Agenda

20 Mag 2026 12:15

Philippos Louis (University of Cyprus)

Sala Partesotti, San Giobbe Economics Campus + online

 

Philippos Louis (University of Cyprus) - Dynamic (un)structured bargaining in the lab

Abstract:

This study investigates how the structure of a bargaining process may affect its outcomes, its efficiency, and the associated payoff distributions. We rely on a controlled laboratory experiment where two subjects face a finite set of options in the presence of deadlines and bargaining occurs with real-time feedback. We compare three processes that differ in the degree of structure imposed on the bargaining protocol: Unstructured Bargaining, Alternating Offers, and Voting with Alternating Offers and Vetoes. Our main findings reveal the existence of a trade-off in bargaining design: adding structure reduces the likelihood of disagreement but comes at the cost of lower-quality agreements. We also document large differences in the bargaining process itself, including the timing of agreements, the number of proposals, and the strategic use of dominated contracts. These provide insights into the mechanisms explaining the differences in outcomes.

 

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM.

Link Zoom: bit.ly/insem-2425
ID riunione:  880 2639 9452
Passcode: InSem-2425

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (InSeminars)

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