



Ca' Foscari
University
of Venice

Department of Economics

2026 Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory - European Workshop on Economic Theory

June 10th-12th, 2026

San Giobbe Economics Campus, Venice

Programme

Updated: May 18th, 2026



Wednesday, June 10th, 2026

14.00-14.30	Registration
14.30-16.30	Contributed Sessions 1
16.30-17.00	Coffee Break
17.00-18.30	Contributed Sessions 2

Thursday, June 11th, 2026

9.30-11.30	Contributed Sessions 3
11.30-12.00	Coffee Break
12.00-13.15	Ca' Foscari University of Venice Lecture - Marciano Siniscalchi
13.15-14.30	Lunch Break
14.30-16.30	Contributed Sessions 4
16.30-17.00	Coffee Break
17.00-18.30	Contributed Sessions 5
20.00	Social Dinner

Friday, June 12th, 2026

9.30-11.30	Contributed Sessions 6
11.30-12.00	Coffee Break
12.00-13.15	Debreu Lecture - Pierre-André Chiappori
13.15-14.30	Lunch Break
14.30-16.30	Contributed Sessions 7
16.30-17.00	Coffee Break

Contributed Sessions: Wednesday, June 10th, 2026

14.30-16.30 Contributed Sessions 1
1A | Networks 1 (Room 10A)
1B | Applied Decision Theory (Room 4A)

17.00-18.30 Contributed Sessions 2
2A | Game Theory 1 (Room 10A)
2B | Decision Theory 1 (Room 4A)

Contributed Sessions: Thursday, June 11th, 2026

9.30-11.30 Contributed Sessions 3
3A | Financial Economics (Room 10A)
3B | Decision Theory 2 (Room 4A)

14.30-16.30 Contributed Sessions 4
4A | General Equilibrium 1 (Room 10A)
4B | Game Theory 2 (Room 4A)

17.00-18.30 Contributed Sessions 5
5A | Behavioral Decision Theory (Room 10A)
5B | Networks 2 (Room 4A)

Contributed Sessions: Friday, June 12th, 2026

9.30-11.30 Contributed Sessions 6
6A | Information Economics (Room 10A)
6B | General Equilibrium 2 (Room 4A)

14.30-16.30 Contributed Sessions 7
7A | Matching (Room 10A)
7B | Applied Game Theory (Room 4A)



A few practical points

~ Presenters are kindly asked to **upload their presentations on the laptop in the room where they are presenting**. Please do not use your own laptop for the presentation.

~ We have a **very tight schedule** thus it is crucial that sessions do not overrun. The allocated time for each paper is 30 minutes (25 minutes for the presentation and 5 minutes for questions). Please keep the assigned presentation order to allow for switching between sessions.

~ We kindly ask the last speaker in a session to **act as chairperson**, monitoring time on behalf of the speakers.

Keynote Lectures

Thursday, June 11th, 2026 – Ca' Foscari University of Venice Lecture

12.00-13.15, Room 4A

Speaker: **Marciano Siniscalchi**, Northwestern University

Structural Forward Induction (joint with Emiliano Catonini)

Abstract:

Structural rationality (Siniscalchi, ECMA 2022) requires players to account for the possibility of future surprises when choosing their current actions. This requirement strengthens the notion of (weak) sequential rationality introduced by Reny (ECMA, 1992). We investigate the implications of structural rationality for both equilibrium and non-equilibrium solution concepts. In particular, we explore the interplay between forward-induction reasoning and structural rationality, provide computationally tractable characterizations of structural rationality under strong belief restrictions (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, JET 2002), and draw a connection with quasi-perfection (Van Damme, IJGT 1984).

Friday, June 12th, 2026 – Debreu Lecture

12.00-13.15, Room 4A

Speaker: **Pierre-André Chiappori**, Columbia University

Is General Equilibrium Theory Empirically Testable?



Contributed Sessions Programme

Wednesday, June 10th, 2026 – Contributed Session 1

14.30-16.30

1A. Networks 1 (Room 10A)

Chair: **Xufeng Wang**

Default Propagation in Financial Networks

Nizar Allouch (University of Kent), Alfred Duncan (University of Kent), Maya Jalloul (University of Lancaster)

Production Networks, Capital Dynamics, and Heterogeneous Agents

Giulio Bottazzi (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna), Daniele Giachini (Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna), Eleonora Priori (Università di Pavia)

Strategic Expression, Popularity Traps, and Welfare in Social Media

Zaruhi Hakobyan (University of Luxembourg), Zafer Kanik (University of Glasgow)

