Agenda

03 Dec 2026 16:00

3) HISTEPS | WG - HISTory of Epistemology and Philosophy of Science Working Group

online

October 2026-April 2027

HISTEPS | WG is jointly coordinated by Dr. Matteo Vagelli at the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and Professor Roberto Gronda at the Department of Civilizations and Forms of Knowledge, University of Pisa.

3 December 2026, 16.00 - 17.30 (CET, Venice Time), online
Niall Roe (University of Cambridge), C.S. Peirce and Reasoning through Experimentation

Abstract:
Charles Peirce claimed that “[r]easoning is strictly experimentation” and vice versa, that “[e]xperimentation is strictly appeal to reason” (CP 6.568, W 6:386, [1890]). In this talk I use Peirce’s discussion of “logical machines” to explore two kinds of reasoning (relational and developmental) and two kinds of experimentation (physical and diagrammatic) to show when one is the same as the other, and why it matters for Peirce’s philosophy of science. I end by briefly relating Peirce’s view to recent discussions in artificial intelligence, philosophy of experimentation, and the self-correcting nature of science. 

“Logical machines” was Peirce’s term for (1) proto-computers that could do basic logical operations, and more broadly for (2) “[a]ny apparatus whatever used for experimentation” (CP 2.59, 1902). In 1887 Peirce argued that such machines reason in what I call the relational sense: they reliably instantiate a logical relation, “the same principle which lies at the foundation of every logical algebra” (Peirce 1887, 168). This is also what separates physical from diagrammatic experimentation. Both explore a relation, but in the algebra the relation is fixed by conventional rules and in the machine by the laws of nature (ibid.). These relations are reliable in part because the systems that instantiate them lack initiative. (Peirce comments that hot air balloons are problematic machines precisely because they appear to have too much initiative – we cannot control them [Peirce 1887, 169].) Logical machines “cannot find [their] own problems,” and so “the whole business of initiative is thrown upon the [experimenter’s] mind; and this is the principal labor” (ibid., 169). Elsewhere, Peirce builds this labour into the definition of reasoning. To reason in this developmental sense is to act purposefully and to be able to learn from the outcome of that action, modifying one’s method in response to its results so as to better achieve one’s end. It is only in this sense that reasoning and experimentation are the same thing. 

All meetings will be held online. To receive the Zoom link, please send a message to matteo.vagelli@unive.it.

Complete programme attached For further information, visit unive.it/sciplu.

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Progetto SCIPLU MSCA2024_0000054 finanziato dall’UE – Next-GenerationEU - PNRR - MISS4 COMP2 INV1.2. CUP: H73C24002000001

Language

The event will be held in English

Organized by

Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali, Progetto SCIPLU, Università di Pisa - Dipartimento di civiltà e forme del sapere, TIPScentre

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