Agenda

Economics Seminars are study seminars held on current research proposals or on studies carried out by eminent international researchers and teachers. They are an opportunity for discussion of new theories, developments, models and debates, focussing on various current economics topics.

Economics Seminars are generally held on Mondays at 12:15 in Meeting Room 1 (Complex A – San Giobbe Economics Campus – map).

Upcoming event:

Antonio Penta (Barcelona School of Economics) - Coordination and Sophistication

Abstract

How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions is a long-standing question in game theory. Without communication and in the absence of focal points, whether coordination can be reached at all is unclear. We show, however, that in a non-equilibrium model in which the level of reasoning responds to incentives, high stakes may induce coordination when the cognitive sophistication of the players is heterogeneous and when this is agreed upon. The equilibrium on which coordination is expected to occur, according to our model, depends on the payoff structure of the game in ways that differ from those implicit in standard solution concepts, or from the implications that one could draw by applying exogenous criteria for the attribution of the strategic advantage. Our model therefore provides a novel mechanism for endogenous coordination and one in which it is differences between players, rather than their similarities, that lead to increased coordination. Using the model as a framework, we conduct an experiment to examine coordination in such a setting.