Linkage-Specific Fiscal Policies in Production Networks

Xufeng Wang (KU Leuven)

1B. Applied Decision Theory (Room 4A)

Chair: **Peter Norman Sørensen**

Robust Social Discounting under Expert Disagreement

Philippe Bich (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics), Bach Dong (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

Constructing the Finest Choice-Based Ranking

Susana Furtado (University of Porto), **Anna Rubinchik** (University of Porto)

Information Aggregation in Organizations: An Order-Statistics Approach to Voting Rules

Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University), **Peter Norman Sørensen** (University of Copenhagen)



Wednesday, June 10th, 2026 – Contributed Session 2

17.00-19.00

2A. Game theory 1 (Room 10A)

Chair: **Jingwen Tian**

Overtaking Criteria with Supermodular Payoff Functions

Thai Ha-Huy (University Evry Paris-Saclay)

On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Single-Object Auctions with Multidimensional Types

Pavlo Prokopovych (Kyiv School of Economics), **Nicholas C. Yannelis** (University of Iowa)

The Recommendation Principle in Information Design

Zeky Murra-Anton (ISO New England), **Giacomo Rubbini** (University of Bologna), **Roberto Serrano** (Brown University)

On the Repeated Volunteer's Dilemma with Equal Cost Sharing

Rabah Amir (The University of Iowa), **Huizhong Liu** (Zhongnan University of Economics and Law), **Tatiana Mayskaya** (HSE University), **Jingwen Tian** (Wuhan University)

2B. Decision theory 1 (Room 4A)

Chair: **Bertrand Wigniolle**

On Dynamic Programming under α -MaxMin Preferences

Jean-Pierre Drugeon (PSE-CNRS)

Beyond Revealed Preference Theory: Macro-Rationalization

Davide Carpentiere (University of Catania), **Jean-Paul Doignon** (Université Libre de Bruxelles), **Alfio Giarlotta** (University of Catania), **Stephen Watson** (York University of Toronto)

On Recursive Preferences via Nested Binary Aggregators: Foundations and Properties

Jean-Pierre Drugeon (PSE-CNRS), **Bertrand Wigniolle** (Paris School of Economics, University Paris)



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1 Pantheon-Sorbonne)

Thursday, June 11th, 2026 – Contributed Session 3

9.30-11.30

3A. Financial Economics (Room 10A)

Chair: **Michael Zierhut**

Managerial Delegation under Disagreement: Incentives, Termination, and Collegial Management

Elyes Jouini (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)

A Macro-Finance Model of Credit Spreads

Christopher Hyland (Oxford University), Theofanis Papamichalis (Yale), Nikolaos Romanidis (Natixis Corporate & Investment Banking), **Dimitrios Tsomocos** (University of Oxford)

On Repayment Incentives in Sovereign Debt Markets

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha (Fundação Getulio Vargas), **Yiannis Vailakis** (University of Glasgow)

The Arbitrage Pricing Theory in Incomplete Markets

Michael Zierhut (Kobe University)

3B. Decision Theory 2 (Room 4A)

Chair: **Angelo Enrico Petralia**

On Pure Altruism

Paweł Dziewulski (University of Sussex), Łukasz Woźny (SGH Warsaw School of Economics)

Midpoint and Choquet Pricing

Charles-Thierry Lacaussade (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas), Jean-Philippe Lefort (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL), Frédéric Loss (Université Cergy Paris)

Misspecification Averse Preferences

Alfonso Maselli (University of Pennsylvania)



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Harmful Random Utility Models

Angelo Enrico Petralia (University of Catania)

Thursday, June 11th, 2026 – Contributed Session 4

14.30-16.30

4A. General Equilibrium 1 (Room 10A)

Chair: **Jaime Velasco-Sánchez**

Determinacy among Overlapping Generations with a Large but Finite Number of Differentiated Commodities

Jonathan Burke (Pepperdine University)

Non-discriminatory cores

Carlos Hervés-Beloso (Universidad de Vigo), **Emma Moreno-García** (Universidad de Salamanca)

Market Structure and Underdevelopment Traps: A Further Look at the Big Push Theory

Chiara Pillon (University of Udine), **Simone Tonin** (University of Udine)

Value Allocations and Monopolistic Competition

Marta Faias (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Emma Moreno-García (Universidad de Salamanca), Mário Páscoa (University of Surrey), **Jaime Velasco-Sánchez** (University of Surrey)

4B. Game Theory 2 (Room 4A)

Chair: **Matteo Triossi**

On Cournot's Theory of Oligopoly with Perfect Complements

Rabah Amir (The University of Iowa), Adriana Gama (El Colegio de México)

