PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS

This course provides first-year doctoral students in Management with: (a) a working knowledge about the foundations of the economic approaches to the study of organizations; (b) an introduction to game theory and to contract theory; (c) an exposure to questions and models in organizational economics. The main goal is to make students comfortable with using the language and tools of economic theory for describing or analyzing managerial problems.

The course aims to make students comfortable with using the language and tools of economic theory for describing or analyzing managerial problems.

1. Knowledge and understanding:
1.1. Knowing models for the analysis of issues in organizational economics;
1.2. Knowing how to present and interpret the results produced by these models to answer research questions in management (widely interpreted);
1.3. Knowing the hypotheses at the basis of the models studied during the course and their logical consequences on the conclusions.

2. Applying knowledge and understanding:
2.1. Applying the models studied in the course to answer a research question in management;
2.2. Comparing the results produced by alternative models based on different set of hypotheses and their limitations concerning the research questions at hand;
2.3. Using empirical evidence to assess the plausibility of alternative set of assumptions fed into the models.

3. Evaluation and project skills:
3.1. Designing novel models (or tweaking existing one) to address an economic research question of interest;
3.2. Evaluating the contribution provided by models available in the economic literature to address a research question of interest;
3.3. Thinking about the formulation of models aimed at improving the existing knowledge base or address specific issues.

4. Lifelong learning skills
4.1 Master complex theoretical reasoning;
4.2 Master principles of information economics to guide applications;
4.3 Ability to exploit new tools and adapt them to different contexts.

You are expected to be familiar with microeconomics and game theory at the level of Chapters 6–9 and Appendices A–B in Kandori (2023), Mighty Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press. This is required summer reading.

The course explores the following topics:
- Dominance
- Nash equilibrium
- Mixed strategies
- Subgame perfection
- Repeated games
- Bayesian equilibrium

- Organizational failures
- Knowledge hierarchies
- Knowledge economies
- Cases

Main references:
[EM] A. Espinola-Arredondo and F. Munoz-Garcia (2023), Game Theory: An Introduction with Step-by-Step Examples, Palgrave MacMillan (Chapters 1–8, 10, 13)
[GR] L. Garicano and L. Rayo (2016), “Why organizations fail: Models and cases”, Journal of Economic Literature 54, 137–192.

Sources:
[GA] I.K. Geckil and P.L. Anderson (2010), Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior, CRC Press (Chapters 2–7)
[G] P. Ghemawat (1997), Games Businesses Play: Cases and Models, The MIT Press (Chapters 5–8)
[LL] D.A. Levinthal and G.K. Lee (2023), “Introduction to the Virtual Special Issue: Strategy Science’s Contributions to Doctoral Reading Lists”, Strategy Science 8, 117–119.
[VH] The Visible Hand, podcast, see https://www.thevisiblehand.uk

Additional readings:
The Moodle coursepage makes available readings and accompanying material.

Grading is comparative, and is based on the following deliverables:
25%: class participation;
25%: homework;
25%: one class presentation on a topic agreed in advance with the instructor;
25%: one critical review or one research proposal.

written and oral

The instructor is responsible for ensuring the authenticity and originality of all examinations and coursework. In cases of suspected academic misconduct, an additional on-site assessment may be required during the exams, which may differ from the standard format.

A+ 4,25 A 4,00 A- 3,75 A/B 3,5
B+ 3,25 B 3,00 B- 2,75 B/C 2,5
C+ 2,25 C 2,00 C- 1,75 C/D 1,5

There will be fifteen meetings, arranged as follows: about eight meetings cover game theory, complemented by one meeting about cases; about three meetings cover knowledge hierarchies and knowledge economies, complemented by a general overview of organizational failures; the last two meetings are dedicated to students’ presentations.

The first thirteen meetings follows a mixed-interaction format, to be explained during the first class. Students are expected to read the assigned material in advance and deliver solved exercises or their conceptual map at least 12h before class. During the class, one student is randomly called up to present an excerpt of the work handed in.

For more information and updates, trust only the class Moodle page.

Ca’ Foscari abides by Italian Law (Law 17/1999; Law 170/2010) regarding support services and accommodation available to students with disabilities. This includes students with mobility, visual, hearing and other disabilities (Law 17/1999), and specific learning impairments (Law 170/2010). If you have a disability or impairment that requires accommodations (i.e., alternate testing, readers, note takers or interpreters) please contact the Disability and Accessibility Offices in Student Services: disabilita@unive.it.

This subject deals with topics related to the macro-area "Human capital, health, education" and contributes to the achievement of one or more goals of U. N. Agenda for Sustainable Development