Agenda

12 Ott 2022 12:15

Roberto Rozzi - The rise of conformism in the Hawk - Dove game (PhD pre-defense)

Meeting Room 1, Campus Economico San Giobbe + Live streaming (ZOOM)

Roberto Rozzi - The rise of conformism in the Hawk-Dove game

Abstract 
I consider a double selection mechanism to study the evolution of two behavioral rules in the Hawk-Dove game: conformism and myopic best reply, the latter paying a cognitive cost for being the most rational. I consider a two-stage game: in the first stage, I compute the stochastically stable distribution of strategies for a fixed population level, and in the second stage, the fittest behavioral rule in the stochastically stable distribution of strategies replicates the most. The process goes on until the two systems reach a stable state. In contrast with previous results in the literature, in the stable composition of the population, conformists always outnumber myopic best repliers. Moreover, in the stable distribution of strategies, the fraction of agents playing Hawk is never the one predicted by the mixed Nash Equilibrium predicted by the standard Hawk-Dove game. In equilibrium, conformists (myopic best repliers) play Hawk or Dove (Dove or Hawk), depending on the harshness of conflict.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM: bit.ly/Internalseminars_RobertoRozzi
Meeting ID: : 852 3024 9590
Passcode: aZYm3b
 

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Dipartimento di Economia (InSeminars)

Link

https://bit.ly/Internalseminars_RobertoRozzi

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