Agenda

01 Apr 2026 12:15

Dimitrios Xefteris (University of Cyprus)

Meeting Room 1, San Giobbe Economics Campus + online

Dimitrios Xefteris (University of Cyprus) - Welfare Theorems for Democratic Politics

Abstract
The efficiency of competitive markets for private goods is formally established by the two welfare theorems. By contrast, democratic collective choice lacks an analogous foundation: applying one-person-one-vote across multiple issues can lead to Pareto-dominated outcomes. We study a general class of voting mechanisms where agents can freely allocate a budget of influence across issues subject to concentration penalties, spanning the extremes of one-vote-per-issue rigidity and frictionless transfer. Square penalties emerge as the unique efficient configuration: they alone ensure Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium outcome for every preference profile (a First Welfare Theorem), and---via an appropriate redistribution of influence---support the implementation of any Pareto-efficient outcome in equilibrium (a Second Welfare Theorem). That is, democracy is not inherently inefficient; it simply requires a quadratic conversion rate between allocated influence and exerted power.

 

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM.

Link Zoom: bit.ly/insem-2425
ID riunione:  880 2639 9452
Passcode: InSem-2425

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (InSeminars)

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