhetorical items. With many scholars pulling and tugging at definitions over the centuries, the classification of Table 4 is only one of many possible classifications, albeit one that draws attention to the main categories of rhetoric. Indeed, already Quintilian, in *Institutio Oratoria* (3.4), would provide other possible divisions of oratory handed down from antiquity.

49 Consider Peacham’s classification of figures into three different orders or Hoskins’s classification of figures for varying, amplifying, and illustrating. Melanchthon, in his *Institutiones Rhetorices* (1523 b6r-b7v; c8v-d1r.), and
Susenbrotus, in his *Epitome* (1540 2.2.3), in order to avoid the overlap between figures of speech and of thought introduced a third category of *figures of amplification*.

50 *Institutiones Rhetorices* (1523 b6r-b7v; c8v-d1r). In Peacham’s word: “The figures of this order be such, which for the most part do both amplifie” (1593:119).

51 Schools were indeed scant throughout Europe in the Early Middle Ages, and even scantier the good teachers On schools in Europe in this period, see Deanesly and Bateson (1926). We have to wait until the rise of universities in the late 12th century and the 13th century to witness a resurgence of scholarship (the first universities set up in Europe were: Bologna in 1088, Paris, 1150, Oxford, 1167, Modena, 1175, Valencia, 1208, Cambridge, 1209, Salamanca, 1218, Montpellier, 1220, Padua, 1222, Toulouse, 1229, and Orleans, 1235). We have to wait even longer until the 16th century to see a general expansion in the provision of education across Europe. In England, according to Jordan’s survey of ten counties, there were some 34 schools open to the laity in 1480, but, by 1660, 410 new, mostly grammar schools opened (Jordan, 1959: 279-91; see also Stone, 1964: 68). No less revolutionary was the concomitant expansion of Jesuit Colleges across Europe (e.g., Lang, 1952; Moss, 1986).

52 On rhetoric and the curriculum in English grammar schools, see the first chapter of Mack’s excellent book on Elizabethan rhetoric, “Rhetoric in the grammar school” (Mack, 2002: 11-47).

53 On the tradition of commonplaces, see Lechner (1962), Moss (1996).

54 Yet, rhetoric made an unexpected come back in the late 20th century under the influence of post-modernity with its linguistic and rhetorical turn. A number of important theoretical developments appeared (e.g., Toulmin, 1969; Perelman, 1969). A deluge of work bearing the word “rhetoric” in the titles flooded the scholarly market well beyond the humanities (e.g., Edmondson, 1984; McCloskey, 1985; Nelson et al., 1987; Billig, 1987; Kirk, 1992; Fahnestock, 1999; Finocchiaro, 1980).

55 The symbolic devices listed in this table are “new” devices, in addition

56 We use the label “linguistic elements,” following Johnston’s stress on the “ongoing empirical dialogue between linguistic behavior and the mental processes they are said to manifest” (Johnston 1995: 219).

57 The word rhetoric does appear in several studies of framing, but never in relation to a two-and-a-half millennia old branch of knowledge but as a generic adjective. Gitlin (1980), for instance, mentions rhetoric 28 times but in its common meaning and never as a methodological tool of investigation.