Cooperation with Endogenous Costs

Andrea Benso (University of Florence), **Alessandro Gioffré** (University of Florence)

Algorithmic Learning in Local and Global Public Goods Games

Jean-Jacques Herings (Tilburg University), Christian Seel (Maastricht University), **Philippos**

Michaelides (Maastricht University)

Expectations, Cores, and Strategy-Proofness under Externalities

María Haydée Fonseca Mairena (Universidad Católica del Maule), **Matteo Triossi** (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)

Thursday, June 11th, 2026 – Contributed Session 5

17.00-18.30

5A. Behavioral Decision Theory (Room 10A)

Chair: **Lukasz Wozny**

Preferences for Information Bias with Anticipated Learning

Raquel Lorenzo (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Paul O. Richter (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Context-based Imitation and the Evolution of Behavioral Rules

Xinyang Wang (ITAM), Enrique Urbano (ITAM)

Loss Aversion or Preference Imprecision? What Drives the WTA-WTP Disparity?

Michał Jakubczyk (SGH Warsaw School of Economics), Michał Lewandowski (SGH Warsaw School of Economics), **Lukasz Wozny** (SGH Warsaw School of Economics)

5B. Networks 2 (Room 4A)

Chair: **Francesco Ciardiello**

Power in Graphs with Classes

Michele Aleandri (Luiss University), **Francesco Ciardiello** (University of Salerno), Andrea Di Liddo (University of Foggia)

Transportation as a Chokepoint: Impact on Trade and Prices

Giulia Brancaccio (New York University), **Myrto Kalouptsi** (Harvard University), Theodore Papageorgiou (Boston College), Yixin Zhou (Harvard University)

Market Power and Network Structure

Luca Scotti (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)

Friday, June 12th, 2026 – Contributed Session 6

9.30-11.30

6A. Information Economics (Room 10A)

Chair: **Sergey Stepanov**

Bot Got your Tongue? Social Learning with Timidity and Noise

John Cremin (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)

Screening in a Priority-Based Assignment Problem

Allen Bueno Magsino (European University Institute)

Selling Supplemental Information

Arlindo Skenderaj (Brown University)

Advising a Decision-Maker with Unknown Preferences

Sergey Stepanov (Higher School of Economics)

6B. General Equilibrium 2 (Room 4A)

Chair: **Ronald Wendner**

Asset Pricing in an Economy with Sentiment Swings and Price Feedback

Yacine Aït-Sahalia (Princeton University and NBER), **Patrick Beissner** (Australian National University), Patrick Cheridito (ETH Zurich), Felix Matthys (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)

Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information and Restricted Participation: The No-Arbitrage Characterization

Lionel de Boisdeffre (University of Paris 1)

Capital Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies: Production Efficiency, Risk, and Bubbles

Nikos Kokonas (University of Bath)



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Optimal Mixed Taxation and Market Power in a Dynamic Economy

Thomas Aronsson (University of Umea), **Ronald Wendner** (University of Graz)

Friday, June 12th, 2026 – Contributed Session 7

14.30-16.30

7A. Matching (Room 10A)

Chair: **Tomoeda Kentaro**

Knowledge Economies

Guilherme Carmona (University of Surrey), Krittanai Laohakunakorn (University of Surrey), Hitoshi Tsujiyama (University of Surrey)

Dummy Agents in Allocation Mechanisms: Is Clearinghouse Manipulation Possible?

Behrang Kamali (Khatam University), Ali Ghajari (Khatam University)

Rationalizable Behavior in Matching with Externalities

Antonio Nicolò (University of Padua), **Pietro Salmaso** (University of Naples Federico II), Riccardo Saulle (University of Padua)

Zoned Out: The Long-Term Consequences of School Choice for Wealth Segregation

Georgy Artemov (University of Melbourne), **Kentaro Tomoeda** (University of Technology Sydney)

7B. Applied Game Theory (Room 4A)

Chair: **Federico Vaccari**

Vocation and Incentives

Marta Faias (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Mercedes Guevara-Velázquez (Universidad de Salamanca), Emma Moreno-García (Universidad de Salamanca)

Waiting for Others: Long Delays in Social Learning

Luis Fronés (Universidad de la República)

Voting over Time and Space



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Gregorio Curello (University of Mannheim), **John Quah** (National University of Singapore), Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

On Negotiating Prices in Standard Setting Organizations

Kyle Dempsey (Ohio State University), David Glancy (Federal Reserve Board), **Federico Vaccari** (Federal Reserve Board)