Agenda

09 Ott 2026 12:15

Ben Golub (Northwestern University)

Meeting Room 1, San Giobbe Economics Campus

Ben Golub (Northwestern University) - Coordination under Different Priors: The Power of Confidence and Inattention (with Stephen Morris, MIT)

Abstract:

We study canonical coordination games in which agents respond linearly to an uncertain state and others’ average action. With heterogeneous priors and asymmetric information (in contrast to common priors) information releases change expected behavior. Behavior is anchored at a weighted average of prior means, with greater influence given to confident and poorly informed groups. We discuss a number of applications: In a team production application, when coordination is sufficiently strong, all groups prefer that optimists receive less precise information, strengthening their influence and raising welfare. The influence of various groups depends in rich ways on the clarity of public announcements and the network structure of coordination motives.

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (EcSeminars)

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